LESSON'S OF THE WAR.

New Zealand Times, Volume LXXVI, Issue 5219, 8 March 1904, Page 4

LESSON'S OF THE WAR.

It may seem early to be garnering the lessons of a 'war that has barely commenced; but, nevertheless, certain facts, and l the inevitable deductions from them, in connection with the Russo-Japaineso campaign, sthnd emt so clearly as to justify Mr Arthur It. Leo, Civil Lord of the Admiralty, in drawdug attention to one point, in a recent speech delivered by him in the House of Commons. Ho stated that tho present ifnfcrtunito position of tho Rust sinn fleet was duo “ less to lack of fighting power than to lack of adequate facilities for sheltering, repairing and protecting warships against torpedoes.” In those, respects, it is clear, the Japanese enjoy a. tremendous advantage over their more powerful antagonists. Air F. J. Norman, writing to. tho London “Spectator” before the outbreak of war, said that tho Russians were “immeasurably inferior to the Japanese in regard to coaling and dockyard facilities and bases of operation,” and the truth of this is shown by tho fact that, within a mftnth after tho commenooment of hostilities, practically the whole Russian fleet has been “bottled up” in Port Arthur, with a number of vessels dianagcd beyond the possibility of repair with tiie. defective appointments available. The first and greatest lessen of tho war is, therefore, not so much tho importance of “ .sea power,” as -measured by tonnage, guns and men, but of sea power as made effective by the possession of docks, coaling facilities, and means of carrying out repairs.

The Russian fleet in Far Eastern waters was as nearly as possible equpl to that of Japan; the Muscovite navy had, in tho words of an impartial authority, “officers and men superior to any tho Japanese can bring forward ”; yet, despite these facts, we. have seen how Japan has conquered all along the line. The extensive seaboard of Japan, and the fact that her seamen are largely recruited from fisher-folk, have doubt- . Jess given her naval forces greater

dash, exportneiss and confidence' than the Russians have displayed. The possession of oxcollcnt naval bases, with dockyards, etc., organised on British lines, lias told heavily in favour of the Mikado's forces. Yokosuka is considered to bo the headquarters of t he Japanese navy, but Kurc, in the Inland Sea, is in no way behind it in importance, for, in addition to superior dockyard accommodation and a. fine ®.vsonal, the harbour there is for naval purposes one of the finest in existence. Sasebo, close to Nagasaki, is magnificentlysituated for commanding the waters lying between Japan and Korea, and no lesis so as a base for extensive operations in the Gulf of Peetiili and the China Sens. In addition to these, Japan has, other ports of great value as coaling stations, harbours of refuge or places of embarkation for troops to the mainland <rf Asia.. As against all these advantage;, Russia has but two imperfectly* equipped l harbours —Port Arthur and Vladivcstock —while for the transport of troops and supplies, her whole reliance has to bo placed upon a single line of railway, with a break at Lake Baikal, and with the overpresent feasibility of the enemy or hostile tribes in Manchuria cutting the lino and delaying the vitally necessary comm.u.viications.

Another lesson of the war that must bo apparent to observers of the course of events is the importance of the national spirit, or patriotism. Wo find thd'"Japanese people united and of one mind, while the Russians are at tho best indifferent, and the country is vexed with internal troubles and dissensions. Tho Finns, who formerly provided tho best material for manning the Russian navy, have been driven to the verge of revolt by the harsh and overbearing, mlo established, in their midst by General Bobrikoff. The Jews throughout the Empire, a solid mass of six millions, are a constant 'source of danger, because of the brutal repressive inea'.niires adopted against them. Again, Russia's policy of continual aggression and intrigue on all lie* borders tends to weaken her in a crisis like tile present; for, oven had she the power to transport sufficient men to Manchuria, it is doubtful whether, in the exist ing state, of elm unrest in the Balkans, she could afford to Withdraw her forces from Europe. In her straits, she is driven, to employ coercion to compel soldiers to go to tho front, she has to force labourers to work at tho point of tho bayonet, aivd she is giving political prisoners a free pardon on condition that they join the army in the Fair East. It is not by means of this kind that a great conflict is to bo won, and' no one will be surprised though the land campaign for which preparations arc in active progress should result as disastrously for Russia as the naval operations have diene. The fall of Port Arthur and evacuation of Vladivostock seem both within measurable distance ; and if the- Japanese army shows equal strategy and activity to that displayed by tho navy, the Russian larpl forces—-the strength of which has been greatly over-rated —may very soon bo driven out of the .country which they now occupy in defiance of international obligations. Russia apparently trusts solely to “the mailed fist” in dealing with tho Manchurians, and tho consequence is that she is creating a strongly hostile feeling among tho populace. Add to this the fact of general unpyeparednoss, and it will be seen that the iosson of “how not to do it” has had powerful exemplification in tho Russian conduct of the campaign. The final outcome of tho war may drive home several other lessons,-but none, it may bo hoped, will bo more forcibly impressed upon men an(d nations than the truth that a cause which rests upon spoliation, deception and bad faith can never prosper.