BRITISH SURRENDERS.

New Zealand Times, Volume LXXI, Issue 4294, 1 March 1901, Page 4

BRITISH SURRENDERS.

Tho nows that large forces 6f llritish soldiers had surrendered to Boer commandants in the height of the Transvaal campaign was wont to fill tho public mind wdth astonishment and regret. Indeed, the various surrenders, were invariably described in the official despatches as “regrettable incidents” ; and as they cam© to bo repeated with alarming rapidity, they came to be regarded as inevitable occurrences, and the natural result of a warfare carried. on against a mobile force, which knew every inch of tho countin', and had no need to trouble itself about maintaining communications. Now that the war is practically over, the British public, through its representatives in the House of Commons, has been forcing the War Office to declare what proceedings it has taken to discover the truth relating, to the numerous surrenders that took place during thei campaign. Mr Brodrick, Secretary of State for War, has just informed 1 Parliament that ninety-nine Courts of Inquiry had been held regarding twenty i such occurrences, and that as a consequence some ten officers had been dismissed or placed c,n half-pay, while others bad boon substantially penalised. It is gratifying to learn that in the cases involving the holding of courtsmartial tho evidence yvill be laid before the public. This is tho proper course to pursue, for in the annals of courts-mar-tial are recorded some of tho bravest acts cf British soldiers. But a review of tho prominent disasters in the war must emphasise the necessity for the most searching inquiry being made, and 1 the blame placed upon those who either from carelessness, or neglect of reasonable precautions, or it may be positive cowardice, wore, responsible! for the frequent spectacles which British soldiers and their leaders presented to tho civilised world. There were eight engagements in which, notwithstanding official concealment and the glozing of tho press censor, it has been ascertained that no fewer than 2800 Britishers laid down their arms to the Boers. These engagements were—Dundee, 331; Nicholson’s Nek (including Farquhar’s Farm), 927; Stormberg, 632; Magersfontein, 108; Colenso, 228;CoIesberg (Suffolk®), 113: Spionkop, 338; and Rensberg, 103. The casualties in these battles approximated the number that surrendered. At Dundee and Nicholson’s Nek, so far as wo know, surrender was inevitable. Then, when the night attack failed at Stormberg, the men, who had been twenty-fonr hours on their legs, fell asleep on the ground, and the wonder is that many more were not captured. The surrenders at Cclpnso, Magersfontein and Colesberg were also at the time inevitable; although the capture of ten guns and two hundred odd men at Colenso Vy, Boers, who had to cross the Tugela to carry off these trophies of the battle, is an enigma of the fighting that still remains unexplained. It is different with Spionkop. Here, it is now admitted, the Britishers were indifferently led. Thci men endured a terrible ordeal; but the British soldier showed' greater bravery and endurance at Waterloo, when tho Inniskillings lost 4.7 S out of 750 men engaged. The surrender of tho Wiltshire® at Rensburg is perhaps tho least dishonourable of the British disasters in South Africa.

On tho other hand, the capture of detachments and convoys is in many instances inexplicable. Indeed, as in the Koorn Spruit affair, when Dc Wet captured ninety waggons of stores and took 426 prisoners, the disaster was manifestly tho result of no scouts having pre'ceded the waggons and the inactivity of the mounted infantry. At Reddersburg there was a shew of resistance, but General Gatacre was too late with his reinforcements, and 400 men. laid down their arms. The sensational surrender of “the pick and flower” of British blood at Bindley is an event that is not likely to be easily disposed of. General Col vile, who declined to go to the aid of the Yeomanry, as he was under orders to be at Heilbron by a certain date, throws the whole blame on bad staff management.” The ‘‘dismissed general, iu his defence, states that, in his opinion, the safety of 4000 Hollanders was of more importance than the safety of 500 Yeomanry, millionaires though some of them were. But they did not, evidently, display much bravery themselves,

for they were escorted north by eight Boers, and made no effort to escape, although British forces wore in tho vicinity. V.'c need not stop to refer to Do Wet's capture of 55 waggons and IGO men at Idhoaostcr: but -it is palpable that ••f.cmF, one blundered'’ there or Do W <■( would not have secured "all the stores that hud been accumulated for Lord Roberts's army.’’ Passing over a scries of similar disasters. Dcwelsdorp and Ncoitgodacht might bo mentioned, where out of some 1100 men engaged over one thousand yielded to the ‘‘Flying Dr.l chin an.’'

Altogether some 202 British officers and 7172 men have laid down their arms to the enemy in the Boor war. Hits in unparalleled in tho history of. British battles. Not to. make thd fullest inquiry into the circumstances would hare been an injustice to the army and i•> the nation. Tho people have a right to know the truth, and ought to bo prepared to accept the verdict that tho British army is not so well officered and manned as it ought tc be. That the first is being proved by the inquiries already made, and that punishment is being administered to several officers, will show to other nations that the British arc not afraid to expose their military shortcomings. Lord Roberts has now the handling of the "War Office, and be is fresh from tho war. Supported by tho nation, ho will have opportunities of instituting those reforms which the Transvaal war has shown to bo necessary, and which must be undertaken if the British army is to re-establish its prestige and honour. Neglect and cowardice hive to bo punished and bravery and endurance adequately rewarded. Justice must he do.no, and evidently the War Office is not now afraid to act.