THE New Zealand Times. (PUBLISHED DAILY.) FRIDAY, JUNE 28, 1895. THE NEW SOUTH WALES DEADLOCK.

New Zealand Times, Volume LVII, Issue 2548, 28 June 1895, Page 2

THE New Zealand Times. (PUBLISHED DAILY.)

FRIDAY, JUNE 28, 1895. THE NEW SOUTH WALES DEADLOCK.

With which are incorporated the Weilir.fptcn Independent, established 1845, ftlld the New Zealander.

It is only in moments of strain that the strength of a structure is properly tested. Such a moment has arrived in New South Wales, where the bicameral system ia now being subjected to a strain which promises to very effectually test the NewSouth Wales constitution. How far the promise will bo realised will appear by-and-bye, but at the very outset some things are becoming quite dear. The Government, which is giving effect by its fiscal proposals to the wishes of the great bulk of the people of the country, having passed those proposals through the Representative Assembly, finds them decisively blocked in the Upper House, The proposals drop a substantial Customs revenue, and make up the difference by direct taxation on land and income. The Revising Chamber is ready to accept the Preetrade part of the scheme, but the direct taxation it has refused as something evil, if not sacrilegious. The Government as a matter of course has to accept battle, and is under the necessity of at all hazards forcing the position of the Council, which is made exceptionally strong by the fact that the majority adverse to the Government is overwhelming. At the outset it is evident that if the number of the Council were fixed by law theposition would beabsolutoly hopeless. It the Council were up to the constitutional limit of number, the majority of that body holding their seats for life would be the perpetual ruler of tho country. Their position could not be assailed in front by any measure proposing to alter their constitution, for they would not allow any such measure to get a footing on their floor. N either could they bo outflanked by a batch of new creations, the manoeuvre the threat of which brought tho House of Lords to its senses in tho matter of the first Reform Bill. Tho Council, with a fixed limit of number, would at tho present moment be the autocratic ruler of Now South Wales with power as absolute as the power of tho white Czar of to-day,or tho Ottoman Sultans in the unquestioning days of their conquering grandeur. Let that point bo duly noted. It applies to every country which is governed under the bicameral system. It reminds us of the great fact that under a system which has no specific remedy against deadlocks in the Legislature, and nothing to aid the ordinary machinery of legislation in effecting constitutional reform, a fixed limit of tho numerical strength of the Upper House transfers all power to that branch of the Legislature. Under such a constitution every proposal to fix the number of members, either to a limit arbitrarily selected or to any fixed proportion of the number of the Representative House, is a crime against the Democracy. It proposes to deprive the Representatives of all real power and to vest it in the hands of a body whose chief function it is to secure deliberation in the popular will and whose privilege it is to help the work of legislation by the superior experience of its members and by deliborationsfreed from the disturbing elementslot party conflict. No true democrat who has over proposed such a fatal step, can have given the subject a moment’s serious consideration. Here it is being industriously repeated that there is a general agreement to the effect that the Upper House membership must be limited to one half the membership of the Representative Chamber. We know of no such general agreement; if there were such an agreement we should not regard it with any respect at all, and certainly not with such respect as is duo to the statute law of the country. Wo know quite well that if the democracy were to admit such an agreement the next step would be to give the agreement statutory strength. The result would be tho elevation of the Legislative Council to autocratic power, and the stultification |of the whole representative system. In times of peace vital truths like this are forgotten, but every acute constitutional crisis rouses the slumbering public mind. The crisis in New South Wales is valuable to the New Zealand Democracy at the present moment. Mr Reid is taking tho right course to deal with the crisis. That demonstrates that the constitution is by no means helpless in the matter. Wo trust the success of the right policy may show before long that the constitution is absolutely masterful, and therefore complete. The right course is to appeal to the people, and get another mandate from them, and to send that mandate up to the Council with everything ready to enforce it by a creation of new members sufficient to carry it to the Statute Boob. It will be found that there will be a general hesitation in the Council to resist n second popular mandate, especially when that disinclination is assisted towards wisdom by the throat of numerical force. In effect tho constitution permits a statesman who, representing the popular will, finds himself at grips with the Upper House, to attack the position of the Council in front with tho battering strength of tho whole people, while at tho same time he turns it with a new creation of councillors. Against such a combined attack no Council could stand; and we think none, however arrogant, ignorant or stupid it might be, would attempt to do so for a moment. In other words our constitution at critical moments throws light on the strength as well as the will of the nation, and by displaying their force ready for organised attack, causes opposition to subside and restores harmony to tho constitutional machine.