THE AIM OF JAPAN

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1716, 18 January 1905, Page 13

THE AIM OF JAPAN

WHAT WILL BE ITS FUTURE POLICY? (By James R. Morse, in “New York Tribune/') To tile "world in general the most startling development of the Manchurian campaign has been the proof which it has furnished of the high efficiency of Japan as a military and naval power. To Germany, Prance and all other nations with Eastern possessions or Oriental ambitions this has been both a surprise and a shock. The chancelleries find themselves called upon to reckon with a new world power and a new factor in the comity of nations. To the commercial world, to those large interests, American and European, which are already heavily engaged in trade with the Orient and are seeking an expansion of that trade, the surprise has been equally great and the future conditions are equally difficult to determine. The question is asked daily in political and commercial circles: “What will be the future policy of Japan?" The answers have been many; but it cannot bo said that some of them have been well informed. We have heard much of the f ‘Yellow Peril/"’ of Japan’s organising the Chinese army on the political side, and on the commercial side of a limitless manufacturing organisation in Japan and China, designed to-utilise cheap labour and flood the world "with its products. Neither of these contingencies is worth discussing, because both are impossible. China as a nation is a great, inert mass of different peoples, speaking two hundred different dialects, devoted, to trade and agriculture, and ignorant and reactionary to the last degree. For Japan to organise it in anyway would be impossible. Up to the Chinese war the Chinese despised the Japanese, In Formosa and generally the latter look upon the Chinese as children. The comparatively small educated class who make up Chinese national opinion are pleased at the prospect of the restoration of Manchuria. Chinese banners usher the Japanese into a conquered tuwn, and the local Chinese express gratitude and joy. But if the war was to end to-morrow, all thought of any joint future policy between China and Japan cn any line, political or commercial, would probably pass from the pubJ:c mind within.the next thirty days. ith regard fo Korea, however, the case is entirely different. Japan has openly guaranteed the independence of Korea and the integrity of Manchuria. During the diplomatic exchanges which preceded the war her policy with regard to Korea underwent so many apparent changes that she seemed to have no polecat all. x\ow the Korean question is an exceedingly important one‘commercially, and ifc seems to have been settled only lately by the agreement of August 22nci, which has just been made public. Under this agreement Korea will Lake no important step, financial, political, or economic, without Japan's consent. In other words, Korea, while maintaining its independent sovereignity, is to be managed by Japan. Korea is an extremely rich country. Its soil is exceedingly fertile; its forests and its mines are valuable. One of the ratter, the Oriental Consolidated, for which was given to me the original concession, ranks high among the gold producers of the world, and there are undoubtedly many others yet undiscovered. The country is almost untouched. Farmed by Japanese fanners, it will support an immense population, produce great wealth and ultimately open a valuable market to the world. The control assumed by Japan is a necessity which could not be escaped. Even a buffer State must, for the protection of its neighbours, have some degree of national solidarity, and this Korea entirely lacks. The King has not been sufficiently in touch with international relations to properly safeguard his realm. He has no organisation to lean upon in the way of cabinet or constitution, his ministers being self-seeking puppets, and his rule entirely arbitrary. The people, given over to brutal taxmasters in all the districts of the country, are extremely ignorant, extremely poor and entirely unequal to any economic development as a nation. The diplomatic control of Japan consequently must be in all ways beneficial. The interesting question to *th© world at large is how far is the world at large to share commercially in the benefits of this development ? The answer to this can be only a statement as to the general future policy of Japan, and this of course can be declared by only the Emperor, The truth is, however, that it lias already been declared in the clearest possible terms, but has been either overlooked or not believed in by many of the statesmen and commercial companies whose interests are directly affected.

In his proclamation of April 21st, 1895, the Emperor said: “We deem it that the development of the prestige of the country can be obtained only by peace. It is our mission, which we inherited from our ancestors, that peace shall be maintained in an effectual way. We desire that, together with our people, we be specially guarded against arrogance or relaxation. We highly object to the people becoming arrogant, through triumph, to their being led to despise others rashly, and thereby lose the respect of foreign powers. Since the development of the nation can be obtained by peace, it is a divine duty imposed upon us by our ancestors, and it has been our intention and our endeavour since our accession, to the throne to maintain peace, so as to enjoy it constantly." This desire for the peaceful development of Japan will bo found to be the dominant note of all public utterances of the Japanese policy. The war with Russia was not entered upon in any selfish spirit. Every effort on the part of Japan was made to avoid it. and It would have been avoided if St. Petersburg had been informed of the facts as Japan declared them and as they truly existed. At the Educational Congress at Tokio,

representing all the schools and colleges of the Empire, a resolution was adopted, saving: We confirm the statement that Japan has not entered upon the present struggle for aggrandisement or conquest, but has been,forced into it for the security of the Empire, for the permanent peace of the East, and for the progress of that beneficient and enlightened civil'eation which Japan herself has imbibed from the nations of the West and has made her own.’’

I know Baron Katsura the Prime Minister, and know what the Emperor’s view is—his own view—not only officially, but personally. In a published interview given to the Rev. IV. Imbrie, Katsura said :

“Should Japan ever become the leader of the Orient, her influence will be exercised to turn her neighbours’ feet into the path she has herself irrevocably chosen—-the path of close community with the Octid nt.”

Noiv, when it is remembered that Japan, already the v’.ecor over China, has guaranteed the integrity of Manchuria as a part of the Chinese Empire, and the independence of Korea, it will be seen that she means what she says, and that her primary aim and desire arc peace and the economic development which can come only through peace. The evidences of tills are many.

During the past twenty years she has not only been studying the art of war, but the arts of xieace as well. She has studied the la'ctcr as ardently as the former, and if her development lias not been so rapid along economic lines, this is because the pressure of necessity has been less. She is building her own railroads, and equipping them completely. She is budding her own factories upon the best modern lines. She is developing her agriculture by all possible favouring legislation in that direction —has a state experimental farm and nine branch farms for the improvement in the quality and the quantity of crops, the more careful selection of seeds and the breeding of fine stock. Irrigation, forestry, drainage, the formation of farmers’ guilds, the extension of the farming industry through products which enrich other countries and can be produced in Japan, have been and are being pushed almost as actively as the building of warships or the equipment of troops. Twenty years ago her banking was entirely in the hands of foreign bankers, of whom only three now remain. The Yokohama Specie Bank was founded, and since then, using the best financial experience of the world-as a basis, she has developed as rapidly in finance as she has along all other fines. It may be taken as an undoubted fact, therefore, that despite her brilliant successes in war, her fundamental policy is peace. Her future commercial policy is still undeclared, however, and some facts in this regard may be of pertinent interest. Baron Kaneko Kentara, who is now in America as the Emperor’s special commissioner, I Know well. His views are those of the Japanese financiers. They were expressed in a public interview', in W'hich he said: “Japan must be the big salesman and the middleman for a trade the limits of which cannot at present be appreciated by Americans. They will learn more of its possibilities before the present war is ended, and when it is ended, whether to Japan’s advantage or disadvantage, there will be a rush of commerce to the Ear East unprecedented in the history of the trade of the world. And America, which is to have the lion’s share of that trade, cannot handle it to advantage without Japanese assistance/’ Anyone interested in the future policy of Japan cannot study these statements too closely. They show a policy which in itself is the best guarantee of peace. As far as America obtaining the lion’s share of this trade is concerned, it is naturally favoured in two important respects—cotton and petroleum—and thebe markets cannot be taken from it. Its exports to Japan, before they were disturbed by the war, had risen from three millions in 1890 to tiventy-three millions in 1903. During the same period Great Britain’s exports to Japan rose from thirteen millions to twenty-four millions. Germany, however, by her active commercial policy, has made a rapid advance, and in 1903 exported to Japan twelve millions.

Moreover, I know, from recent correspondence with Tokio on the subject, that the policy outlined by Baron Kaneko is being actively followed. Japan is not a rich country. The burden of the present war is a heavy one. If Russia, aware of this, prolongs it as a financial as well as a military duel, the burden will be still greater. Should Japan win, and should she, by the capture of Vladivostcck and the seizure of Saghalin Island, place herself in a position to demand an indemnity, that indemnity will bo absorbed along national lines in repaying the indebtedness due to the war and in expenditure ou the army and navy. It will play little or no part in economic development. She is going to need a great deal of foreign capital. It is not alone true, as Baron Kaneko said, that America cannot handle the new trade without Japan's assistance; it is still more true that Japan cannot handle it to her own ends without the aid of foreign capital, and a great deal of foreign capital. Her attitude towaras the foreign capitalists is of importance, and I have had some correspondence lately with the nephew of Baron Slhibusawa in this regard. Baron Shibusawa is the organiser of Japan’s financial system, the president of the First National Bank and Chamber of Commerce of Tokio and of several railway companies. I wrote to the Baron that American capital wonld want not only a proper interest for its money but a fair share in the profits of the enterprises developed. This is trde of not only American capital but of English, German, and of all investors. I have reason to know that this fact is fully recognised, and that its recognition will appear in the terms on which foreign capital is borrowed. Japan, commercially speaking, is no longer to be judged by the standard of the former open-port native merchant. A better class of men have come to the front, and the value of a high and unimpeachable credit is understood. This lesson the elementary rule ol business,

Baron •Shibusawa well understands, and it will be impressed and enforced by the government as definitely as any fundamental principle of agriculture or manufactures. Foreign capital will b 8 invited to invest, and the guarantees and profits will be all that can reasonably be desired. The money will come from all the world’s exchanges; Japan will get it on the best terms available. For a year after the war the country will be comparatively inert, as is usual in such cases. But Korea and Japan are to be developed by foreign capital, and the trade expansion will be rapid and great. Concerning Manchuria, with its enormous commercial possibilities, nothing can derin tely be said. Without the slightest knowledge of Japan’s intentions, my opinion is, that in the event of hex victory she will hold Port Arthur and possibly ivew-Chv/ang. The rest of Manchuria will revert to Chinese rule, and the old method* will be resumed. The change, however, will be -distinctly beneficial to foreign trade. Since the war America’s trade with China, which had languished for three years, has increased largely. This increase will augment in ratio after the war. The Russian policy has been, if natural, extremely selfish. A sustained and consistent effort has been manifest to exploit Manchuria for themselves. They have not only' developed Pore Dalny as part of an immense commercial scheme, bxxt- have built flour-mills rapidly and extensively, and tried by every means to shut out the foreign merchant, notably in their endeavour to control the junk-carrying trade at NewChwang and. keep ail foreign goods out of the country. Under Chinese rule we shall be assured of an open market in Manchuria, which means much to the world’s trade. The farms and fisheries of Korea will be developed by l, Japan alone, but the railways, factories and all commercial enterprises of both Japan and Korea will be established to a great extent with iore gn money, and in the profits the foreign investor will share.