LIFE, ART AND SCIENCE

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1696, 31 August 1904, Page 21

LIFE, ART AND SCIENCE

A QUESTION IN EVOLUTION. “Essays on Life-; Art and Science,” by ' Samuel-Butler. Edited by R. A.* Krroatfeild. Grant Richards, London ] Gordon and Gotch. 'Wellington These admirable essays require no apology for being placed before the public. Samuel Butler was a man ol rare versatility and genius. His interests were many and varied, and lus literary style has commended itseif to all cultured people. Ho will best be known to posterity, as he is to the present* generation of reading meii and women, by Ins works, “arewhon * an<i • “Erewhon Revisited.” But these essays must take rank among the nest efforts of their kind, that have been written within the last quarter of a centurv, and will add lustre to tho fair name of their author. They are all unquestionably of rare merit, but n wo wore to select any one m preierenc© to tho others, it would bo that wlncu follows “Thought and Language,” and entitled “The Deadlock in Darwinism.” Under “The Deadlock” there are virtually three essays, and they may be regarded as a postcript to Butler’s four hooka on Evolution, namely, “Life and Habit/’ “Evolution Old and New.” “Unconscious Memory” and “Luck or Cunning.” How far the problem* embodied in these essays is from a solution.. was shown by correspondence which appeared in the “London limes" of last year, which brought forth some remarks by Lord Kelvin at the university College, when he proposed a vote of thanks to Professor Kendow for his letter on “Present Day Rationalism.” Mr Streatfeild points out that Lord Kelvin's claim for recognition of the fact that “in organic nature scientific thought is compelled to accept, the idea of some kind of directive power, and his statement that biolog ists are coming once more to a firm acceptance of a vital principle, drew from several distinguished men of science retorts heated enough to r rove beyond a doubt that the gulf between the two main divisions of evolutionists is as wide to-day as it was when Butler wrote.” All evolutionists agree that the differences between species are caused 'by the accumulation and transmissions of variations, but they do not agree as to the causes to which variations are duo. It may ho noted that the view lieid by Bulfon, Erasmus D'ar win, and Lamarck, who have been followed by many modern thinkers, including Herbert Spencer, and Butler, is that the variations occur mainly as the result of -effort and design. On the other hand, the opposite view, which is that advocated by Alfred Russel Wallace in “Darwinism,” is that the % variations occur merely as the result of chance. The former recognises the presence in organic nature of de- • sign, whether it be called creative power or vital principle. The latter view, ill which the existence of design is absolutely negatived, is now usually described as Weismannism, from the name of the writer who has been its principal advocate in more recent years. Butler in his essay contends that as early as 1756, Buff on discovered that “the movement of nature turned on two immovable pivots, one the illimitable lecundity, which he has given to all species, the other the innumerable difficulties which reduce the results of that fecundity.” Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck followed in the same sense. Thus they admit the survival of the fittest as fully as Mr Darwin himself, though they do not make use of tliis particular expression. The dispute, therefore, turns not upon natural selection, which is. common to all readers on evolution, but upon the nature and causes of the variations that are supposed to be selected and thus accumulated; The question for scientists, Butler points out, is, are these variations mainly attributable 4 o the inherited effects of use and disuse supplemented by occasional sports and happy accidents? or, are they due to sports and happy accidents supplemented by occasional inherited effects of use and disuse? Butler declares that nature cannot take what is not offered to her and it is plain that what nature can he supposed able to do, by way of choice, must depend on the supply " of the variations, from which she is supposed to choose. He argues and reasons with logical sequence and with a convincing force that is not deniable. The question which makes the difference between the Darwinism of Erasmus Darwin and the Darwinism of his grandson > Charles, is not a personal one, nor anything like a personal one. it envoi ones the existence of evoltsti'Qst, and

it affects the view, says Butler, we take of life and things in an endless variety of most interesting and important ways. It is imperative that those who take any interest in these matters should place side by side, in the clearest contrast, the views of those who refer the evolution of species mainly to accumulation of variations without any other inception of chance and that older school, which makes design perceive and develop still further the ' goods that chance provides. “The older view gives us our design, and gives us evolution also ; the more recent view supplies a quasi anthropomorphic God modelling species and variations as a potter models clay, it N gives us God as vivifying and indwelling in all his creatures. He in them and they in Him. If it refuses to see God outside the universe, it equally refuses to see any part of the universe as outside God. If it makes tho universe the body of Gcd, it also makes God the soul of the universe.”

In his essay on ‘Thought* and Language,” our author contends that it does not prove a lack of intelligence, or a want of thought in the minds of lower animals, in that they are not able to express themselves in articulate .speech. The way in which he supports this contention is perhaps one of the finest intellectual efforts in the book. YVo would like to follqw liH’ argument for the benefit of students, and to show to our readers how effectually our author has dealt with the subject that lias puzzled and is still commanding the attention of the greatest minds tho world knows; but tho limits of our space forbid that we should further pursue this subject. We can, however, commend this volume of essays on “Life, Art and Science,” to all thoughtful people. One "Word as to its publication: it is a pity it has not been presented to tho public in such a binding as the merits or the book ought to have suggested to editor and publisher.