RUSSIA AND JAPAN.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1686, 22 June 1904, Page 18

RUSSIA AND JAPAN.

AN INTERESTING REVIEW.

The “"Quarterly Review” contains a remarkable article on the history of Russo-Japanese relations. It will attract attention not only for the freshness and detachment from tradition with Avfiicli it surveys the record of Russia's expansion in the Far East, but for the additional light which it throws upon the incidents and negotiations proceeding the present war. In his preliminary survey of the entire question, the reviewer insists upon two points. One is the opportunist, almost hand-to mouth manner in which Russia's expansion eastward was effected. The other is that Russia, so far from exhibiting that extraordinary and remorseless diplomatic skill with which Englishmen are apt to credit her, is as prone to foolish mistakes as any other Power. “Discordant counsels in high places’' are often responsible lor weakness, and an • interesting picture is drawn of the conflict between the Russian factions at the time Port Arthur was acquired. It will surprise many persons to learn that M. Lessar himself was a consistent advocate of evacuation. In proportion as one or other of these parties gained the upper hand or seemed to be justified by the course of events, the decision of the Czar oscillated between their two policies; and the oscillation was rendered all the easier by the masquerade of evacuation in which the schemes of annexation were decked out. Similar phenomena have been observed in countries less ‘‘autocratic” than Russia, but it is precisely because Russia is ‘‘autocratic” that she is so amenable to the distracting influences of conflicting counsels, which in other countries are kept separate by party classifications and constitutional safeguards. The reviewer makes short work of the story that Russia proposed to Japan a treaty of alliance against Great Britain, and then goes on to show that the AngloJapanese treaty had its genesis in no less a document than the Anglo-German Agreement of October, 1900. Article 111. of the. Agreement provided that in case of another Power unduly obtaining advantages in China calculated to impair her undiminished territorial condition, the two contracting Powers “ reserve to themselves to corne to a preliminary understanding as to the eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own interests in China.” All the Powers were given an opportunity to accept the position of signatories to this Agreement. Japan was the only one to do so. Accordingly, when Germany refused to recognise its application to Manchuria, the Agreement, so far as that incidence of it was concerned, became one between England and Japan. In April, 1901, Japan opened negotiations with Lord Lansdowne for the purpose of arriving at the understanding envisaged by the Agreement, and in the following January the AngloJapanese Treaty was signed. The Treaty was a blow to the prestige of the Annexationist party in Russia. The .party in favour of withdrawal secured the upper hand, and a treaty providing for the Russian evacuation of Manchuria was concluded with China and partly carried out. Then the Annexationists recovered their ascendancy. It was thought that England would not fight, and that Japan could not. The process of evacuation was stayed. Japan’s polite invitation to resume negotiations on the Manchurian and Korean questions was regarded, not as the last effort to avert Avar, but as a confession of Aveakness, Admiral Alexieff Avas created Viceroy in the Far East. M. Bezobrazoff, assisted by an advisory committee, Avas given control of the Far Eastern question. M. De Witte, an uncompromising opponent of annexation, Avas relieved of his portfolio. Mukden was re-occupied. ‘‘This,” says the reviewer, after summing up the ‘‘hideous miscalculation” of Russia’s diplomacy “slioavs what the statesmen of the Neva thought of the peril that Avas hanging over them.” The first' account in anything like detail of the negotiations Avliicli preceded the outbreak of hostilities is then given. Japan submitted a draft treaty, actually drawn up in consultation with the Russian Minister at Tokio, Avhich consisted of six articles, and Avas to the folloAring effect:

1. Independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea to be mutually respected, and the principle of the open door in both countries to be preserved. 2. Japan’s preponderating interests in Korea and the interests accruing to Russia through her railway in Manchuria to be recognised, both Powers being at liberty to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of their interests subject to Article I. 3. Subject to Article 1., both Powers to bo at liberty to promote the development of their industrial and commercial activities in their respective spheres of influence without interference from the other." Russia also to bind herself not to oppose the eventual connection of the

Korean and Manchurian railway systems. 4. In the event of either PoAver finding it necessary to take military measures for the protection of her .interests as set forth in Article 11., or for ensuring order in her sphere of interest, only a sufficient force for the purpose to be sent, such force to be recalled as soon as its mission is accomplished. 5. Russia to recognise the exclusive right of Jajian to givo advice and assistance to Korea, including military assistance, for the promotion of reform and good government. 6. AH previous agreements respecting Korea to be abrogated.

This scheme placed Manchuria and Korea on approximately the same basis. It assimilated the position of Russia in the one country and Japan in the other. But Russia believed that Japan Avas bluffing, and would insist upon nothing. Counter proposals Avere made of an unjust and extravagant character. The treaty was practically limited to Korea. Japan Avas placed under restrictions in that country Avliile Russia aauis gtien a fiee hand in Manchuria. There was to be no open door and no connection of the Korean and Manchurian railway systems, Avhiio Russia “made three further and uncompensated demands stipulating (1) for no fortifications on the Straits; (2) a neutral zone exclusively Korean; and (3) the abandonment by Japan of all political interests in Manchuria.''

For an account of the negotiations which followed the reader must turn to the article itself. Russia's blindness in believing that Japan was not in earnest, and her folly in declaring mat she Avould come to no terms in respect of Manchuria are clearly set forth. In the folloAvmg passage the reviewer confirms the exclusive account which the “Daily Graphic” Avas able to give of the communication to Japan of Russia's decision regarding Manchuria in the last days of January:— She (that is, Russia) still, hoAvever, had a lingering belief in tne braggadocio of the Japanese, for it was almost inconceriable to Her that any Asiatic State in its senses would dare to defy her—especially after Bla go vestch en s k—and she imagined that she might yet buy off tne Mikado’s Ministers by further concessions on minor points, accompanied by a i.tt.Jc wholesome intimidation. r J.ne consequence Avas that she delayed tier reply to the last Japanese proposals, the while she hurried men and ships to Eastern Asia. M. Kurino was, HoAvever, not unnaturally pertinacious. On January 26m, at his Aveekly ambience of the Czar, Count Lamsdorff Avas told that it had been finally resolved by the Ear Eastern Committee not to yield on the Manchurian question, but to make substantial concessions to Japan on other points. The following day M. Kurino met M. Bezobrazolf, and casually learnt from him the decision that had been arrived at. From that moment the die Avas. cast. The article is by far the most important contribution that has yet appeared to me history of the origins of the Russo-Japan-ese W ar.