RUSSIA, JAPAN AND CHINA.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1675, 6 April 1904, Page 54

RUSSIA, JAPAN AND CHINA.

A ■ ""■ 4 am » lI.— THE RUSSIANS IN THE FAR . EAST. 1 By JOHN FOSTER FRASER (Author of “ The Real Siberia,” efco.) [All Rights Reserved.] It is perfectly natural that the sympathies of the British people should be with the Japanese nation in the war which they may wage with Russia. Whatever we may say from an aesthetic point of view about the Japanese forsaking their individuality, casting aside their picturesque traditions, and suddenly taking to the imitation of Western ways, we most admire the pluck and indomitable energy with which, in a generation, they have changed from a peep-show race to. a -strong Power to be reckoned with in the government of the world. On the other hand, it is also natural that Ate should have little sympathy, as a nation, with Russia, because, in the struggle for authority over the semicivilised people of the East, our interests have frequently come in conflict, and we have by no means always got the best of it. We have a prejudice against Russia., socially, politically aud territorially. Inclined to democracy ourselves, we imagine that autocracy' is degrading in these latter times, and we jump to hasty conclusions about the iron heel of autocracy crushing the aspirations of a people, very much as the average American believes the average Briton is something not far removed from a serf, because ve have a monarch at the head of the State. A NATIONAL ANTIPATHY.

We have shown a ready disposition to swallow most of the dramatic stories that are occasionally served up to us about horrible cruelties perpetrated in Siberia by Russian officials on the poor men who corue within their grasp. The stories may be true, or they may not. My point is that anything that tells against Russia ve accept as greedily as oui' Teutonic friends accepted, during the South African war, all the cock-and-[build atrocity-stories that were manufactured against our soldiery. Within the' memory of man, Russia has, as much as any other Power, extended the boundaries of her Empire. She ha,s not ahvays dc.no it straightforwardly. There has been time-serving, bribery, as w r ell as chicanery ancl de- - liber ate lying. A R ussian promise is considered not vortii' the paper it is written on. We. of course, view Russian diplomacy from an English standpoint., forgetting that the Russian is largely Eastern in his composition, that he has had to deal with Eastern peoples., and that in the East lying is regarded as perfectly justifiable in diplomacy. Any way, by one' means or another, Russia, has conie into possession of vast, tracts of country, partly because she lias the ambition of most nations to have a mighty Empire, but chiefly because of a desire to reach Eastern waters, where; ■ all tlia year round she may have ports, instead of being oraniped to the one harbour of Vladivostock, which is frozen up for several months cf the winter. If rve look at the matter fair-mindedly, avo avill appreciate the irritation Avhich must have long been in the mind of the governing poAvers in Russia at having practically no outlets to the sea in the East., Some folk have dubbed me a pro-Rus-sian. I Avofuld be. very sorry to take that title to myself. I haA r e Avritten many severe things against Russia, and no copy of my hook “The Real Siberia” enters the land of the Czar Avithout first of all having a number of pages Blac'ked out by the Censor. But. Avliile '“' one may resent this smothering of criticism, I hope I am clear-visioned enough to understand the good tilings Russia is doing and has accomplished. AN UNBIASSED OPINION. And here, bearing on the present dispute, is an interesting fact: Few people who knoAV Russia and the Russians fail in the end to admire them; and feiv people who know Japan and the Japanese fail in the end to dislike them. I have rarely met a business man avlio has intimate commercial relationship with the East Avho does not speak disparagingly of the. tactics of the Japanese in trade Avhilst their neighbours, the muchabused Chinese, are declared to he among the most honest-dealing merchants to he encountered. THE CAUSE OF CONFLICT. If you regard dispassionately the grave issues at stake, you will see that both nations have a good deal of right in their case. v The Japanese have a rapidly increasing population. The time has come when there must' he an outlet in colonisation. The groat western Poivers, ourselves among them, have already gobbled up a good deal of the earth’s surface, japan, full >of ambition and hope for her future, has naturally been troubled in her soul that semi-civilised countries, adjacent to her own. country, and suitable for 'her emigrated people. a:<t likely to foe closed against her. The issue vc her da really one of life or death. If she cannot expand,then heir desire to become the strong Power of Eastern Waters is crippled at the outset. Accnrnino-H

she has looked not only Avith envious, but with resentful, eyes, upon the occupation of Manchuria and the ultimate annexation of Korea by tire Russians. Russia did her a bad turn at the conclusion of the Chino-Japanese war by refusing her the full fruits of her victory. She knows quite well-that it is Russia’s policy to hamper and to prevent her becoming the PoAver toward, which she is striving. But also there is Russia’s point of vie'AV. She has Siberia —a country not unlike Canada, and which, were it inhabited by a capable agricultural population, would soon become a great food producing tract. That portion of Siberia which butts on the Pacific, is, for nearly half the year, ice-bound. And it is impossible for any country to prosper in trade Avlien for half a year it is closed to the outer world. To OAvn Manchuria and Korea Avould grie her a warm Aviater outlet, providing harbours not only for an all-the-year-round commerce, but also stations for her fleet in the event of Eastern hostilities. If you argue from the standpoint that it .is" wrong for any great Power to annex semi-cm'lise d and compa rat riel y unproductive countries, there is not a Avoid to bo said in defence of Russia having seized Manchuria and proposing to seize Korea. Unfortunately, it is impossible to A'iev the Avovld from this high moral standpoint. We have ourselves taken possession of much of the uncivilised Avorld. When, lioAveA’or, you regard the matter in a broad spirit it cannot bo denied that those places’ where Ave have planted our flag and set up our rule —'have not benefited a<s a result. Russian rule is, cf course, not English rule. But, admitting all this, nobody avlio lias come in contact AA'ith what Russia is accomplishing in her tranls-Caspian provinces, and in Manchuria, can ignore the undoubted fact .that both thetse countries have benefited materially as a consequence. THE STATE OF MANCHURIA. I don’t know anybody, outside Downing street. avlio has ever believed in the long-promised eAWCuation of Manchuria by Russia any more than anyone -believed in the evacuation of Egypt by Britain. Ten years ago Manchuria Avas little other than a Avaste. inhabited by dirty hordes of Manchus living in a constant state of terror of being raided and their crops destroyed by the Chungcliua—predatory bands of robbers —to suppress aa'lucli ay as Russia's first reason for occupying Manchuria. What is Manchuria to-day? Port Arthur has become a great and important naval station- Not far atvay is Tal-ien-wan, or Dalny as the Russians call it, a city of mushroom growth, but already with wide thoroughfares, huge commercial houses, bfinks, churches and the prospect of becoming another Shanghai. Every Aveek many steamers go there and! merchandise of all sorts is poured into the interior. A railway line stretches northwards past Mukden, to Harping, which is the junction of the line from Vladivostock and then aAvay in a nonth-westerly direction the railway runs to near Tsitsikar, over the Hingan mountains to Hilar, in Mongolia and so till it. meets the great trans-Siberian line in trans-Baikalia. not far from Chita. THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY. I have been across that line. _ One cannot become enthusiastic "about it, in an engineering sense. Most of it is nothing more than a construction line, wobbly and uneven, alongside Avhiqh a permanent Ava.y is being built. Millions of money have been spent not only on the construction of the line—primarily intended for the conveyance of troops — but on the construction of toAvns and villages. Thousands of Russian immigrants pour into Manchuria every month, and although many of them are adventurers seeking for gold, the parallel that came into my mind Avas certain stretches of Western America in Avhich there is a boom, anc! toward Avhich people a'nd money flow without stint. Ten years age there Avas not a single Russian at Harping. If you go there today you Avill find a large, flourishing town cf 40,000 Russian inhabitants. AM along the. line villages, are springing! into, existence, ancl a hustling trade is in progress. As I have said, Russian Avays are not our Avays. Yet no impartial observer can go through Manchuria without realising—hoAvever much you criticise the occupancy of the land by Russia from high moral ethics —that Manchuria is having a commercial future opened up to it-, which it avoulcl not have had AA'ero the country left to the Manchus. : I don’t say that Manchuria Avould not have been better .and the general Avorld reap more advantage in trade and Japan become the occupant. Biut that is a point on AA’hich the Russians have, naturally, divergent views from the rest of the Avorld'd / IH —THE JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN ' NAVIES :' A CONTRAST'. By ERNEST YOUNG (Author of “The Kingdom, of the YelloAv or Robe,” etc.) There seems to be very little doubt ?n the minds of naval experts and in those of. men who have made a close study of the problems that are disturbing the Far East that as far as the naval strengths of Russia and Japan are concerned the suHP.i'ini'itvo- in. alnio&t-. all resueets re*!- 3

Avitln the Asiatic l Power. It is true that for the last few years Russia has been preparing with feverish haste and lavish expenditure for a struggle in the northern Pacific. But although she has thus concentrated her attention upon this distant part of the globe, she is to all intents and purposes the loser in the race. To gain her end she has resigned herself to a complete sacrifice of her positioii as a maritime Power in Europe. Her fleet in the Baltic Sea has been reduced to the minimum necessary for purely defensive purposes. .In these waters, it is more than probable that the fleets of even Norway and Sweden Avould hold her at bay, Avhile she Avould he utterly overwhelmed by the naval forces of Germany. In the Black Sea also she lias stayed he natural expansion of her fleet, and lias been content Avitli merely strengthening a few points in her armour, Avlien one might have expected that oAving to tlie complex character of politics in the Near East she Avould have wished to gather together a powerful and imposing lorcer It is not that her activities in the direction of preparation for naval warfare have ceased, but only that thfese activities have been directed in other channels. For several years she lias been spending huge sums of money, and her dockyards have been ringing with the sounds of continuous labour as one great A' esse 1 after another has been launched, for the Eastern conflict, Avhich she knows must te. termine her fate in northern Asia. it is not merely Japan that she has to iear. but unless slie guides her footsteps with more honesty in the' future than in the past, she may find herself in conflict both Avith England and tlie United States. And so it lias come to pass that tlie biggest of her battleships, the best of' her armoured cruisers and the newest of ner gunboats have been despatched to tlie Yellow Sea. NO RUSSIAN NAVAL RESERVES. All this has a A r ery material aurl important, bearing upon the . question, noiv under our consideration, because it means that Russia lias, practically no reserves. Her Baltic fleet is not- Avorth consideration as far as this matter is concerned, and the-Black Sea portion of her navy is, under existing treaties, confined to its inland waters. Without the permission of otheir great Powers there it must remain, and it is extremely probable that those Powers who are most affected by. the expansion of the Russian Empire would refuse to alloiv these vessels to pass through the Dardanelles. The Russians are building reserves, and every, moment of delay adds to her strength. But great- ships are not built in. a day, and. even if thev Avere, Japan is 1 in a position to out-distance her rival in any competition-of this character. There is one element in the discussion which lies been frequently overlooked, and that is the question of finance. It is general knowledge that Russia is heavily burdened with taxes, and deeply impoverished. But it should not be forgotten that the Japanese finances are also in a somewhat precarious position, and that should the contest between the two Powers be a prolonged one. Japan, unless aided by some friendly State, will probably feel the pinch of poverty to a greater degree even than her enemy. Accounts of the relative naval strengths of the two countries vary to some extent. The exact naval strength of Japan is knoAvn Avith fair accuracy, but that of Russia is not knoAvn Avitli the same degree of exactitude, partly owing to misleading news from St. Petersburg as to the Avhereabouts of some cf the larger vessels. For instance on January Bth a telegram Avas issued from St. Petersburg stating that the battleship Oslabiya, Avas at, Vladivostock. Only a month before she Avas stated to be at Spezzia undergoing necessary repairs. SOME FIGURES AND A COMPARISON. Let us first attempt, some' comparison betAveen the two fleets, based solely on statistics referring to the numbers and speeds of the vessels possessed by the two antagonists. We shall then be able to show how other considerations, not of a numerical character, affect this statistical comparison.

Of battleships, Russia lias nine, and Japan six. Of armoured cruisers, Russia has ten and Japan eight. Of cruisers Russia has eight, aud Japan has sixteen. These sixteen Japanese cruisers are all boats of the first-class. She has in addition a number of smaller cruisers, but they are not sufficiently speedy or poiverful to lie taken into account in the initial stages of a campaign, •though in the event of an early victory over Russia, they Avould doubtless be of considerable utility at a later period. Russia claims to have twenty*seven destroyers and torpedo boats. To meet these Japan lias twentv-four gunboats and destroyers, thirty-eight first-class torpedo boats, and thirty-nine second-class torpedo boats. Viewed, then, solely as a question of numbers, Russia has a slight advantage in the number of battleships and armoured cruisers, but in all the other divisions she is hopelessly outnumbered.

If av© noAv turn our attention to the allimportant question of speed, there: is no very marked difference between .the two fleets. The vessels of any one class belonging to Russia have usually the same speed as the vessels of the corresponding class belonging to Japan. Russia’s fastest battleship, hoAvever, can travel at nineteen knots, Avhil-e Japan’s fastest battleship has a speed of twenty knots. Russia’s fastest armoured cruiser, on the other hand can steam twenty-four knots to Japan’s tAventy-tliree. There is also about one knot to the adA-antage of Russia in -the matter of the fastest cruiser. Guns and men have their part to id ay as well a,s ships. The following table may miove of interest:—•

Destroyers, etc. 27 Destroyers etc. 101 Such are tlie figures, but it would be uuAvise to take them as they stand as a complete statement of the positions of the fcwn narties.

THE ADVANTAGE WITH JAPAN. We have to remember that nearly all Japan’s biggest battleships and armoured cruisers are of the very latest type, and that they have nearly all been built in the best ship-building yards of Britain. They bear considerable resemblance to the corresponding vessels in the Brit--ish Navy, but they differ in one important respect. Our ships are often destined for service in far aivay lands and their capacity for storing coal must be very considerable. Japan’s boats on the other hand are designed for use at home and they have consequently a much smaller coal capacity. This lias enabled, them to protect their boats Avitli a much heaA rier armour without reducing their speed. Then again Avith regard to the guns. Were a comparison to be made betAveen. tbe actual mimber of the guns of each pattern on board each ship in the two fleets, it Avould be at once apparent that in the RussiannnaryA r y there are many more varieties of pattern than there are in the Japanese navy. Presumably some of the Russian guns are old ones, and eA'en if they are neAV, there is a distinct adA'antage to the fleet that possesses the greater uniformity of type in the matter of its offensrie equipment, provided that this type is as in the case of Japan, the best obtainable, But Avar, Avlietlier on land or sea, is not entirely a matter of offensive tactics. There is the question of harbours and docks, and of the poAver to repair rapidly any damage caused either by the guns of your opponent or bv the breakdoAvn ot your machinery. Now, Russia has practically only one base of operations, viz., at Port Arthur. Vladivostock need not be taken into account, for during tlie winter it is completely icebound. Port Arthur could in a fe\v more years have been fully equipped for the rapid and effectrie repair of ships and guns of all classes in time of Avar, but at the present time any A'ery great demand upon its limited resources Avould result in complete confusion. The Japanese, however, being at home, liaA’e an abundance of well-stocked coaling stations, Avell defended, almost impregnable harbours, and docks equipped Avitli all the best machinery that money can buy or science devise.

Let us not forget also on the Japanese side of the account to take into consideration her recent experiences in maritime Avarfare. Her sailors have already been under fire. They are men of courage, of neiwe, and of great strength. eA r en if of small stature. Above all, they are men who have but lately avou signal victories in these very waters. They will fight therefore Avith a courage born of patriotism, and with a confidence engendered bv success. -

Look at the matter which way you will, Japan’s superiority at the present time is not a mere paper one measured by so many figures. Russia’s superiority in battleships is more than compensated for by Japan’s superiority in the lighter and more active cruiser, for there are many services in war for Avhich the cruiser is much better fitted than the stately, costly, and slower battleship.

Russia. Japan. Battleships 9 Battleships 6 'No. of guns 463 No. of guns 272 No. of men 6015 No. of men 4367 Armoured cruisers 10 Armoured cruisers 8 No. of guns 382 No. of guns 296 No. of men ■ 4773 No. of men 4488 Cruiser's 8 Cruisers ‘ 16 No. of guns 227 No. of guns • 402 No. of men 3493 No. of men 5260