NEWTOWN LICENSES.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1640, 5 August 1903, Page 19

NEWTOWN LICENSES.

DECISION OF THE FULL COURT. THE HOTELS TO BE CLOSED. APPEAL TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL. Oil Friday the Full Supremo Court, consisting of tlio Chief «J ustice, Justices Denniston, Co-olly, Edwards and Cooper, gave judgment on tho hearing of applications for mandamus on behalf of Corby mid others, the licensees of the five hotels in tho Newtown electorate, to compel tho Licensing Committee to grant renewals of their licenses, or in tho alternative, to direct the committee to hear and determine the same. Tho Chief Justice, after reciting the facts of the 'case, already mported, dealt with tho contention for the committee that section 3 of tho Act of 1895 applied as no determination of tho electors had been arrived at —the poll having been voided—and. that, therefore no licenses could bo issued; and with the contentions for tho licensees that the section only had a limited application and did not affect the present position. Tho Question, really was, Was full effect to be given to the ordinary meaning,of the words? To give full effect to the section, he said, would no doubt create many anomalies; brat if full effect was net given there would also be anomalies, To appreciate tho position and effect _ of section 3, the course of legislation since 1873 must be looked at. He traced the legislation and its effects, and quoted a number of other sections that bore on the question- Continuing; ho said the point was raised in regard to tho Act of 1895 whether, if tho poll was not valid, a half of the electors not voting, and there being no electoral contest, the returning officer could certify under subsection 4 of section 8 that none of the proposals was carried. Hie was of opinion that, reading subsection 4 and the third schedule together, the returning officer could, if there were no valid poll as provided in sub-section 3 of section 4, give the notification mentioned in subsection 4 of section 8. It would be observed that the Acts had gradually reduced the powers of committees, given a greater right of renewals to licensees than they previously had, and, at the same time increased the powers of electors so far as a direct vote was concerned. 1 Tho licensing committees were now, save in a few comparatively unimportant matters, but courts for registering and giving effect to the decisions of the electors. The true licensing committees were the electors in the respective districts. It was their determination that authorised the issue of certificates for licenses. It was not, in his opinion, a proper view of the Act, unless section 3 was, after the first election under the 1895 Act, inoperative, to say that the licenses could not bo taken away till there was a vote. Section 3 said that licenses were not to be granted or renewed until tho electors determined whether licenses should or should nob be issued. In interpreting section 3, it could not reasonably bo said that, if the words were given their ordinary meaning, they did not prohibit the issue of licenses till the electors had previously determined the propositions mentioned. The stress of tho argument was that if tho plain words of the statute were given effect to, a great injury would be done to licensees. If the law was plain, this Court could not because of injurious consequences to individuals refuse to give effect to the words of the statute. There were anomalies, and it might appear absurdities, if either view *was taken. Further, ' these anomalies and absurdities would have appeared if the section was only temporary and only applicable to the first election after the passing of the Act, namely, in 1898. (1) Ho could not find in the statute any words that would tend to limit the operation of section 3 to the first poll after the Act. The section was general in its terms, and there was nothing in the section itself that would show that it was to be a temporary provision. Subsections 4, 5 and 6 of section 5 referred specifically to section 3. Before a general section copaid be deemed to be temporary there must be something in the section itself, or in tlio context, showing that it was contemporary. It was not enough to show that if it remained permanent anomalies would remain. (2) The section spoke of a determination by the electors. It was not, in his Honours opinion, sufficient that there should be a poll. There must bo a determination ; for tho electors stood in the place of the former licensing authority. (3) Tho contention that tho section was satisfied if the determination come to was afterwards set aside did not appear to him to have any warrant-. There was no determination ever come to if the p°H was declared void. There was nothing left to guide the committee in the exercise of its functions, aud it ivas the mandate of the electors that the committee must obey. The section was very emphatic. The words were—'‘Until the electors of the district have previously determined,” They bad not determined the propositions if the poll was void. If they had determined any propositions, then this letermination remained. (4) As tn the section being read subject to

the exceptions that were mentioned, there were no such exceptions in the Act, nor was it necessary in interpreting the section to road them into the section. They were all exceptions that were raised, because if the full meaning was given to the section it was said injurious consequences would flow to licensees. But if they were read into the section, it was clear that full effect cou’.d not be given to the section as to tho nights of the electors. In such a conflict of interests, he saw no warrant, and lie knew of no authority that enabled the Court to set the section aside. (5) The duty of a returning officer after the poll was strictly limited to tho counting of votes and signing tlio notification mentioned in section 8 of tho 1895 Act.. He had no duty to perform in connection with a void poll, and subsection 4 of section 8 could not apply to such a case.. What he had to notify was that he found after “counting the votes.” A question that was discussed under this head was, What was a. determination? It was something that resulted from voting and was fixed by the statute. A proposition carried by a majority might be a determination, and a minority vote might also determine a matter. Suppose there was a society or association that did not admit members, if five members opposed, then, if even seventy members voted for a .candidate and five voted against him, the society had come to a determination. So in the case of -an invalid poll under subsection 3 of section 4 thcro was a determination, for if the electors refrained from voting, so that not half voted, they were, because of the special provisions of the Act, coming to a determination. Tho poll, the Act said, was not valid—that is, was not “strong” to carry any proposition. By the electors abstaining from voting they had enabled a determination to bo arrived at when the result of their vote was seen and the provisions of the Act were examined. A poll that "was not valid under the subsection, was not the same as a poll declared void, for when a poll was declared void nothing remained. (6) Section 21 of the Act- of 1893 wa.s relied on a 3 showing that section 3 had been complied with, even if no poll was taken or the poll declared void. Section 21 was as follows: —• “ Where a district .constituted under this Act-, or the principal Act, has been abolished or altered, and has been constituted o>r divided into new districts, the poll in foroo in such first-mentioned district >at the time of such abolition or alteration shall continue and remain in fore,a in such new district until the period arrives for taking the next triennial poll, and shall liave-the same force and effect as if such poll had been taken in such new district.” There was no statement in this section that the previous determination mi the parts of a new district that were constituted a new district was the fulfilment of the condition imposed by section 3. The provision was that, up till the period arrived for taking tho poll, the determination in tho old district remained in force, and had the same force and effect as if such poll been taken in the new district, but there was nothing saying that it was to be deemed a poll in a new district, and it remained in force only for a limited period, namely, till the time arrived for taking ‘the new poll. When that time arrived, there was no determination left in the new district, xuore had been only two cases in New Zealand dealing with questions analogous to those raised in this case (in re Mary Paterson and the Moeraki Licensing Committee, and in re Addington, Newtown and Sydenham East Licensing Committees.) Both cases were decided under the 1881 Act. In the latter case, however, the Court of Appeal dealt with the effect of section 21 of the 1893 Act, which had been passed while the appeal was pending. It was held in the first case that the effect of section 45 was to suspend the issue of new licenses till the ratepayers came to a determination. The effect of section 3 of the 1895 Act must bo the same. In the second case, as no local option poll had been taken in the new districts, it was held that no license could issue, and it was said in tho judgment of the Supreme Court:—“The question must bo determined, not upon the consideration of cases of individual hardship, hut, if possible, upon some general principle. The determination was to be the determination of the ratepayers.” And the members of the Appeal Court all approved of the decision of the Supreme Court. The Court held that section 21 was not retrospective, and one of the Judges doubted if, after 1894, the section could operate. There was nothing in the judgment that showed that section 21 could he said to operate in this case. There had been, as he said, various subsidiary questions raised. Whether a new poll could have been held under section 52 had been raised. In his own opinion section 52 was in force, but whether what occurred was or was not a “mischance or misadventure,” could not he determined on the materials before the Court. Another question was, whether the Magistrate could declare the pol ; l void. The words relied on in paragraph subsection 1 of section 7, of the Act of 1895 were: “If the result of a licensing poll is disputed,” etc. Similar words were used in subsection 4 of the Licensing Committees and Polls Vet, 1902. Did the words mean only the counting and disallowing of votes, or was there power to set aside a pojl

as void? The matter was not clear to his Honor’s mind, but it was in his. opinion unnecessary to decide the question. These and other questions that had been raised show the necessity of amendments, both in the various Licensing Acts and the Regulation of Local Elections Act, 1876. The only point 3 Court had, however, at present, to determine was whether as the terms of section 3 had not been complied with, tho committee could issue renewals of licenses, and, in his Honor’s opinion, it had no jurisdiction to do so, and this motion should therefore be refused with the costs as agreed.

Mr Justice Denniston, in concurring, referred to the fact that the boundaries of all electorates on tho representations of the Commissioners in J 902 were altered. Accordingly, in none of the electoral districts had there been at the date of the general election on the 25th November. 1902, any previous determination of the elect cl's under the provisions of tho Act of 1895. He pointed out that while tho poll declared void in this case was in favour of “no license ” the same consequences would liavo resulted in a case where the vote had been otherwise. Take the case of Wellington, where the vote was for “ continuance.” The voiding there of a poll, finally and without appeal, by a Stipendiary Magistrate on the application of fifty electors, on the ground of any of tho numerous irregularities (some of the most trifling character) mentioned in the Regulations of Local Elections Act, would close every hotel in the city, and confiscate, against tho wishes, as far as ascertained, of a majority of tlio electors, some hundreds of thousands of pounds’ worth of property. It was certainly a result which could not have been contemplated by Parliament. It was to his mind very far from clear that the Magistrate had the power assumed in this and other cases of voiding not only what might from one point of view be called tho “result” of the poll hut the poll itself. In any case, looking at the enormous interests involved, a single Magistrate formed a very unsatisfactory tribunal. He disagreed with the contention of plaintiffs that there had been in effect a determination by the electors, although such determination had been subsequently voided. The diet crimination was not to be a mere form. It was the foundation for and the guide to action by the committee. A poll which had been declared void was a nullity from the beginning. It was never effective, and it could not bo held to have lived just long enough to satisfy a formality and give a riglhTto a committee to act. The main arguments for the applicants were directed to the point that, under the statute, there might bo results of a poll on which a committee must act, which would not be a “ determination ” by the electors in manner provided bv the Act, and that therefore the words of section 3, requiring such determination as a .condition precedent to a committee’s action, must be modified in some way. Tlio whole question had been submitted to the electors. Some had voted upon it; some had abstained from voting; in some cases all might have voted. Tho result of such voting had, in every instance, and in every possible contingency, resulted in a prescribed conclusion which in every - case answered one of the questions submitted It was, in his opinion, a statutory determination on the questions submitted, and was the result in every case of the vote of tne electors. It was therefore properly and accurately described as a determination or tho electors of a district as provided by the Act. It seemed to him the words, previously determined” meant d p teimined by the poll to he taken before each prescribed poll. He thought it was plain that the contingency of a poll beffiio- voided as the result of an inquiry under subdivision (o). subsection 1 of section 12 and the finality of such inquiry had not been present in the minds of the Legislature when the Act was passed The Court could not, on account of the consequences, take on itself to supp y an omission on the part of the Legis atore, and read into the Act what it Wight think Parliament would hare done had its attention been drawn to the omis sion. It was impossible to say m what wav the overlooked contingency wo uni have been dealt with by Parliament. It could not bo supposed that it would have enacted that —in the event or a poll being voided, finally and without appeal by a Magistrate (as had been the case), on, it might be. some trifling irregularity not affecting the actual result —existing licenses should .continue, without any regard to the opinion of the electors. They were asked, m order to avoid what had been a most serious, and might possibly in future be an enormous, injury and hardship, but still a hardship, which they were confident was not intended, to inflict on others a deprivation of rights. It was the Legislature. and not the Court, which was responsible for tho hardship; and it was from the Legislature that the remedy must he sought. He would not speak of the existing state of the law as a scandal, for such language would not be respectful and legislators were not more infallible than Courts. But they were justified in concluding with confidence -that no Legislature would hesitate, when the omission and its serious consequences were pointed out by the body wnose duty it was to interpret the law, to supply the omission, and, as far as possible, to correct and avert

such cct-sequcnces. He thought, therefore, that the motion should bo dismissed. Mr Justice Edwards reviewed the position and rights of licensees under the Licensing Acts, and, after quoting numerous provisions, said it would bo impossible to find proof more conclusive that it was the intention of the Legislature that the existing state of things, whatever it might from time to time bo, should not be disturbed, save by express mandate of the electors given at ;i valid poll. If the defendants were right in their construction of the Act of 1895, the Newtown Licensing District, by the default of the returning officer and in defiance of the cardinal principle of the statute, had now become a prohibition area for all time. It must he borne in mind, also, that the result of enforcing prohibition in any district was not only to deprive the licensees of their statutory right of renewal until an adverse vote had been carried, and to deprive that section of tho public who considered licensed houses necessary, of their right to a public convenience; but also to affect the right of landlords and licensee! of licensed premises as between themselves. The difficulties and incongruities he had pointed out were not disputed by counsel for the defendants, but they contended that the remedy for all these was to be found in section 52 of the Act of 1881, which, they alleged, enabled the Governor-in-Council to order a new poll to be taken. “As the provisions of the Act of 1895, requiring the poll and the licensing poll to be taken together are so imperative,” continued his Honor, “I doubt much whether a licensed poll can bo taken at any other time than an electoral poll, except in the case specially provided for by the statute, and consequently whether section 52 of the Act of 1881 can have any application to a poll under the Act of 1895.” It had been stated, he went cn to say, that the Governor-in-Oouncil had declined to order a new poll, and he through his Excellency had h&en rightly advised. If he was nibA it was now too Late to correct the mistake. He thought it would be contrary to tho cardinal principles of the Act of 1895 to hoid that the vested rights of the licensees were extinguished without the previous determination of the ratepayers, because the Governor refused to order a second poll, even if he had the right to do so. It was plain section 52 could not refer to the avoidance of a poll upon a judicial i®r quiry. It was an abuse of to say that the result of an pon was that the electors had by that poll determined anything. Could tho electors be said to have determined anything by a poll that was not binding? ,Tho question seemed too clear for serious argument. The context, however, might show that the words in subsection 3 of section 4 were not used in their ordinary sense, and he held t-nat subsection 4 of section 8, which was necessary for the completion of the scheme providing for the results of a valid poll, had no application to an invalid polil under subsection 3 of section 4. He showed that on taking a valid poll the result might he that although every vote recorded was cast against the continuance of existing licenses the existing licenses might still continue. It seemed an abuse of language to say in such a state of things' 'O electors had determined that the existing licenses should continue. He could discern nothiug to lean ta the conclusion that the Legislature intended that a failure of tho electors under section 8 to determine should be called a determination. He dealt seriatim with the points raised for the plaintiffs. He could not adopt the construction that section 3 of the Act of 1895 applied only to districts existing on thf day prior to the taking of the first polir after the statute came into operation, and that after that poll had been taken the effect of this section was completely exhausted. In his opinion, section 3 was general in its operation. It applied! to all licensing districts and to tho granting of all licenses. In the case of the readjustment of boundaries of a district, section 21 of the Act of 1893 preserved the status quo in each part of the new district, until the next triennial poll. There could he no difficulty in administering the law in this state of facts. The first grounds urged by the plaintiffs in this connection therefore failed. If the .conclusions. at Which he had arrived in dealing with the first ground were sound they incidentally disposed tlso of the sixth ground—that the Case comes within the twenty-first section of the Act of 1893. If lie was right in supposing that the third section of the Act of 1895 applies to the licenses of an old district as well as to those of a new district, section 21 does not help the plaintiffs. The . fifth ground taken by counsel for plaintiffs had been incidentally dealt with in disposing of the first ground. That ground was that the case comes within subsection 4 of section 8 of the Act of 1895. which m'ado provision for the event of none of the proposals being carried by the prescribed majority. In his opinion this subsection was designed only for the completion of the scheme which provided for the results of a valid poll. The fourth ground—that the prohibition of section 3 must he restricted to cases where it was possible, under the provisions of the statute that a valid determination of the electors might be

frm/l —could not be sustained. The second ground was that section 3 must be read merely as requiring a poll to be taken. If he was right in the conclusion that a poll invalid under section 4. subsectiou 3, did not determine e three questions to be submitted to electors, or in the conclusion that if nemo of such proposals was carried under section 8 the result was not a determination by the electors hut a failure to determine, then it was evident that some qualification must be put upon the meaning of section 3. It was sufficient if it was established that if none of the proposals was carried under section 8 there had been a failure of the electors to determine the three proposals, although there had been a valid poll. In this event, the words of subsection 4 were imperative—that the Humber of existing licenses was to continue until the taking of the next licensing poll. That being so, it was evident that some qualification must be placed upon section 3. If, therefore, the result of an invalid poll under subsection 3 of section 4 was a failure to determine, and not a determination, and the defendants were right in their construction of section 3, there was another class of cases in which a failure of the electors to determine the questions submitted to them would result m total and permanent prohibition contrary to the cardinal principles of the statute. This was so clearly contrary to the intent of the Legislature that it afforded an additional reason for holding that the provisions oi section 3 could not he literally read. It was, he thought, clear' that in interpreting this statute there were but two courses open. The one was, without, so far as he could see, any warrant derived from the ordinary meaning of the words themselves,.or from their context, to f>ut a strained and unnatural interpretation upon section 4, subsection 3, and section 8, subsection 4, and to say that that was a determination which was no determination. This would get over the difficulty so far as concerned cases coming under subsection 3 of section 4, hut it would leave such cases as the present unprovided for. The other alternative was to read section 4, subsection 3, und section 8, subsection 4, in their natural and ordinary meaning, and to hold that a failure to determine the question whether or not the existing state of things should be altered was not a determination that it should not be altered. If this construction was adopted, then it was manifest that some qualification not only might be read, but must be read into section 3. If this point was reached, all difficulties in tho construction of the statute were overcome. In his. opinion the true construction of the statute was to read the necessary qualifications into section 3. That construction preserved tho cardinal principle of the statutes that tho existing state of things was to continue until it had been disturbed by the mandate of the electors; it avoided the destruction of vested rights ; it precluded the establishment within tho colony of permanent prohibition areas contrary to the express provisions of tho statutes that the electors should determine tho questions of “license” or “no license” in every third year. It preserved tho statutory rights of the licensees and owners of licensed premises as between themselves; and it involved far less violence to the language than tlio. alternative construction which resulted in all those consequences. There remained the third ground relied upon by counsel for the plaintiffs, that the requirements of section 3 were satisfied if in fact a poll had been taken, and a determination had been arrived at, although that determination might afterwards bo set aside upon an inquiry into the poll. In tho view which he took of this case that ground could not bo sustained. If, however, he could come to the conclusion that an invalid poll under section 4, subsection 3, was a determination of tho electors, and a compliance with tho conditions precedent of section 3, so that notwithstanding the invalidity of that poll licenses might still be granted, he should have great difficulty in saying that the same principle did not apply to a poll avoided under tho inquiry authorised by subsection 1 (0). Such a poll, indeed, more clearly resembled a determination of the electors than an invalid poll. It had, at all events, some operation, ft was voidable only not void, and it had effect until it was avoided. Until that had happened it must be treated as determining the questions. An invalid poll had no effect as a poll at all, and determined nothing; nor was this the less tho case because by statute the samo result fallowed as would follow if the poll had resulted in the adoption of the first of the three proposals. It was unnecessary further to consider that question. Ho based his judgment upon tho second ground taken by counsel for the plaintiffs. In the conrso of tho argument it had been suggested, rather than argued, by counsel for tho defendants that the Magistrate had no power to set aside the poll. That ground did not appear to be open to the defendants upon this record. They had expressly admitted that the poll was duly declared void, and that it was void at law. If the objection was open t-o the defendants, it was, in bis opinion, without substance. It did not appear to be arguable. For these reasons be was of opinion that each of the plaintiffs was entitled to

a renewal of his license, and that in each case a writ of mandamus ought to go to the defendants to grant the licenses. Mr Justice Conolly’s judgment, read by the Chief Justice, concurred with Mr Justice Edwards. It stated:—“ln these cases I have perused the judgments of other members of the Court-, in which every point raised on either side in the course of tho arguments has been so fully dealt with that I do not consider it necessary that I should also discuss them at length. I have been particularly impressed with the very exhaustive judgment of Mr Justioo Edwards and. without accepting every word of it-, I fully agree with the conclusions at which he has arrived. It is quite clear, in my opinion, that since the poll was declared void none of the proposals submitted to the electors respecting licenses in the district were carried ; and, therefore, that tho number of licenses should continue as they are until the taking of the next licensing poll, subject to the power to renew licenses objected t-o under subsections 1 to 4 of section 81 of tho Licensing Act 1881. I am, therefore, of opinion that in each case a mandamus should go to the defendants as prayed.” Mr Justice Cooper, in concurring with the Chief Justice and Mr Justice Denniston that judgment would have to be for defendants, after citing the facts, went on to say that he was of opinion t-he contention of counsel for plaintiffs that section 3 of the A,ct of 1895 had only a temporary effect could not be sustained. -He could find no indication in the Act that- the Legislature intended that the provisions of section 3 should bo limited, as Air Skerrett contended, to the poll first taken after the commencement of the Act, and should expire uxion the taking of that poll. He did not think that section 21 of the Act of 1893 had the effect contended for by counsel for the plaintiffs. He agreed with the other members of the Court that the contention would have to he over-ruled. Regarding tho jurisdiction of the licensing committee to issue licenses, the learned Judge said the conclusion he had come to was that tho policy of the Legislature, as disclosed by the Licensing Act of 1881 and the Licensing Committees Polls Act. 1902, had been primarily to vest in the electors of licensing districts the power to determine from time to time whether or not licenses should- exist in the licensing district; and, secondly, in the event of the determination being in favour of the continuation of existing licenses, to give to the holders of such licenses a limited right to the renewal of such licenses. Electoral districts were constituted licensing districts by the Act of 1893, and the right to vote at the local option poll was extended to the persons upon the roll of electors for members of the House of Representatives, and the renewal of existing licenses became' subject to the determination of such electors at such poll. Tlio full measure of control given to electors ivas reached in the Act of 1895, section 3 of which enacted that no license should be granted or renewed until the electors of the district had previously determined:—(l) “ Whether the number of licenses existing in the district was t-o continue; (2) whether the number of licens.es existing in the district was to be reduced; and (3) whether no licenses were to- be granted in the district.” The material question to bo determined by the Court- in the present proceedings depended upon the meaning which should be given to this provision. The Newtown Licensing District was constituted in 1902, and the p-01l taken on the 25tli November having been vacated by the Magistrate; and no poll having been previously taken in the newly-constituted district, the electors of the district had not determined any of the matters referred to in section 3. Unless the wording of the section 3 could be modified or altered to meet the present circumstances it was clear the licensing committee could not grant or renew licenses in the district, the words of the section being clearly prohibitory—“ No licenses of any description shall be granted or renewed until the electors of the district have previously determined,” etc. On the other hand, counsel for plaintiffs contended, amongst other tilings, that the requirements of the section had been satisfied if in fact a poll had been taken, and a determination arrived at, although that poll and determination had been subsequently set aside under tho provisions of the Regulation of Local Elections Act, 1876. It was further submitted by plaintiffs that the result which followed if section 3 was to be read unmodified and unrestricted would be of such a nature as would justify tho Court in modifying or altering the language of the section. His Honor, after quoting at length from authorities and clauses of the Act bearing on this point, said he was unable to find any material in the statutes _ regulating licenses which would justify the Court in modifying the apparent meaning of section 3. In his > opinion the Legislature had not provided for the case which had arisen, and -it was not the duty of the Court to supply a casus omissus. The Court could not alter or modify the provisions of a statute from a consideration of what might be considered w’se and prudent, or of what would have been done if any existing state of things had been contemplated by the Legislature. To

do so would be to make,, not to interpret, the law. In concluding, bis Honor said: “In the present case the provisions of section 3 are prohibitory. The Legislature has" not, in my opinion, provided for the circumstances which have arisen. In all probability had tho possibility of such a state of circumstances arising, as has occurred in tho present case, been present to the mind of tho Legislature, statutory provision would have been made to meet it. Rut such a provision having been omitted from the statute it is for tlio Legislature, not for the Court, to supply the omission. I am, therefore, of opinion judgment must be given for defendants with the agreed upon costs.” In accordance with the decision of a majority of the Court, the motions for mandamus were dismissed, with costs, as agreed upon, £SO, and disbursements, in each case. Leave to appeal to the Privy Council was granted in each case. It is probable that the hotels will remain open in the meantime. Messrs Skerrett and Levi appeared for tho licensees of the Park, Island Bay and Grosvenor Hotels; Air Morison for tho licensee of the Newtown Hotel;' Air Young for the licensee of tho Eilbirnio Hotel ; and Messrs Adams (Dunedin) and Atkinson for all the members of the Licensing Committee except tho chairman. A QUESTION IN PARLIAMENT. It is tho intention of All' Bedford to ask the Premier whether, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court refusing a mandamus to compel tho Licensing Committee of Newtown to issue licenses, and in view of the prospect of further expensive litigation on appeal to the Privy Council, the Government will introduce immediately a Bill providing for a second poll in all cases where the local option poll was declared void by the Magistrate, seeing that whatever the decision of the Pi ivy Council they wiil be bound {ultimately to grant a second poll, or in somo other way interfere to secure justice :