“THE TIMES" HISTORY OF THE WAR

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1626, 29 April 1903, Page 27

“THE TIMES" HISTORY OF THE WAR

“The .1 imes” History of the War. Vol. 11. "The Times,” Printing Please square, London. Wh.it.ooinna and Tombs, Vv ell.ngtoil. The s_eona iv.uuu of "Tho Times” history of the South African war toLs the lir. t.sh Army and pAitic.aiis s.one home truths in very fmc-bie language. Tho unpreparedness of tire Arm.v for real wanare, the sup.pi ess:on of aii individuality and mutative, are presented in very p.ain fashion. Many fresh details of the early battles and defeats are given, and the editor criticises with vigorous frankness the bung.ing and muddling of those British gen-oiais who. proved themselves lacking in nerve and strategy. At Talana. Colonel Pickivood, of the Artillery, is said to have lost lias nerve, and "in spite of the entreaties of bus subordinates,” allowed the enemy to retreat under the muzzles of 'the British guns. The battle of Ladysmith on ‘‘Black Monday,” so far from being a “reconnaisahce m force,” is doc ared to have been a serious defeat, even apart from the deplorable disaster of Nichoison’d Nek. The infantry of Colonel Grim wood's brigade, wo are told, wore baAiy liandieti and unsteady in action. ‘'Colonel Grimwood, to whom the fetish of seniority had assigned so allimportant a command, proved quite umit to grapple with the extremely difficult situation in which, largely by the mistakes of others, he was placed; completely unnerved, incapable of issuing orders, too confused t.o remember the position of his men or to try and recover his missing battalions, he simply left his brigade to itself.” The retirement of his trrops was pi reel pita te. 'The retirement soon lost all semblance of order. The two rifle battalions were especially bad. . . . Tiie bulk of Grim wooers brigade just dribbled in a straggling crowd through, tho extended hies or the Manohesters and Liverpcols, who held their ground firmly. For a moment the situation locked serious.” It was only saved by the heroism of the artillery. The cavalry were as bad as the infantry. “For reasons which it is difficult to understand, the cavalry were allowed to save themselves by their speed alone. No attempt was made at a judicious withdrawal by regiments. ... A seething mas-s of clubbed and broken cavalry charged down the narrow nek. and streamed southwards into the open plain. The painful story of Nicholson’s Nek is told in great detail, and the conclusion is reached that the surrender was premature, though “m>o more humiliating than many surrenders that occurred after it, while there have been many instances whore the struggle has been abandoned when there was much better hope of escape or relief.” The operations at 'Storm,be|rg) are thus criticised: —“The inadequacy of the force taken ; tho neglect of simple precautions which prevented the arrival of the detachment from Pen Hock; the long and wearying delays of tho entrainment; the change of plan ai, tho eleventh hour, involving an extra effort, on the part of the men and a piunge into country completely unknown to the general or to any of the officers with him ; the pernicious order to march with fixed bayonets, a precaution whose absurdity stands in all the more striking contrast to the culminating pie-oa of carelessness; tho unscreened and blindly confident route march after daybreak over ground of which, the General knew nothing save that lie was within two miles of the enemy’s positions—all these were sheer mismanagement on the part of the General or of his staff.” The immediate cause of the Magersfontein disaster “was undoubtedly General Wauohope’s mistake in not deploying till within 400 yards of the trenches. But so closely is this cause bound up with the preceding ones that it is difficult to attach any blame, anything more than a mere regret, to Wauohope’s action.” As to the failure of tho battle as a whole, the volume states:—.“Not the least was the absence of any provision for the contingency of failure. That defect vgas never remedied. Instead of concentrating all available troops to strike a blow which should retrieve the failure of the night attack. Lord Methuen simply used them to hold the lists while the Boer fire and the burning sun slowly but surely completed the demoralisation of the confused and leaderless Highland Brigade. There can be no surer sign of weak generalship than laying a severe strain upon, and running nreat risks in one part of an army while leaving another part inactive, than being forced into accepting: the defeat of a Section as the

defeat cf the whole. By this standard Magersfontein. and not only Magersfont ein, but- Ladysmith, Colenso-, Spion Kop, stand equally condemned.”

But it is Sir Itc-dvers Bullor who comes in for tho most unqualified condemnation, not only a-; a general, but as a man.; ITis abandonment of the guns at Colenso is severely criticised. .Even supposing that rue retention of the guns had doubled the casualties of the day, that less should have been faced—not for the sake of mere prestige, but because at that, moment- guns were far more important than mc-n. They were nearly half of Bailer's field artillery; without them there would be no question of relieving Ladysmith. Weeks would elapse before guns could reach Natal from .England.” But more was yet to follow: —“Just as in the hour of battle ho (General Buller) had failed the men whom he led. so now in the hour of trial he was to fail his country, which had entrusted the fortunes of war into his hands. . . . He utterly lost heart. Not only did ho despair of doing anything himself, but h i despaired f " others . . . On f ho morning of the 16th he telegraphed to Lord Lansdowne that the relief of Ladysmith was impossible, that Sir G. White would bo ooinpell-ed to lay down his arms, and that he preposed To intrench himself in a defensive position near Ohievele.v. Even on that samo morning, without waiting for a r eply, without waiting to get the fullest information from Sir G. White as to the resources at his disposal, without consulting Ids senior officers, ho sent a hel lie-graphic message to White suggesting tho surrender c-f Lady.emit h.” The exact terms of that message are unknown, but tho following, which differs considerably from previous versions, is given as its real purport:—“As it appears certain that I cannot relieve Ladysmith fo-r another month, and even then by protracted -siege operations you will burn your ciphers, destroy your guns, fire away your ammunition, and make the best terms possible with the general of the besieging forces, after giving me time to fortify myself on the Tugela..” This terrible missive was at first taken by Sir G. White for a Boer forgery, it being supposed that -the enemy had discovered our cipher. It was, says Mr Anverv, tho editor of the volume, “not actnatly an order. But- it was sufficient! v strong to hove been taken a.s such by' anvono who had already 1 -~t the idea of surrender cross his mind, and it is almost impossible to regard it as a mere incidental discussion of the precautions that might have to he taken if tho worst- came to the worst.” The editor of the “Times” history is not tho man to make these grave- statements on mere camp rumour and vague gossip. It must now be considered absolutely established that Sir Redvers Buller showed himself not only a feeble general, but of faint heart, and that he, whom tho British had looked upon a,s a man of bull-dog courage, af'ter his first reverse counselled surrender by S : r George White. Sir George, whatever may have been his failings as a general, was a gallant soldier, and it is to him and Lord Roberts, not to Sir Redvens. that Ladysmith remained unconquered to the end. The “Times” history of the war justifies the inquiry into the whole conduct of the war which is now taking place.