THE PORIRUA TRUST CASE

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1626, 29 April 1903, Page 54

THE PORIRUA TRUST CASE

THE ASPERSIONS OF THE PRIVY ' COUNCIL. PROTEST BY THE COURT OF APPEAL. Tlie announcement that the Chief Justice would have something to say regarding the strictures passed on the New Zealand. Court of Appeal by the Privy Council in the judgment on the Porirua case was responsible for a large gathering of lawyers at the Supreme Court on Saturday morning. The Chief Justice, in a long statement, reviewed the history of the case from the time the land was first ceded by the natives to the Crown up to the period when action was taken m the Courts. His Honor explained at the outset that it was not his intention to canvass the decision of the Privy Council, but to show that its comments on, and its criticism of, the Appeal Court were alike unwarranted. His Honor then went on to show that many of the statements of fact and of law in the judgment of the Privy Council had been made without a knowledge of our legislation. It was not the Appeal Court of New Zealand that acted on loose suggestions or in ignorance of the statute law of the country: it w r as their Lordships who repeatedly reiterated inaccurate statements —statements which had been written through want of knowledge of onr statutes and the uniform practice of the Crown in dealing with demesne lands of the Crown colony. His Honor took particular exception to the statement that the Court of Appeal was subservient to the Executive Government —that,, in fact, the Government had taken upon itself to instruct the Court in the discharge of its functions. These imputations were characterised as baseless, and hardly becoming for the highest tribunal in the Empire. His Honor concluded by saying that, unfortunately, this was not the only judgment of the Privy Council that had been pronounced under a misapprehension and ignorance of the local laws, and while an Imperial judicial tribunal dispensing justice to the meanest British subject was a high ideal, if it was unacquainted with the lav's it was called upon to interpret, it might unconsciously become the worker of injustice. The po-

sit-ion was a serious one, for the Privy Council had shown, so far as New Zealand was concerned, tiiat it knew not our statutes, our conveyancing terms, or our history. Mr J u stico Williams, in a protest which was read to the Court, refuted in equally vigorous terms the strictures of the Privy Council. Liko the Chief Justice, his Honor made a statement of the merits of the case from his point of view. The language used by their Lordships with reference to the Court of Appeal was, he said, of a kind which had never before been used by a superior Court with reference to the findings of an inferior Court in modern times. His Honor said that the natural tendency of the judgment, emanating as it did from so high a tribunal, was to create a distrust of the Appeal Court. and to weaken its authority amongst those who are subject to its jurisdiction. Such being the case, his Honor deemed it right to publicly protest. Touching on the statement that the Judges in New Zealand had shown a want of independence, ho said that no suggestion cf the kind- had ever been made in the colony—it had been reserved for four strangers sitting fourteen thousand miles away to make. At the same time his Honor added it was to the people of the colony the Court was responsible for its judicial conduct, and if it retained the confidence of the people it was sufficient. Had the Appeal Court, lie said, over spoken of a Judge of an inferior Court in the terms their Lordships had spoken, it would be the Court and not the Judge who would have stood condemned. The observations ho had made were solely for the purpose of vindicating the honour of the Court, and showing that the reasons for its conclusions were honest. Mr Justice Edwards, although, like the Chief Justice, not one of the Judges .concerned in the case, deemed it- hia duty to come forward and defend the Court when imputations were made concerning its integrity. The occasion on which it had been necessary to do this, was, his Honor said, without- a precedent. Never before had it happened that the ultimate appellate tribunal o-f the Empire had charged the Judges of any colonial Court with want of dignity, and with denying or delaying justice at the bidding of the Executive Government. If, his Honor continued,. there was any foundation for charges so grave, the learned Judges against whom they were levelled ought to be removed fro*m the High office which they would have shown themselves unworthy to occuny. No Government had sought to influence the Court. If it had, and if any Judge had been so base as to lend himself to such designs, retribution, swift and c-ndign would fall upon Government and Judge alike. The Appeal Court did not object to its decisions being reviewed and reversed, but it dad claim that when their Lordships felt compelled to differ -with it a.s to the meaning of the statute law of the colony they might well do so with the same courtesy and respect* that the Judges of the Court of Appeal invariably extended to Judges and Magistrates of inferior Courts whose decisions it was called upon to review. Tn the interests of justice, liberty and decency, and the unity of that great Empire which could only he Held together by the mutual respect of its. kindred committees, he again protested against the utterances of the Council. The full text of the remarks of the learned Judges, with the comments made on behalf cf the Bar, will appear in the “Times” to-morrow.