THE NAVY AND THE NATION.

New Zealand Mail, 27 August 1902, Page 30

THE NAVY AND THE NATION.

“Naval Efficiency." By Archibald S. Hurd. Chapman and Hall, Ltd., London. S. and W. Mackay, Wellington. There is probably no greater authority on naval affairs than Mr Archibald Hurd. He knows its pdwer, its weaknesses, its worth, and its efficiency. “No one who knows the British fleet can say it is inefficient,” ho tells us; but Mr Hurd is nevertheless conscious that the navy is in some respects defective. While, therefore, observing that “a new spirit pervades Whitehall and that its watchword is efficiency,” he is of opinion that it is time another energetio Dockyard Committee was appointed to look into the naval affairs of the nation. Lord Salisbury once stated that “the defence of the country is not the business of the War Office or of the Government, but the business of the people themselves”; but how shall the people know what is wanted for the adequate and efficient defence of the Empire unless they are informed, and how shall they be informed unless men in authority with knowledge write articles and books in the manner and style adopted by Mr Hurd? It is, therefore, our author’s intention not to raise a panic, hut to point out in a plain, matter-of-fact manner the defects of the navy and show how these defects may be remedied. Anything like a panio is to be deprecated. It leads to extravagant conduct. An informing book, like the one before us, will tend rather to obviate extravagance by turning popular opinion into proper lines and showing what the public should demand in order to feel the greatest security possible in an efficient and reliable navy.

The object Mr Hurd has in view is modest, yet of its necessity there can be no doubt. If here and there he displays a kind of pessimism, his judgment is sound. Ho notes how Government after Government has played fast and loose with interests of the highest importance in order to serve party ends or to pose as economists. There ought to be a well-defined policy of defence, and the British Government should abandon for ever the haphazard, dangerous and expensive panic legislation which lias been the lever whereby the navy has been raised to its present strength. Both political parties have been at fault in neglecting the navy, and any scheme of rational defence has been ■ disregarded. “Lord Beaconsfield vied with Mr Gladstone in his contempt for ‘bloated armaments,’ ” and patriotism and the security of the Empire were treated as insignificant matters so long as an administration could keep down taxation. This was, however, not an economical policy, and it may he remembered that in the spring of 1885, Mr Gladstone, being suddenly brought face to face with the prospect of a war ivith Russia, asked for a vote of credit amounting to eleven millions. This was merely for preparations, for Mr Gladstone said: “It is not a case of war.” Yet ivith all this there was confusion, anxiety and Jlarm. In order to avoid a repetition of such conditions, Mr Hurd sets out Avhat he regards as “the only rational system of defence.” The British Navy must hold the seas in absolute command. On war occurring, Britain’s defensive policy w v ould become an offensive one; and in the opinion of our author, “for the protection of our shores, for the safe-guarding of our colonies, for the Avell-being of our oversea commerce, the fleet must make the coastline of the enemy its base of operations as soon as trouble threatens.” The detail of this policy as elaborated in Mr Hurd’s very interesting Avork is ably done, and his quotations from men who made Avarfare a profession are extremely apropos. As Napoleon has remarked, “the only Avay to prevent the Continental PoAvers from bridling you is for England to proceed in her proper sphere as an insular poAver, possessing the coinmaud of the sea. Your marine is the real force of your country, and one which, Avhile you preserve it, will always render you poAverful.” The navy is Great Britain’s all in all. “It is,” as Sir William King-Hall remarked, “the first line of defence, the second

line of defence, and the third line of defence.” Sea supremacy is essential. We gained our over-sea possessions by its strength, and we retain them only by its power. While recognising that the supremacy of Great Britain rests upon her command of the sea, we cannot live for ever on its ancient prestige. We must do much to maintain it. This cannot be done without national sacrifice, and it cannot bo accomplished unless the nation realises its necessity. Coast defences are good, the equipment of every citizen Avith rifle and bandolier is excellent, but after all, the navy once impaired or defeated, Britain’s greatness is on the Avane. The navy must be prepared for war. It has no other grounds for maintenance unless as an instrument to bo used in war and the safe-guarding of all Britain’s world-in-terests. Mr Hurd justifies the demands made by the Admiralty on the British taxpayer for the upkeep and expansion of the nation’s sure-strength and safety. He deprecates spasmodic attempts at reform. He advocates a policy consistent with our needs, and urges our statesmen to steadily pursue it. He shoAA’s the present weakness and necessities of tike navy, and contrasts the aggressiveness of Russia, Germany, France and the United States in shipbuilding with the passiveness of the British Admiralty. The British people would have little necessity to expand their navy Avere it not for the expansion going on among other nations; for “avo aro compelled to increase our expenditure as other nations increase theirs, not taking the lead, not pressing on more than they; but as they increase Ai r e must increase.” Still, if other Powers should be prepared to diminish their programme of shipbuilding, Ave should be prepared on our side to meet such a procedure by modifying ours. That is the position avo stand in in regard to other PoAvers, and it is to be equal to any possible naval combination that should bo Great Britain’s aim and policy. It is this policy that, in Mr Hurd’s estimation, Avill correct, the evident belief of some of our rivals that they can wear doAvn Britain’s resistance to their aspirations. Our author does not forget the colonies, and he concludes a notable passage Avitli this sentence: ‘Let business-like preparations be accompanied by an understanding between the Mother Country and her colonies, and the day may not he far distant Avlien wo shall feel the burden of Empire less lieaAy upon us.” But this opens up a new topic for discussion, and reminds us of Sir Wilfrid Laurier’s noAv famous utterance: “Call us to your councils, Mother England.” On the Avliole, Mr Hurd’s book is in all respects admirable —calm, reasonable, authoritative. Those who Avould obtain a comprehensive vieAV of the British Navy, its minor defects, its strength and its efficiency, Avould do Avell to read for themselves the latest effort of an able and clever writer. The book contains numerous diagrams, charts, and a map indicating the present distribution of the British fleet, i;i the preparation of AA-hick for war Ave have the surest preservative of peace.