THE GERMAN EMPEROR’S PLAN

New Zealand Mail, 21 February 1901, Page 64

THE GERMAN EMPEROR’S PLAN

The decree of the German Emperor, by which he makes the English language an obligatory subject in all the gymnasia, or as we should say, public schools, of his hereditary kingdom, _ while the study of French is left optional, is a most important one, though not, wc think for .the reason that most of our contemporaries assign. They believe, apparently, that "YV illiam 11. is bent on conciliating England, and- not unwilling to give a snub to France, and that he has adopted this mode of attaining both ends because it' calls for no attention from diplomatists. We believe, on the contrary, that he is not thinking, at least not primarily, of his relations either with France or England, being probably aware that mutual intelligibility does not always produce mutual admiration. The Irish have spoken English for two hundred ; years, the Southerners - when they fired' on Fort Sumpter spoke the same language as the ; while the Lorrainers, who- think in German, after thirty years subjugation to Berlin, still Worship France. The Emperor is, we think, pursuing steadily the object which has attracted him, and in a way governed him, from the very beginning of his reign, that of making his people richer. He has two fixed ideas upon that subject,- one of which is certainly true, while the other may be. Ho thinks that the social danger, his keen apprehension of which induced him as one of his first acts to summon a conference of workmen, can be averted by greater and more widely diffused prosperity, by higher w r ages, -more savings, better provision against sickness, accident and old age. In this he is pro-

bablv right, though men usually rebel just "when the grievance is disappearing, and though the English revolt against caste government occurred just as manufactures and commerce began to ease off the dreadful poverty of 1810, when, as the founder of the “Economist'-’ once told the present writer, every man in England was paying a third of his earnings to the State. It may, of course, be alleged that if the iv.rperor has this at heart, he would never allow hi 3 Government. to tax food as it does; but we suspect that in this matter he is not his own master, the Agrarian party, which clamours for protection, being mainly composed of the classes which form the bedrock of his throne. The Emperor also thinks that the basis of national strength is wealth, that a poor people cannot do great things, that if his. subjects had but the English resources he could at once olace Germany at the top of the world. He wants mere revenue from lighter taxes, better credit, a larger national reserve, which would embolden liis people to run great risks. It is possible that in this he is mistaken, the English under Elizabeth hawing been as poor as mice, and the same people having defeated Napoleon before either their wealth or their population had begun largely to increase. A rich people is not always an enterprising people, the governing idea being often to sit upon the wealth accumulated, and risk it as little as may be possible. However that may be, this is His Majesty’s theory, on which he acts consistently, seeking always colonies, transmarine commerce, and the position in Asia to which he ascribes much or all of British prosperity. This.ls the explanation of his rebuff to -Mr Kruger. Experience has taught him, as it teaches all statesmen, that the moment a nation ceases t,o be self-centred the friendship of England is invaluable. Without it, expansion is scarcely possible, for she dominates the seas. Tbe Emperor, therefore, has given up the idea of depriving her of

any possession, and now desires to share with her the advantages of world-wide trade. He cares nothing:, of course, either for Mr Kruger or for the Transvaal Republic, and, probably over-esti-mating the sensitiveness of the British to mere words, he prevents their utterance by civilly declining to receive the ex-President. He is trying in the same way, and, as appears from President McKinley's message, with some success, to “redd up’” the quarrel between Washington and Berlin, which has been smoldering ever since the German Admiral interfered at Manila, and which has once or twice threatened an explosion. In return he vill doubtless expect a full share of any commercial advantages which either England or America may obtain in China, and an absence of opposition to his design of obtaining coaling stations along the road to the Far East. He is, in short, pursuing a mercantile and not a policy either of menace or of bluff against any Power. Menaces may possibly come afterwards when Germany is rich, and the German fleet is a great factor in politics, but immediately his desire is to be taken into partnership with the great Anglo-Saxon firm. Thai, in his judgment, is the line of least resistance on his way fib his object, which is to change Germany from a very poor country into a very rich one, and as on© step to that end lie enforces on his subjects a knowledge of the language which is spoken both by Englishmen and Americans, and -which is becoming the lingua franca of commerce throughout the world. There is, indeed, except Spanish, no other commercial tongue.

We wonder if lie will succeed. It is assumed in this country that he will, and there is much vague alarm at the idea of a “new and giant competitor, ” but we are not sure that the apprehension is not greatly exaggerated. W© have an incurable distrust of the Colbert way of developing, commerce, that is, by pushes directed from above. A nation possessed of the_ trading instinct trades without so muen guidance, which usually directs its energies into the wrong channels. A Government, it is true, fosters trade by removing obstacles, reducing taxes, and abolishing regulations, but the commercial energy of William 11. does not take these directions, hie has no more notion of leaving his subjects alone than any other Prussian King. He has not exerted himself at a'l to make them believe in freetrade. He has iniquitous taxes upon food. He has, made great efforts to acquire colonies, which as yet are no more profitable than the French dependencies. He believes firmly in the proposition that trade follows the flag, which French experience shows to be demonstrably false, and he expends enormous sums upon a fleet to protect his merchantmen before Ixis merchantmen are numerous enough to require such protection. There is no evidence that German trade would not have advanced if he had never noticed its existence, while there is much that he is urging his people to tax themselves until half his subjects are asking whether after all commerce is worth its cost. We suspect that the Prussian system, of Government, with its eternal interference, necessarily cramps trade, and that as German colonies succeed best when under a foreign flag, so German trade will be most profitable when German merchants are lost amongst other nationalities. We should like to compare the wealth of the German merchants of London with that of the German merchants of Berlin, and to ask why, if German emigrants succeed so

well, it is necessary to build up a separate in order to ensure success. Nobody stops any German merchant who pleases from setting up in Calcutta, and we do not see how he is to grow richer because his Emperor has a big fleet. That he may grow prouder, and possibly happier, from gratified patriotism, we can readily perceive, but why he should grow richer is not easily perceptible. He will, it is said, be better protected, but he seems thoroughly satisfied with the protection he has, a German merchant abroad being perhaps the most comfortable person in existence, and very rarely transferring either himself or his wealth to Germany. And, finally,

there is always the doubt whether, as the Emperor is making of himself the sole source of energy in his country, much of his policy may not vanish whenever he is withdrawn. Still, a man can do much in a lifetime, and we watch with unflagging interest, though without fear, an experiment which has not been tried in Europe for a hundred and fifty years, the experiment, that making of the State the grand of trade.—“ The Spectator.” ” '