THE New Zealand Mail. PUBLISHED WEEKLY. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1901. INNER HISTORY OF THE WAR

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1511, 14 February 1901, Page 34

THE New Zealand Mail. PUBLISHED WEEKLY. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1901. INNER HISTORY OF THE WAR

The most important operation or the South African campaign—the relief of . Ladysmith—has just been placed m a gippclear light before the British people by the publication of two volumes of official despatches bearing upon the period preceding the triumphant entry of the relieving force. These despatches, assuming that they have been correctly summarised by the cable agency, convey the astounding revelation that the general in command of the operations for the relief of Ladysmith was at one stage inclined to let that position fall into the hands of the enemy, witnoat any further efforts on his part. Sir Redvers Buller had a large army, composed of the best troops in the British Empire. The eyes of the world were upon the struggle for Ladysmith. The moral effect of a Boer victory there would have been tremendous. In every corner of the British Empire the belief in the speedy relief of the place was encouraged. Yet in those very hours of universal strain, General Buller was asking the Commander-in-Chief “whether he ought to risk the sacrifice of two , or three thousand men in order to gain access to the plain within ten miles of Sir George White’s position; ” and he took care to add that in his opinion the success of the operation was doubtful. In plain English, the General commanding the relieving force thought It was almost impossible to get near enough to Ladysmith, not to relieve J&ia place, but to show his army the Spectacle of its surrender to the exulting Boer, and he wired to the Commander-in-Chief that he did not like to lose two or three thousand men in the prohaoly unsuccessful attempt to get that doubtful advantage. If the despatches have been properly summarised, it is proved beyond doubt that had Sir Redvers Buller remained in the chief command, Sir George White would have been left to his fate, and the British Army would have suffered a disgrace worse than anything experienced in the whole of its. annals. Saratoga and Yorktown are only barely endurable in history, because the buik of the troops under our flag were mercenaries ,and the enemy opposed to them was of our own flesh and blood. But if Ladysmith had been added to the record, i here would have , been no suoh consolation. Part of the flower of the British Army might have surrendered, almost within sight of another part of its flower, to an enemy undisciplined, foreign and boastful. It was often said of the great Napoleon that his presence 'was worth 40,000 men. "What will be said by history of the value of Lord Roberts’s presence in South Africa at this supreme moment ? The despatches show that, in spite of the i tan on the spot, who thought he could not succeed, he practically ordered the place to be taken, and we know from the published record that it was. There was a mistake at Colenso, and another at Spionkop, but after these errors, which really justified General Buller’s loss of confidence in himself, the relieving force put forth its strength, under the direction of its General, and tho siege at ouce collapsed, without any such loss as that which would, according to his own despatches, have deterred Sir Redvers Buller from attempting the relief at all. Lord Roberts very properly gave General Buller and his fine army full credit for their great effort, which lasted from the loth of January to the 28th of February, 1900. But to the veteran Field-Marshal, and to him alone, apparently, belongs the whole credit for the relief of Ladysmith. The Empire will never forget how Lord Roberts 'proved himself a great commander at a most critical moment, and how Sir Redvers Buller did not. The certain conclusion from these despatches is that if a great war should ever come upon the Empire, Sir Redvers Buller will not be trusted with an independent command. He has had an opportunity, and has been found wanting- ,