WHAT WAR WOULD MEAN.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1290, 19 November 1896, Page 10

WHAT WAR WOULD MEAN.

When Ahabi King’ cif Israel, had incurred the Divine wrath, prophets were inspired to falsely persuade him that he would succeed if he joined Jehosophat in making war on the Syrians. “Go Up,” they said, tc go up to Ramoth Gilead and prosper !” He went up, and was killed. The peers and bishops who are now trying to entice the British Government to make war on the Turks independently are doing precisely what those prophets did, points out a writer in the Sydney Daily Telegraph. They are inviting the nation to go up to Turkey and bo beaten, perhaps nationally slain.

People who sympathise with the persecuted Armenians, and want to see them relieved, have to remember two things. First, that when war was declared there would be a general massacre of Christians by Turks, which would sweep the Armenian question out of existence; second, that for England to declare war against Turkey is to do the same to Russia, if not Russia and France. At best, it would be England versus Russia and Turkey. Let anyone who is curious about the probable result of such a struggle consider the warlike capacities of the three Powers. The British army, according to the latest return compiled for 1895, amounts to a total of all branches, including the regular forces in India, of 718,821, of whom 669,553 are classed as “ effectives." That 718,821 includes the regular forces at Home and abroad, army reserve, militia, yeomanry and volunteers, so that it really represents the “ war footing ” of the army, to which may be added nearly 200,000 for the native forces in India — altogether, say, about a million men. Russia has over 800,000 men under arms in Europe and the Caucasus, 75,000 in Asia and 10,000 in Finland. Her nominal war strength is about 2,500,000, to which are to be added :—Available reserve, 1,064,000 ; frontier battalions, 41,000; Cossacks, 142,000: total, 1,247,000. Then there are a territoral reserve of 2,000,000, and a national militia of 1,200,000. So that the real war footing, estimated on the same basis as that of Great Britain, is nearly seven millions. The reserve system is being altered, however, in such a way that the second “ ban," or draft, from it, would call up about 7,000,000 of men. The war strength of Turkey is 700,000 men, which could be increased to over a million, nearly all trained, on the same principle as is in force in Germany. France, if she joined Russia, would be able to draw from 524,768 men now under colours, and the reserve for the active army, with the territorial army and its reserve, amount to nearly 4,500,000 trained men.

Leaving France aside, however, Great Britain could raise a million white and coloured soldiers, if they could all be spared for this service, and her two certain antagonists could put into the field millions upon millions. The Turks and Russians, up to over three millions, would be trained men, virtually regulars; a large proportion of the British volunteers, yeomanry and militia. The enemy would be on their own ground, with all the advantages of locality in their favour in the matter of supplies, reinforcements, and so on; the crusaders would have to be transported to the battle ground by sea, under cover of Great Britain’s magnificent navy. Of course the British have incomparably the best navy in the world—one that could about hold its own, according to Mr Brassey, against Russia and France, Indeed, the British navy is numerically stronger than the fleets of that combination. All fighting isn’t done at sea, however. Bombarding Constantinople to destruction would not amount to much if only the harbour could be occupied, and even if it would, it could be made a terribly difficult task for the whole British navy, by the simple and easy expedient of renderiiig the Dardanelles impassable. The Turks and Russians are not without sea power, either. There are 268 vessels in the Russian navy, 102 (including 18 ironclads) and 25 torpedo-boats in the Turkish. Recently Russia has greatly increased her Black Sea fleet, and massed troops in the vicinity of Turkey ready for action, so that at best the British navy, if it got into the Marmora Sea, would find between the ships of the enemy and the land armaments, which would be carefully disposed thereabout in vast numbers, the possibilities for a fight in which the chances wouldn’t be any more certain in their favour than in favour of the other side. Moreover, what couldn’t be done by sea cofildn’t be done at all. The disparity between David and Goliath would be small compared to that of the British and RussoTurkish land forces.

The navy, however, could uot Ids spared to make a united attack on Russia and Turkey. What is Great Britain’s strength in peace, the extent of her dominion, is her weakness in war. The colonies and India have to be protected, In Africa now there seems to be the greatest difficulty in keeping territory that has been annexed. When the Transvaal affair happened a few months ago the designs of Germany in that direction were made abundantly clear. Since, those designs have been matured, and there can be no doubt that a strong German military leaven pervades the Transvaal at present. In the Zanzibar incident, again, the Germans almost offensively protected, and are still protecting, the usurper whom the British vessels had to bombard out of the Sultanate. On the Niger and Congo, a few months back, the French were rapidly claiming or taking territory that was either virtually or actually British. All round there is a tendency among the Powers to restrict and cramp England ; a jealousy of her which finds open vent in all the European capitals, and threatens to force the early evacuation of Egypt. The navy is required to check the practical enforcement of this tendency, and therefore cannot gafely be mobilised.

Then, what is to be done about India? The Russians would not need to detach soldiers from the force defending Turkey to invade India. They could spare an extra million or two for the purpose easily. The navy might retort on Russian ports, but that wouldn’t compensate for the overrunning of India, and possibly the loss of great tracts of colonial territory which other European Powers would either snatch while England’s back was turned, or extort from her when she was exhausted and crippled after the war. It comes to this, then, in effect, that war against Turkey (and Russia) could only be successful, if at all, by sea. The navy would be required not only to carry on the fight, but also to protect British commerce and colonies. What was available after that had been allowed for would have to meet a desperate and immensely numerous enemy in a nasty corner —an almost inexhaustible enemy, too, because Russia could go on moving up fresh millions every week for quite a long time. Meantime, it would probably be found hard to hold India and many of the African possessions ; and the end would certainly be, on the very brightest speculation, frightful loss of life and property. To crown it all, the Armenians ■would not have been helped. Even if they were not slaughtered at the outset by infuriated Turks, they could not be got at and protected afterwards by the British. " Sooner or later the Sultan will be deposed and sent back into Asia, where lie properly belongs, and his territory subdivided among civilised Powers. It is plainly in apprehension of this latter contingency not being favourable to Russia that the latter is now sheltering Turkey. Until recently there seemed to be no prospect of this strange alliance being made, and Lord Salisbury went so far as to threaten the Sultan with the dismemberment of his Empire. Russia, however, intervened last year, and intimated that she would oppose separate action against Turkey by any other Power, “ and there is no reason,” Lord Rosebery said the other day, “ to suppose that she would have stood alone in that resistance or that she lias since modified her attitude." That is, seemingly, France would probably take part in the resistance. However that may be, it is plain that Great Britain cannot afford the expensive luxury of pretending to protect the Armenians. And what we in these colonies, who are vitally interested in the foreign policy of the Imperial Government when it means Avar, have to hope for is that the prophets of war —the bishops Avho complain that “ the sword has been sheathed too soon," and that the British should accept “ any risk rather than dishonour”—will fail to arouse sufficient public feeling in England to induce the Government to imitate Aliab.