MILITARY SCIENCE.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1266, 4 June 1896, Page 9

MILITARY SCIENCE.

In the event of hostilities breaking out in Europe great stress will undoubtedly bo laid, in tho selection and assignment of officers, upon oxperienco gained in recent ward. This is but natural, as it is well known that in tho profession of anus oven more than in any other experience ever proves the best teacher. The fact must not bo lost sight of, however, that remarkable 'strides have been made during tho last 30 years in the art and scienco of war, and more especially in tactics, that branch of the art which many officers will be called upon to administer. Now, unquestionably, many officers have had neither the time nor opportunity to keep abreast of tl o changes which tactical methods have undergone since tho war. It becomes, then, interesting to note the steps which mark the evolution of the methods in vogue 25 years ago to those advocated by the best authorities to-day, and which officers intrusted with the conduct of battles will bo obliged to take cognisance of. INFANTRY TACTICS. As the infantry comprises the main body of an army, of which the cavalry and artillery, however useful, are but adjuncts, infantry tactics, that is to say, the prescribed methods of conducting an infantry combat, will alone be considered here. The basis of the tactical methods practised during this century is essentially Napoleonic. Napoleon, like Frederick before him, stamped with tho seal of his wonderful victories certain methods of combat which caused them to be adopted by all civilised nations who gave to tho efficiency of their armies that weighty consideration which its importance deserves. Tactics, unlike strategy, whoso principles are immutable, are constantly undergoing change, development, improvement if you will, following closely in the wake of progress in other more pacific lines, and this product of Napoleon, the master mind, proved no exception. NATO I. ICON'S FORMATION. Up to the time of the Austro-Prussian war Napoleon's tactics were still in vogue. His formation for battle may bo briefly described as consisting, first, of a line of skirmishers, to be pushed to tho front to feel tho enemy and open the combat; second, of a number of small columns in rear, to be thrown upon the point of attack to carry it by assault, or, should the skirmishers be driven back, to support them and receive the enemy's attack. Napoleon's skirmish lino was thin, his columns, short at first, became long and unwieldy at Waterloo. Tho sequel will show a final tendency to return, after i changes of marked disparity, to the methods of the great soldier. Tho first material change in Napoleon's tactics was brought about by tho advent of the breechloading rifle, first introduced by the Prussians in 1851 and first tested in the Austro-Prussian war of lSu'G. This short war was marked by two innovations on the part of the Prussians. Besides introducing the needle gun, they had substituted for tho long, unwieldly columns previously in use a largo number of small columns possessing tho advantage of greater mobility. These small columns made up of single companios had more or less independence of action, great discretion being necessarily allowed their captains, and it was a common saying at that time that the victorios of tho war wero won by the captains of companios. INDEPENDENCE OF CAPTAINS. This theory of tho necessary independence of commanders of companies was carried to such an extreme after tho close of this war that a reaction soon set in against it, it 3 opponents claiming that it would eventuato in lack of cohesion between the different parts of a largo command, pre-, vent concert of action and precludo the possibility of control and guidance of thoso under them by commanders of larger units ( such a 3 tho battalion, tho regimont, &c. Such was the feeling springing up | , against these tactics when discussion was i I

put an end to by the outbreak of tho Franco-Prussian war in 1870. The Prussians very wisely decided to make no change at such a time, and the war was fought out on these tactical principles. It is now considered that the part heretofore played by the skirmishers was wholly inadequate to their increased importance, that they must hereafter be used in far greater numbers, that, in fact, the battle formation must be made up almost wholly of skirmish lines, the small columns being retained merely as supports.

The charge was to be done away with, and the destructive fire of the modern rifie was to accomplish at a distance what tho bayonet at close quarters had always heretofore been called upon to do. Such were the ideas pievalent when the TurkoRussian war broke out in 1577. TI'RKO-RUSSIAN LESSONS. The first battles of this war rather favoured these ideas, but the Tutkish fire in front of Plevna, mowing down as it did the helpless Prussian skirmish lines, and yet having in itself nothing in common with the carefully aimed skirmish fire —for the Turks fired straight to the front, regardless of distance, sights or aims convinced tacticians that it fire action was. to become the solo or dominant factor of battle it must be applied by other methods than the above.

The Turks fired at long range, and succeeded in inundating and rendering untenable by their crude process the ground in their front. It was seen then that the long range of (lie rifle, in addition to its rapidity of fire, must lie utilised.

Here we see infantry tactics virtually reduced to nothing more than a mere bombardment of the enemy's position. The steady advance on the enemy, tho hurried, excited firing, the rush upon tho position to carry it by main force—all, every marked feature of the old combat was done away with.

The absurd point to which exaggeration of the assumed all powerfulness of fire was being carried was soon realised by tacticians, and a strong counter current set in against these methods, their opponents maintaining that tire action alone would never drive an enemy worthy of the name from a position which, chosen for the very reason of its strong points of defence, must in the nature of things give tho defensive every advantage of lire over the offensive, that in tlie moral strength acquired by the advance to the front alone could the offensive overcome this disadvantage—that, in short, to drive an enemy from his position it is absolutely essential to approach him, to charge upon him, to forcibly eject him. Convinced of the error of their ways, tacticians new (just 12 years ago) decided on a complete revision of existing methods. A new system was elaborated wherein shock action, the charge, received again recognition commensurate with its supreme importance. The offensive combat was now to be marked by three distinct phasesfirst, the march to within effective range of the enemy ; second, tho advance across the zone of effective fire to within assaulting distance ; third, the assault. Corresponding to these three phases, three divisions of an assaulting force, usually the battalion, were to be made, known respectively as the firing line, the support and the reseivo. EXECUTION* OF THE MANOEUVRES. The march of the firing line to within effective range was to bo made with more or less dispersion of the elements, so as to tako every advantage of cover, the support and reserve; keeping well to the rear. The advance across the zone of effective fire was to be made in thin skirmish lines and by short, quick rushes from point to point, the halts, in recumbent position, being brief, only long enough to enable the men to retake breath and load and fire a few shots. The supreme effort, the assault, marks the third and last phase of the combat. Here at close range, say two or three hundred yards, the combined firing line and support become subject to a terrific fire. Here more than ever a new and powerful impulse is needed to carry tie) lino forwaul and precipitate it upon the foe. This impulse is to lie found in the strong reinforcement now hurried to the front—the reserve. Tlllj FINAL CIIAItOE. At last its time for action has com". Pushed straight up to and beyond the | firing line, with bayonets at the charge the weight of its numbers, its comparative freshness, tho elan of its long restrained ardour, all combine to carry everything with it and launch the whole line in a last supreme effort direct upon the enemy's position.