N.Z. MAIL PUBLISHED WEEKLY. FRIDAY, MARCH 15, 1889.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 889, 15 March 1889, Page 16

N.Z. MAIL PUBLISHED WEEKLY. FRIDAY, MARCH 15, 1889.

It is always with the greatest reluctance that we offer any unfavourable comment upon the action of Judges in their judicial capacity. The maintenance of thorough public confidence in the Bencli is so important that we hold it often preferable to pass over proceedings which we may not wholly approve, rather than to do anything which may have the effect of weakening that confidence. But there must necessarily be some exception to this rule of abstention from comment. Occasions un doubtedly do arise from time to time when newspaper criticism is rendered imperative in the interests of justice. It seems to us that the case In re William Munro, which came before the Bankruptcy Court on Monday last, and which 'was referred to again at Tuesday's sitting, furnishes one of such occasions. The proceedings are duly reported elsewhere. It appears tliat at the Monday s sitting, on the case of VVUliam Munro, a bankrupt, hteing called on, IJr Jellicoe moved, on behalf of the Official A ssignee, to have it declared that the bankrupt’s wife should refund to the estate £IOO paid by the bankrupt to the Wellington Trust aud Loan Society for her use in liquidation of a mortgage which she had created over some property of her own ; also, for an order charging the properly with the said payment. It was alleged that in March. ISSS the bankrupt sftjfttl business with a capital of £2UO, which ins w ft imi ftin for Dade purposes, aim vvhicn Atm raised b_, mortgage on her prnje-iy, She had not proved t*>» tne whole amount ; and an the Ist July, 1887, and in -Tu'y, ISSS, «h----bankrupt paid out of his own moneys two separate sums of £oU each on account of the mortgage. . it was contended, on the o'her side, that Mrs Munro had given Munro the money out of her savings from the household expenses. Tie Chief Justice, in giving judgment, said he disbelieved the statement as to how the money had been saved, ft was proved to his satisfaction that the payment was giafia out of the moneys 'of the bankrupt at a time \yheii he was'in insolvent cirbuinstances. ' An order would be niade'for tmi refund of the £IOO, and' in the alternative charging it on the property. Costs (£5 ss) were given agaiust Mrs Munro. vps qn Monday. wq,* pronounepd Riyd * the case definitely settled, But op Tuesday all this was changed- A night, s reflection had evidently presented the case in a different light to the mind of the Chief Justice, for, when the Court resumed, his Honor intimated with regard to his decision of the 1 previous day as to Mrs Munro’s proof in the estate of her husband, William Munro,'that, “subject of coursq fo money to have been the husband s, as he concluded it was, then the bankrupt;* was' payjng a qebt tg fija vyliipjj Ijp wjpj piif«ct}y anti ii.q to t|u, provided it wrs pot a fraudulent .preference, that was to say, paid within three months of the bankruptcy. There was nothing in the Married Women’s Property Act to prevent his paying his wife a debt before the bankruptcy, aud if it was paid—as he understood it was —more' than three months of the bankruptcy, then it was not a fraudulent’ preference-' was qf opinion that tape wag; tq tjfe point.*’

Noyv, have, of coprse, no intention of referring in any way to the case itself or its merits. That is a question which the Onvt will prpbaWy have still to flQiibider on a motion for the reversal of the order ipade by the Chief Justice on Monday and admitted by hia Honor on Tuesday to have been made in error Nor is it our purpose to say one adverse word as to the action ot his Honor in thus candidly admitting that he had made a mistake on the previous day. On the contrary, it appears to us that his frauk admission of error reflected most honorably upon him, as showing bis paramount desire that strict justice should be done, even though this involved a confession of

erroneous and hasty judgment which could not but have been a somewhat mortifying one for a Chief Justice to make. A Judge less punctiliously careful to do right would probably have left the counsel for the unsuccessful side to take the initiative toward obtaining the reversal of the decision if he deemed there were adequate grounds for such action. Few would have blamed the Chief Justice had he taken that course, but it is all the more to his honour that lie preferred to make a prompt and manly admission ti;afc even a Chief J ustice is not infallible, and that he had given a wrong judgment the day before JN one the less is a very grave hardship and injustice done to the person against whom the confessedly erroneous decision was recorded. For that decision remains unaffected by the learned Judge’s next-day admission of error. It has been pronounced, and stands, until reversed by the Court after a regular process of motion and argument. This is where the hardship enters. Wrong has been done to the two pereens chiefly concerned by an imputation of improper conduct hasiily made and now ro traded. And upon one of those same persons is cast the onus of entering into further litigation in order that the injustice done by a hasty decision may be undone. Upon whom will fall the costs of these further proceedings? If the bankrupt’s wife (against whom costs were given in Monday’s judgment) succeeds in obtaining a formal reversal of the decision, the costs, we presume, follow the result. In that case they will fall on the tank-, rupt’s estate, or, in other words, will come out of the creditors’ pockets. This is a little hard, aud we cannot help thinking that if strict moral justice could be done, the costs ought to be given against the Bench. For it is evident that the whole trouble arose through too hasty ari opinion being formed upon the merits of the case. It a night’s consideration led his Honor to reverse his doiniim of the previous day, it would likewise have led him to deliver a decision diametrically opposite to that which ho did deliver, had he reserved judgunnt upon a point which it is now demonstrated that he had. not adequately weighed before deciding it. I’he same train of thought that brought about so complete a reversal of the yesterday s view, would have evolved a just decision instead of the admittedly un just one which was too hastily pronounced the day before, and which now needs to be formally, as it'has been informally, reversed.

It is for this reason that we venture, with every possible spect for the judicial Bench, to urge the advisableness of avoiding such unfortunate occurrences by taking all time to, consider q cage ‘b&fom delivering judgment. Thera is, no doubt, a temptation to pronounce off-hand upon a case which at the first blush may seem a simple one, and, we are aware ihatj some Judges pride themselves on never (or “ hardly ever ”) reserving judgment. The phenomenal acumen displayed by the famous English Judge, the late Sir George Jessel, the mflfV vellous rapidity with which, he arrived at an alrnost-ipvariably accurate view of a pqne, and' the praises lavished on that extraordinary man for the vast saving of time and expense which hie wonderful brought about, hqye 'inspired a general desire, to follow GO hriUmnt examt Ip. But. while"the sayiiig of time and _ expense may be great if these lightning judgments always prove accurate, the case is very different should fche decisions be inaccurate and involve special litigation to rectify them. Bor then there is needless waste of time and trouble and temper as well as of money. From Gverv viewp°i better, to takers ; little mortJ tu%e £>» deliberation in order t'bafc the judgment, when delivered, may be sound. “ J&st/ina, is a wise old saying, for “ Xt i§ bettor to be sqre than garrjf, u