Fair Play.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 879, 4 January 1889, Page 28

Fair Play.

According to a recent London telegram the inhabitants of the chief English ports have declined without thanks the proposal that they should provide their own defences against invasion by a foreign foe. It appears from the cable message that on Friday last a deputation, headed by Sir William Armstrong, the head of the eminent engineering firm ol .New-castle-on-Tyne, waited on the English Prime Minister, and presented an address, in which the signatories stated that they absolutely declined to initiate the local defences of the Clyde, Eorth, Mersey, Tees, and Tyne, Bubmitting that this was a duty devolving on the Government. They strongly urged the necessity of taking urgent measures to place the defences on a proper basis, and expressed the opinion that the present defences were quite inadequate. It can hardly excite much surprise that the ratepayers residing in the various British ports should fail to see that the duty devolves upon them of undertaking so vital a part of the Empire’s defences as tbe protection of the chief porta. Why should they ? The Bafety of every British port is quite as much the concern of the entire Empire as it is of the people who happen to live on the spot. J-h® capture, or sack, or bombardment of Liverpool, Glasgow, Edinburgh or Newcastle would be an unprecedetuecl blow and injury and humiliation to the whole Empire. The successful holding of an English port by a hostile force would be tantamount to England s crushing defeat, and the extreme force of Great Britain would have to be put forth—and assuredly would be put forth —to preventer repair such a disaster. There can be no mere local interests in Buch a .case. The question is an Imperial one in every sense. But for possible Imperial disputes the ports would be in no danger. Their danger in its general aspect is one which they share with all other parts of the Empire, and the provision for defence ought to be a Summon one. The inhabitants .of the different seaport towns are of .course bound to supply their share of the cost of the common defence, but it would clearly be unfair and unreasonable to expect that they should contribute more than their share merely because the value of the ports to Imperial interests is so great as to attract the special invidious attention of the Empire’s enemies. Bather on that ground are they entitled to special consideration and protection at the cost of j the common purse. But their case is even stronger than this.

There can be no doubt at all that all the unfortified or weakly fortified seaport towns will be exposed to additional risk in case of war through the particular care devoted toward ensuring the impregnableness of London, Chatham, Portsmouth, and Plymouth. A “ dash on London” is the favourite theoretical exploit of the future invader of England, but in view of the enormous influence which the metropolis can exercise, it is probable that unless the country is taken by surprise, or involved suddenly and unexpectedly in a great war, such care will have been taken to render London approximately impregnable that au enemy might be disposed to think twice, or oftener, before venturing upon so formidable an enterprise as its attempted capture. The consequence would be the diversion of the hostile intentions to points less efficiently protected, and in this way the places distinguished by these disagreeable attentions would actually be exposed to increased risk through the expenditure, to which they had contributed their share, on the defences of London and Portsmouth. Unless, therefore, it were proposed to relieve Liverpool, Newcastle, and other ports from a proportionate part of their contributions to the general taxation in consideration of their undertaking their own defences, it would be highly inequitable to devolve such a responsibility upon them. The increase in local rates has been almost as steady and heavy in many British towns as in New Zealand boroughs and harbour districts. The poor-rates, police-rates, and education-rates have been felt very severely during the recent depression, the last-named impost especially, which has in some instances grown into an almost intolerable burden. To add a new defence rate to all these would be rightly felt a grievous hardship, and we are not at all surprised to find an early opportunity taken to repudiate and protest against any such scheme. Even were the respective ports disposed to undertake their own defences the advantages of the plan seem exceedingly dubious as compared with those attaching to a well-devised and adequate system of Imperial defence. Conflicts between the local and central authorities, or at the least serious heartburnings, would be almost inevitable if the expenditure of the locally-raised funds should be interfered with by the Government, and yet failing some control from headquarters there would assuredly be a lack of concert and homogeneity in the national defence system which could not fail to prove extremely prejudicial to its efficiency in time of need. The only safe and proper course is for England as a nation to undertake her own defences, and to do it thoroughly at the common cost. To expect Liverpool or Hull or Sunderland to [provide its own fortifications would be as unjust as to throw upon the ports of Auckland, Wellington Lyttelton and Dunedin the cost of the defence works which have been carried out in the interest of the whole Colony. Defence against a common foe can only be satisfactorily or equitable undertaken at the common charge and under the direction of one central authority.