Russia and England in lndia.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 850, 15 June 1888, Page 9

Russia and England in lndia.

Edward Lawrence, in ‘Time.’

The loose reasoner and superficial observer, who takes his ideas of Eastern thought and politics from the speeches and writings of_a class of malcontents, which in India, as in all more advanced and educated societies, civilisation las brought into undue prominence, is apt to imagine that the lucubrations of Poona Brahmins or the effusions of Bengali Baboos are thoroughly representative of the feeling of the populace that surround them. Nothing can be more erroneous than this opinion they have the Bame relation to such popular feeling as the fonl gases, which find their, way through the ventilators of some well-filled room, do to pure air with which it was originally filled, and in their outgoing are 'cqually.as harmless. But education, whilst it ha‘, aa was only to be expected, brought ato existence a class of this nature, has had a deeper and far different influence npon the vast majority of our Indian fellow-subjects. It, has taught them that whatever may be the defects of our rule (and that they.: are many I for one would be the last to deny), it has secured to them advantages such as India never before had enjoyed, and which a severance from that rule would ruthlessly, sweep away. Peace, securityj juStree, _ improved means of com.munication, extended commerce, immunity from famine and from pestilence—these are - but a piortion of the blessings which- have been brought in its train. A return to anarchy and internal war would indisputably be avoided by all ; arid what Is the alternative to this should the British power in Indio be annihilated ? TVhat else but the Russian yoke ? And "are we to imagine that the educated native of India, with all his susceptibility and intelligence, is unaware of what is connoted by this term? It always seems to me that those who hold that, in the event of a Russian attack upon India, serious objections on the part of the nativesisto be anticipated, pay a less ’ compliment to their common sense than to their good feeliDg. The writer (in the Fortnigh'ly, to whom allusion has already been made, lays it down that ‘lndia certainly canbofc be defended if the native princes turn against us.’ In this I entirely concur, .with this slight modification (whiohy however, I apprehend was pre. sent to his mind at thetime of writing), that the defence is to be made against_ an attack from a first-rate military power like Russia. And yet the only logical result of the acceptance of such a proposition is that we should actively proceed with the work of enlisting the aid of the natives towards the general scheme of defence, and extend to them for that purpose that implicit confidence which alone’ oau afford a safe and solid basis for mutual co-operation and assistance. We have probably,; it is true, a short breathing-Bpace before us. ; The digestion of their latest swallowed acquisitions must be for the Russians a work of at least a few years ; though, looking at the rapidity with which advance has recently followed npon advance, he would be a bold man who dare prophesy that the day when we shall have to meet them face to face on an eastern battle-field is distant by even a decade. Thus, though we have a breathing space, it may be but a short'one, and the time has surely come when the final dispositions forthe straggle must .be made. It has been well for England that hitherto she has had at the helm of affairs in India a statesman of such well-tried parts as Lord Dufferin, into whose hands momentous issues may be trusted with the utmost degree of confidence. But he is now retiring, and I cannot refrain from the expression of a fear lest his successor, however able and ably supported, should in any way, allow his better instincts _ to bo adversely influenced by the prejudices of those timid and ultra-conservative AngloIndian politicians, whose counsels, both at Simla and at the Indian office, have not undeservedly acquired a notoriety for their utter want of appreciation of the rapid changes which mark the course of events in the East. As explanatory of tbia fear I

would call attention to the .earlier stage of the late Burmese war, in which the Viceroy, in spite of the dictates of his own reason, and in deference to party exigencies at Home, adopted a course 6taction whioh met with well-deserved failure- The attempt to complete the subjugation of Burmah by a coup do main, and at a nominal cost, was from the outset known by all practical men to be impossible, and was only made in order to raise a successful party-cry. lam fully alive to the fact thaU the subsequent management cf affairs in the province have atoned as far as possible, for the omissions made in the initial plan of campaign ; and I only mention the point as illustrative of the sinister influence which is at times cast over the polioy of the Viceregal government by the intervention of the authorities at homo, I mean of that inconsequent and inscrutable<Btate-tnachine ‘the Secretary of State for Indiain'Council.’ That in the present instance Lord Dufferin will allow such an influence . 7 to • prejudice his decision upon any measures \ necessary for the defence of the empire,-I am not inclined to believe, nor that he will fail to avail himself of the opportunity afforded, by the spontaneous outburst of loyalty ou the. part, of the native prinoes for enlisting their active co-operation in any soheme for the furtherance of so important an object, remembering always the old saying, that ho ‘Who will not take, when onoe ’tis offer’d,

Shall never find it more.’ is as frequently true ia tbe.ryeightier matters of state-oraffc as in the • more trivial occurrences of every-day life.