INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

New Zealand Herald, Volume 82, Issue 25214, 29 May 1945, Page 3

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

DISPUTES' IN THE DOMINION

BETTER METHODS OF SETTLEMENT By A. E.'C. HARE, Ph.D.

No. I. As Valder Research Fellow In Industrial Relations at Victoria University College, Dr Hare has issued annual reports UU42-43-44) on developments in New Zealand industry.

Court in 1894 right down to the Strike and Lockout Emergency Regulations of 1939, the main idea behind the legislation has always been that a system of arbitration coupled with heavy penalties for refusal to accept a decision was the best way of preventing strikes. Experience in New Zealand and in many other countries has, however, shown that legally prohibiting strikes does not prevent them and that the difficulty of enforcing fines on or imprisoning a large number of workmen is so great that strict enforcement of the law is impracticable. Conciliation Commissioners One result the legislation has had: it has prevented the growth in New Zealand of a fully-lledgcd conciliation service. The existing conciliation commissioners and conciliation councils are all part of the legal system for collective bargaining under, the industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act. which culminates in the Arbitration Court; and the commissioners do not normally step outside that legal framework unless by special request. Nor do the commissioners keep watch on industry and endeavour to anticipate the points at which disputes are likely to arise. Their activities an' mainly confined to routine duties undei the I.C. and A. Act, and they intervene only at the request of the parties when a dispute over an award liar broken out. Moreover the commissioners are local officials and as such lack authority of a national scope. Thus the work of the conciliation commissioners is not fully comparable with .that of the conciliation division of the British Ministry of Labour or the conciliation service of the United States Department of Labour. The last .'i() years has seen a remarkable growth in the means of voluntary conciliation and of methods of State intervention in these countries; but in New Zealand no parallel growth has taken place, because it has been assumed that the legal framework of the arbitration system is sufficient to firevent all but occasional strikes. The strikes of the last four years should be sufficient proof that something further than legal prohibition is now required. (To Ik> rnncliidrd.)

The past year has seen a notable increase in the number of serious strikes in New Zealand and it seems probable that the coming year and the years immediately following the end of the war are likely, as in the period 1918-1921, to witness many further industrial struggles. It is not the purpose of this article to examine the causes of this- increasing industrial discord because, while it may be possible gradually to remove the causes of industrial strife, there is no prospect of doing so within a short time. The measures required for this are of such a nature that slow progress is all that can be hoped for.

The immediate task, therefore, is to improve, as far as is possible, our methods of settling disputes once they have arisen, so that, should we have to face a post-war industrial crisis, we may do so with our machinery for settlement in the best possible working order.

The main fault apparent to the external observer watching dispute after dispute in many different industries is that the machinery for preventing a strike is frequently not set in motion until too late in the dispute, and is often needlessly slow in reaching a sett lenient. In oacli of the last three years my annual reports have contained an examination of serious strikes in which, after signs of trouble had become evident, delay was one of the major contributory causes of the strike. Three Cases of Delay The industrial troubles fln the West Coast in February and March, 1914, were anticipated before the holidays began in December, 1943. An outbreak of strikes was to be expected because the old agreement in the coalmining industry was due to expire in April, 1944; but no action was taken to forestall trouble by reaching a new agreement some time before the old one expired. Toward the end of 1913 there was evidence that a grave dispute was threatening on the railways and that unofficial strikes might take place; hut negotiations were carried on so slowly that it was not until April, 1914, that an Act was passed setting up a tribunal to hear the dispute. There were further delays in appointing the personnel of the tribunal; and in November, 1014. it was dangerously clear that, unless the Railways Tribunal reached a decision on the raihvaymen's claims before Christmas, the impatience of the railway men , who had been waiting more than 18 months for a settlement of their claims, might result in a strike, as it did in.January, 1945.

In the dairy industry it had been evident for more than a year that serious trouble was developing. Threats of direct action were heard two months before the men actually resorted to it in .January. 191") ll in all . these examples (and many more could be given) the danger of an outbreak of industrial strife was apparent to an outside observer, how much more so must it have been to those in close touch "with industry?

From Bad to Worse While the methods available lor the settlement of disputes are not beyond improvement, they are generally adequate. In disputes committees set up under awards, in special disputes committees appointed by the Minister of Labour, in the work oi the conciliation commissioners, and the conciliation councils under the Industrial Concilia tion and Arbitration Act a wide variety of methods is provided by which an agreement may be reached. It is not that the means for reaching a settlement are inadequate, but thaT they are set to work too late in the dispute, or act too slowly once they have been set in motion.

Even in quarters which frequently handle industrial disputes it is not generally realised how vitally important time can be in preventing a strike. Even so little as 24 hours may make all the difference between a settlement without a stoppage and a serious strike. Delay in reaching a settlement gives time for opinion to harden on both sides, for hotheads to get a hearing, or for decisions' to be taken which are not easily rescinded. The further the dispute goes without a settlement the more complicated are the issues likely to become. Old quarrels are raked up. personal animosities grow, all kinds of irrelevances are hrougbt in, people commit themselves to positions from which they cannot withdraw without loss of prestige, and settlement becomes more difficult to achieve. These are very important reasons for reaching a settlement with the least possible delay. Sparks Cause Explosions There is a further and even more important reason. When relations are strained, no one can say when the most trivial matter may not give rise to a serious dispute. Often, in times of industrial unrest, a minor issue may generate a general explosion of feeling and a widespread stoppage of work. Thus, for instance, the Waikato strike of 1942 began over the minimuni wages of 10 miners at one mine and spread to all the mines in the field. The immediate cause of the outbreak was easily dealt with by negotiation when the strike was over. It could as easily have been dealt with before the strike began. It is clear, therefore, that to neglect any possible cause of friction, even for a few days, merely opens the wav for a serious conflict.

What has been said concerning delayin taking measures to reach a settlement, delay in setting up a disputes committee, or delay in intervention b.v the State applies equally to the delays that occur when the machinery for negotiation works too slowly, once it lias been set in motion. If disputes committees adjourn without reaching a settlement, or decide to sit next week instead of this, or in fact fail to reach a settlement, promptly and, having failed, do not at once pass the dispute on to n higher body with more authority, needless opportunity is given for the growth of an industrial conflict on a larger scale. Legal Sanctions Delays in the working of negotiating and arbitration machinery have been very noticeable in the last few years. The interminable delays of the railways industrial tribunals in reaching a decision, the years of litigation over the harbour boards' dispute and the announcement of the Coal Mines Council, when the. Kamo mine at Whangarei was idle as the result of a strike, that, it would arrive in 10 days' time to hear the dispute and give a decision are all examples of this tendency.

The reasons for the delays which occur in setting in motion the machinery for the settlement of disputes are so varied that no generalisation about the causes of delay can be made. One fact, however, stands out clearly. It is no one's responsibility to see that there is no delay. New Zealand, unlike most other countries, has always relied on legal sanctions for the prevention of strikes. From the inception of the Arbitration