FOREIGN POLICY

New Zealand Herald, Volume 82, Issue 25202, 15 May 1945, Page 3

FOREIGN POLICY

TRUMAN'S METHODS DEALING WITH RUSSIA NOT ROOSEVELT TECHNIQUE BY A. D. BOTHMAN (Special Washineton Correspondent) Enough has occurred in the early stages of the United Nations Conference on International Organisation to indicate fundamental differences in method between the late President Roosevelt and President Truman in the conduct of America's foreign policy—if not in that policy itself. The admission of Argentina to the conference and the question of seating Polish representatives at San Francisco have clearly revealed these differences. It was a byword of President Roosevelt's domestic administration that when an important Governmental agency which he created to accomplish some vital task failed to do so he almost always created still another agency to top the first one and so get the .job done. His conduct of foreign relations, particularly with Russia, was almost exactly similar. Alter Teheran Thus the Teheran Conference was supposed to settle a number of outstanding questions about European dispositions. The Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers also supposedly went as far as one could hope at the time to implement the great tripartite unity. But somehow with the lapse of time it was disclosed that Russia was not interpreting the agreements reached in the way it was hoped. The Roosevelt method of handling this situation was not to demand and stand by the demand that the Teheran and Moscow agreements must be implemented by Russia in the manner in which these agreements were interpreted by the United States, but, instead, he sought still another meeting with Stalin. To see this point it is only necessary to recall the differences of opinion that arose between Britain, America, and Russia on Rumania after an agreement thereon had been reached. Correspondence With Stalin Before his death it was said Roosevelt was engaged in a personal exchange of messages with Stalin in an effort to clear up the Polish differences. This exchange was in a sense still another conference—after Yalta—to achieve ends which it was expected Yalta had achieved. Conceivably, had Roosevelt lived, there might have . been still another face-to-face meeting between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin to accomplish what each of a number of successive face-to-face conferences had not accomplished. It is said among those close to the White House that Roosevelt in April was gradually coming to a point where he would demand that Russia fulfil her commitments at Yalta before going on to other business, such as what to do with Germany. But evidence is against this conclusion. Molotov and Argentina On the other hand, the Truman method as disclosed to date is to stand for the fulfilment of what is already written on paper before writing any more. Molotov had all the moral arguments on his side on Argentina's admission to Uncio. The opportunism of Argentina's declaration of war and adherence at Chapultepec to the policy of aiding the United Nations' war effort was only too clear. But the United States had definitely committed herself to Latin.Americans that she would support Argentina's admission to Uncio if she signed at Chapultepec. Truman was determined to carry out the commitment even if it meant not meeting Molotov's reasonable request for a few days' delay about the issue of Argentina. Even more important. Truman is determined that Russia .is to meet her commitments in the Yalta Agreement on broadening the base of the Polish Government before the admission of its representatives to Uncio. Truman has that kind of mind, apparently. He will not add reconciliation to reconciliation in order ultimately to achieve the purpose of the first reconciliation, as Roosevelt almost always did. His method is to get each reconciliation carried out before going on to a reconciliation on the next question. Polish Government If it is the purpose of the Soviet, as Russian circles privately admit, not to give Britain and America any real share in the selection of the membership of the Polish Government, then it can be said that the Russians will find a Tartar in Truman. The wisdom of Truman acting the role of a Tartar is altogether another thing. Roosevelt achieved a great deal with the Russians by playing a directly opposite role. It is only necessary to remember haw Roosevelt agreed that Russia should have three votes at Uncio if the United States could have the same, and then abandoned the three-vote idea for the United States, to see the proof of this. But if one wishes to understand why a divergence between the United States and Russia at Uncio is under the surface really widening, if on the surface apparently not much harm has been done over the Argentine issue, one must realise the full significance of the differences in the Roosevelt and Truman methods. Matters like the new Government in Austria can be expected, moreover, still further to harden Truman, and he will he eyen firmer on the primary question in his mind at the momenta—Poland. FUTURE WORLD COURT QUESTION OF LOCATION MANY SUGGESTIONS MADE SAN FRANCISCO, May 12 . Though discussion of the ultimate site of the world security organisation headquarters has not yet'come into the open at the United Nations Conference on International Organisation, an announcement that The Hague has been chosen for the World Court has aroused speculation. The matter has not been discussed formally by the- delegates, but various suggestions are already being canvassed. Here are some of them: A consensus of opinion rules out Geneva (although the necessary buildings already exist there), because the whole tenor of the present conference —largely as a concession to American and other opinion—has been to forget all precedents of the League of Nations. Vienna has been suggested, but many believe it holds too many memories of reaction. In fact, Europe may have been ruled out because of the shifting centre of gravity of international affairs. Why not San Francisco? Europeans, including Russia, are likely to consider it too far away in spite of increasing travel facilities to come in the future. Other suggestions have been Quebec, Boston, Philadelphia. One of the most interesting proposals is that the United States and Canada should present a strip of territory somewhere near the Middle West where an entirely new city might be built. None of these suggestions should be taken as in any way authoritative, hut the question will have to be resolved sooner or later.

"HEADACHE" FOR ARMY The United States Army knows it will have "the biggest headache" in its history when men from the European theatre are moved to their second war, writes the Washington correspondent of an American journal. Letters already are pouring in: "My b'ov has served his time; let someone else go." But Japan must be defeated, and the only way to do it is to send seasoned men ther».