The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1944 BARRIER OF THE MEUSE

New Zealand Herald, Volume 81, Issue 25085, 26 December 1944, Page 4

The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1944 BARRIER OF THE MEUSE

Unless Field-Marshal von Rundstedt can force the crossings of the Meuse in the neighbourhood of Liege down to Sedan, place the bulk of his army over the river and be so sure of his communications that he can push on in the blitzkrieg manner, disaster may overwhelm him. It is now possible to see from the direction of Rundstedt's drives an attempt to cut the communications of the four northern armies dependent on Antwerp, Zeebrugge, Calais and Boulogne. The ability of these armies, or a portion of them, to apply pressure against the northern flank of the enemy thrust is contingent on their keeping open their supply lines from the Channel ports. These are safe so long as the Meuse barrier is held. The river with its escarpments is the key position in the current campaign. Rundstedt will be aware that unless he secures the crossings all the territorial gains he has made in the Ardennes will be comparatively worthless and may prove to be a net from which it will be hard to break loose. He should also know that this fact will not be lost upon General Eisenhower. At this particular time Rundstedt is likely to be more anxious for information on the measures being taken by the Allies to hold the river crossings than on the development of threats to his flanks. It is in search of such information that his fighting patrols crossed the Maas on the British Second Army front. If portion of this army has been sent to the Meuse, or has taken over part of the front held by the Ninth or First American Armies, Rundstedt would like to know of the move as early as possible. It is true that the Meuse did not prove a substantial obstacle in the campaigns of 1914 and 1940. In 1914 the Germans took three days after crossing the border to reach the river. That time was sufficient to permit the Belgians to man the fortresses of Liege and Namur, but it was not long enough to allow them to carry out King Albert's plan of placing the field army in position on the river. In consequence, the enemy was able to find crossing places not dominated by the fortresses. Their subjugation was left to, heavy siege artillery and some infantry formations while the main forces carried on through Belgium and the French Ardennes to meet the British at Mons and the French Fifth Army on their right. Even so the defence of Liege and Namur, although brief, hampered the German supply system. In 1940, the offensive through the Ardennes to the Meuse was unopposed. General Gamelin was late in trying to put the Ninth Army on the river and it never arrived there as a fighting formation. Bridges which should have been demolished fell into enemy hands undamaged, and in a few days the Germans were upon the Allied hinge at Sedan in full strength. It was a classic example of the uselessness of natural or artificial obstacles when not adequately covered by fire. Since Rundstedt is aware of the importance of the Meuse and will credit General Eisenhower with similar knowledge, it should be accepted that he will try to have a counter ready to any move which the Allied commander may make for the defence of the river. An obvious one would be speed and vigour in the assault—a determination to carry the river before its defence could be properly arranged. It would be surprising if this suceeded, as the Allies have had over a week to assess the scope and direction of the attack and to make the necessary moves which could be part of a larger scheme for the enemy's discomfiture. An alternative would be to lure the Allies into making' a strong concentration on the Meuse and then, when they appear to be irrevocably committed there, strike on another part of the front. To do this Rundstedt would need a second offensive army, for it would be imperative for the success of the plan that there should not be any easing of the pressure toward the Meuse. He must also find another soft spot on the Allied front, one that leads to a point which the Allies cannot afford to lose or, alternatively, threatens a substantial Allied force. The soft spot might be found in the Vosges and the American Seventh and Third Armies could be the objective of the attack. Although the swiftness of the German recovery has dimmed the false optimism of many early expectations, there is no evidence that the enemy, still on the defensive east of Aachen, actively employed toward the Meuse, hard pressed in Italy and Hungary and under threat of attack in the East, also possesses the resources with which to play a cat-and-mouse game with the Allies in the West. Rundstedt's real worry will come when, or if, he arrives at the Meuse.

THE GOOD OFFICIAL The growth of bureaucracy in these times calls for so much criticism on points of principle and practical detail that it is pleasant to find a commercial body, the Wellington Chamber of Commerce, specially commending the late Rationing Controller, Mr J. E. Thomas, for the considerate and helpful way in which he carried out a difficult task. The resolution passed by the chamber shows that it is possible to distinguish between a system of public administration and the officials who operate it. The hidebound public servant who occasionally comes to notice may too easily be allowed to obscure the merits of vastly greater numbers who do their jobs with intelligence, human sympathy and as much initiative as red tape permits them to exercise. Mr Thomas was a particularly good example of the capable official. He had to administer the rationing of food and clothing from its inception in April, 1942, and did so until this month, when he resigned for reasons of health. It is safe to say that no form of State control affecting the whole population of New Zealand has worked more smoothly. Mr Thomas' task required him to make quick adaptations as circumstances changed, to suit his control to trade practices in town and country and

to exercise constant ingenuity and resource. Business people always found him friendly, reasonable and understanding. Such criticism as rationing incurred under his charge was mainly due! to Government policy or other outside factors. Mr Thomas' record gives further proof that unwelcome legislation, and even some which is open to attack on grounds of principle, can be made to work by the day-to-day common sense of those whose duty is to administer it.

BRITAIN'S WAR EFFORT

News that Britain, in the sixth year of war, is calling a further 250,000 men to frontline service should bring plaudits from the whole Allied world to a country which continues to plod with dogged determination along a road winding upward all the way. It is true that reduced naval and air commitments in Europe through the breaking of German power in these elements will allow numbers of men to be put«into khaki instead of blue or grey, but this means not the least slackening in the total effort, which has been, and still is, stupendous and unsurpassed anywhere. Of a total male population last June of 15,910,000 between the ages of 14 and-64, the number in the armed forces was 4,602,000. There were 225,000 in whole-time civil defence, 7,269,000 in war and highly-essential industries, 2,900,000 in other occupations and 1,014,000 unavailable by reason of age or disability. The total number of men put into uniform since the beginning of the war was about 5,400,000, and casualties totalled 563,000, including over 176,000 dead, plus nearly 30,000 deaths of merchant seamen, and over 57,000 of civilians. Out of 16,020,000 females from 14 to 59, those in the uniformed services were 523,000, and in essential industry 3,495,000. The recent White Paper makes an illuminating comparison between the mobilisation of manpower, including women, in 1918 and 1944. This shows that the percentages of population within the agelimits mentioned who were in uniform or making munitions rose from 27.8 in 1918 to 32.3 in 1944, and the corresponding total numbers were 7,730,000 and 10,310,000. Thus the present war effort is both greater in the aggregate and in proportion to. the people available. In production of material it is greater still.