The New Zealand Herald. AUCKLAND, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1944 WEST EUROPEAN SECURITY

New Zealand Herald, Volume 81, Issue 25053, 17 November 1944, Page 4

The New Zealand Herald. AUCKLAND, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1944 WEST EUROPEAN SECURITY

Following closely on the renewal of the British Entente Cordiale with France, General de Gaulle and his Foreign Minister, M„ Bidault, have accepted the Soviet Government's invitation to visit Moscow. The sequence is natural and logical. Twice within a generation West and East Europe have been afflicted by the aggressive evil at the Centre. Future peace and security demand that the sources of conflict be contained and kept innocuous. An effective system will require close co-opera-tion between West and East. They must never again be sundered as they were in 1938-39. Britain over two years ago gave form to the cooperative principle in the AngloSoviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance. The two Great Powers "agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the re-establishment of peace for the organisation of security and economic prosperity in Europe." In a speech last November Marshal Stalin laid especial emphasis on the need for a stable settlement in Europe, where the two world wars started. The weakness of the AngloSoviet Alliance in working for peace is geographical—it does not possess even a bridgehead in West Europe, much less bases and space from which to deploy forces on Germany's western frontiers. That is one strong reason why the return of France to the company of the Great Powers is to be welcomed, as well as the prompt sequel seen in the invitation to Moscow. A revitalised France will be ideally placed to keep the reverse "watch on the .Rhine" and to complete a Grand Alliance for the discipline of Central Europe.

Such a continental alliance could and, of course, would be fitted into the framework of the world security organisation. Within the Continent itself, moreover, Kussia is working for the integration defensively of East Europe. The Soviet regional system would be reinforced if its complement were organised in West Europe. Britain has been urged to take the lead in such a movement for security through unity and Mr Eden has given his blessing to the conception. Until recently the idea had followed General Smuts' outline of linking up the British Empire with the "small democracies" of West Europe, one that carries military and political drawbacks as well as advantages. Suppose the links were to be, forged with the Low Countries, Norway, and perhaps Denmark. This narrow coastal fringe would provide Britain with a continental bridgehead, it is true, but one that militarily might prove a dangerous embarrassment a liability rather than an asset. Britain would for thd defence of her continental friends be saddled for all time with the necessity of maintaining a massive army as well as a firstclass navy and air force, Furthermore, it should be recognised that France possesses, and in the past has repeatedly asserted, an interest in the disposition of the Low Countries as vital as the historic British interest. Therefore on military grounds—to provide a substantial base in Europe—and on political grounds—to avoid a cause of suspicion and antagonism—France must be included in any regional organisation of West Europe. A year ago General Smuts said, "France is gone and, if ever she returns, it will be 'a hard, long, upward pull to emerge again." .His judgment was hotly contested then and, in the light of subsequent events, seems today to have been shaken, if not overthrown.

Speaking in Paris on his recent visit, Mr Churchill left no doubt of his faith in the full restoration of Franee. He went further in speaking of the part France could play in , the construction of practical guarantees for future security in West Europe. Most of the published accounts of the discussions in Paris dealt with the organisation of the immediate French contribution to the Allied cause. That would be in accord with Mr Churchill's overriding priority of prosecuting the war unto victory. With that, however, went the exploration of the possibilities of making a regional pact in West Europe. In the approach the opening was made, per--1 haps designedly, by one of the ; "small democracies" whose Governments for a year past have been canvassing the idea in London. The initiative was taken .by the Belgian Premier, M. Pierlot, who a fortnight ago acknowledged that the old Belgian policy of neutrality is no longer adequate. He favoured "an exchange of bases between Britain and Belgium." The statement could scarcely have been better designed to engage the attention of Belgium's neighbours, France and the Netherlands. The latter is reported as "greatly interested" and France to have accepted the argument that the common interests of West Europe should find some political and economic expression. It is probable that little more may be heard of* project until Russia and the United States have been informed and consulted. It will be particularly important to reassure the Soviet as to the motives behind any pact and to demonstrate to both the compatibility of a West European bloc with world security. When these conditions have been satisfied, the world should hear more of the progress made in Paris. BATTLE IN A SWAMP The Second Army's attack in South-east Holland in the WeertMeijel sector is a tactical operation undertaken to improve local positions. Weert is roughly 12 miles from Roermond, an important crossing of the Maas, and from which radiate three roads leading generally in the direction of Dusseldorf and Cologne. A main highway also runs north and south through the town. Roermond therefore has considerable tactical value in any operations which may be directed against these two German cities in conjunction with a move east from Nijmegen and one by the American First Army in the Aachen sector. Weert lies jua the middla p| loe-

lying country which is mostly swamp in the winter, bub between the Weert and Iloermond there is a slight ridge 90ft high. Small as this ridge is, it is enough to provide drier conditions than those suffered by the British at Weert and it also affords the Germans observation over the country. It is therefore a desirable objective in itself, but its capture must also bo looked upon as a preliminary to an assault over the Maas against Iloermond. With Roermond and Aachen in Allied hands, the Germans left in the Maestricht appendix of Holland will be pinched out. All this is easily stated, but realisation of the plan under the prevailing conditions is another matter. It is stated that the enemy resistance is thin. Yet there will be small pockets of resistance which must be cleared out. This means much slithering and crawling through ice-cold swamps where the risk of drowning is almost equal to that of injury by enemy action. It is an undertaking only for valiant hearts. The operation may be a small one and in the official histories receive some such bare mention as "the Weert salient was next reduced," but it is of the type that leaves lasting memories with the participants.