The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1944 COMMAND OF THE SEA

New Zealand Herald, Volume 81, Issue 25051, 15 November 1944, Page 4

The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1944 COMMAND OF THE SEA

German seapower, except in home waters, has been dealt its final blow by the destruction of the superbattleship Tirpitz. The power of the long-range U-boats has gone, the Luftwaffe no longer holds bases from which reconnaissance ancl bombing aircraft could i sweep the Atlantic highways, and the remaining surface units are insufficient in numbers and power to be much more than a nuisance, albeit a nuisance against which guard must be maintained. German naval strategists and writers are bound to inquire why once again the Reich has failed at sea. It can be predicted they will miss the core,of the problem as they did after the last war. The land-minded Germans, with only a small leaven of genuine seafarers, cannot grasp that a navy, to quote the British historian Bryant, "is not just an assemblage of ships and guns," but "an instrument evolved through the ages by constant practice and experiment for creating and training men to command the sea." With all its technical brilliance, German imagination lacks ability to understand fully what is meant by command of the sea. To quote Bryant again: "Seapower means command of the sea's surface ; in other words, the denial of that surface to the enemy and freedom to use it oneself." Denial of the ocean highways to the Allies was the aim and object of the German Navy in the last war and in this one. It had no vision of such a triumph that German commerce would be able to sail untrammelled. In consequence, although German naval efforts have proved exceedingly costly to the Allies, and especially to Britain, they have been so ill-bal-anced that their failure was inevitable.

An admission by the Admiralty to the British Cabinet in the grim days of 1917: "There is not going to be any 1918 campaign for us unless we can find some way to stop the •U-boats," was one of the dominating influences on German naval thought after the last war. A few dreamed of the revival of the High Sea Fleet and of naval competition with Britain. Admiral Karl Doenitz, who, in 1930, produced the blue-prints and the shadow organisation of powerful U-boat squadrons which were to be the instrument with which Germany, although not acquiring command of the sea for herself, would deny that command to her enemies. Doenitz knew that the reply to the U-boat was the convoy. The counter to the convoys was accurate knowledge of their whereabouts to be obtained from air leconnaissance, "wolf-pack" tactics by squadrons of very long-range submarines, and fast surface raiders capable of destroying the escorts and convoys and of escaping before heavy units of the Allied navies could intervene. These were the ideas which inspired the building of the pocket-battleships Admiral Graf Spee, Admiral Scheer and the Deutschland/ now the Lutzow. The Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau, the former sunk and the latter out of action, could show a clean pair of heels to any pre-war British capital ship except the Hood. And to tie up a large number of British heavy ships, the Bismarck and the Tirpitz were built. The abnormally strong escorts on the Murmansk convoys and the use of such ships as the Rodney on Atlantic convoys are witnesses to the effectiveness of their constant threat. How serious the U-boat menace was to Britain during this war is common knowledge. To say that the defeat of the submarine was due to the prowess of the Royal Navy and of the Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force is to beg the issue. Long before the war the Admiralty knew the dangers to be met and how best they could be overcome. But hesitant politicians and more reluctant taxpayers refused the Navy the means to do its work. What really saved Britain on this occasion was the lateness of the German start with submarine warfare and raiding on a large scale. The Germans were not ready for it when they seized the west coast of France. They had to build their long-range submarines in numbers and design and construct the bombing aircraft to take advantage of their new bases. The Royal Navy did noble work at the beginning of the war, as it has ever since, but had the Germans been prepared it is extremely doubtful if, at that time, it could have got convoys across the Atlantic. The Navy, and Britain, were saved by the grace afforded unwillingly by the enemy. That is a point not to be forgotten by the taxpayer of the future. To the credit of the current taxpayers let it be said they have given the Royal Navy since then all the instruments needful for their vast and onerous duties. These can be performed only by well-balanced fleets of ships of all types, of which the battleships is the backbone. That Prince of Wales and Renown and now the Tirpitz have been sunk by air attack proves no more than vulnerability under certain circumstances. Had the Americans in the Coral Sea on May 7, 1942, possessed one fast battleship they could have closed in the gathering darkness on the Japanese carrier fleet, then only 30 miles away, and destroyed it. In spite of many setbacks the navies of the Allies have proved that command of the sea means ability to use the ocean highways oneself besides denying them to the enem£.

OUR GREAT AMBASSADOR If Britain's debt to Mr Churchill be almost incalculable, the obligations of the other nations of Europe to him are little less. He has added to his many functions the role of ambassador at large. In spite of his years he journeys to Moscow, Teheran, Cairo, Rome and Paris as the needs of the United Nations demand. "He doth bestride the nar : row world like a Colossus." None of the other great Allied leaders is so untiring, a traveller; none bears Mr Churchill's weight of years; none is so young. The Prime Minister, the imperious, ebullient politician of his earlier years, is now a statesman of infinite patience, preserving with profound skill the harmony of the

Grand Alliance against Hitler. One is irresistibly reminded of the efforts of his great ancestor, the Duke of Marlborough, to cement the alliance <?f the States fighting the King of France : "His own discretion and frequent submissions, combined with the shattering military events which he produced, preserved to him, if often only in a ghostlike form, a vague but majestic primacy." Such is the language used by Mr Churchill of Marlborough. If the Prime Minister is not so directly responsible for the victories of the Allies he has yet inherited much of the strategic ability of his ancestor. Mr Churchill was the first to lift Europe from the depths. A Bjitish subject may be pardoned for thinking his primacy both majestic and real. His diplomatic powers have never been seen to better advantage than during his visit to Paris. He was visiting a capital which he loved, a people whose genius he admired, but who had suffered the agonies of defeat. It was well done to recognise that but for the Channel Britain might have suffered the same fate as her ally. It was even better to speak to the French as a wise mentor, supremely qualified to tell the benefits of unity to a nation whose disunity had helped to make her a prey to Hitler. Nothing has so become Mr Churchill as the friendship and the warm affection he has lavished on a proud and brilliant people—the French whose destiny is entwined with our own. IMMIGRATION POLICY For social, economic and security reasons, New Zealand's greatest need is a larger population. It is folly, therefore, that prospective immigrants making inquiries at New Zealand House, 'London, should be turned empty away. No one would gainsay Mr Fraser's dictum that the Dominion must provide first for the rehabilitation of her own servicemen. But while this priority must be kept, surely it need not also be exclusive. Certain types of immigrants, such as building workers or key personnel for new industries, should be able to contribute to, rather than complicate, the solution of rehabilitation problems. A Government so confident of its competence to plan in other directions should be able to organise a scheme whereby rehabilitation and immigration go hand in hand, the one helping tha? success of the other. Even if the Government should feel unable to work for the realisation of the double objective, it must admit that the business of rehabilitation will be completed within a reasonable period. Otherwise it is confessing a want of faith in its own administration. So the day must arrive when, to quote Mr Fraser's phrase, "New Zealand would welcome people coming to the Dominion." The Government should be framing its policy against that be possible to inform inquirers in London of the prospects in the hope that they will not cross New Zealand off their list as a dead proposition. In particular the High Commissioner should have some guidance on the class of immigrant that will be wanted and what New Zealand will be prepared to do in establishing newcomers in this country.