REVITALISED BY WAR

New Zealand Herald, Volume 81, Issue 25051, 15 November 1944, Page 3

REVITALISED BY WAR

STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

AMERICAN OBSERVER'S IMPRESSIONS

Less than four years ago the British Empire was counted down and almost out, not only by its enemies, but also by its sorrowing friends. Today British imperialists are taking no back-talk from anybody— not from Russians, Ameri- j cans or their own anti-imperialists, says Demaree Bess in an article written in London for the Saturday Evening Post. In the first years of the war it was easy to find Englishmen who' were ready to admit that imperialism was a handicap to modern nations, and that the British Empire would emerge from the conflict much weaker than when it went in. During that dark period many Englishmen even agreed with foreign critics who were claiming that imperialism had exhausted its mandate and that the British Empire would inevitably be replaced by something different, no matter who might win the war. While very few Englishmen ever conceded the possibility of outright defeat, many of them did feci that the Empire would be overshadowed in the postwar world by both Soviet Russia and the United States. Evidence of Confidence Now those who were so vocal in 1940 and 1941 have been completely routed, and it is poor form to criticise Neville Chamberlain's policy at Munich. That policy, like Stalin's deal with Hitler in 1939, is held justified by subsequent events. « British imperialists are sure of themselves today because the evidence is overwhelming that the British Empire is more powerful now than it has been for generations. It hot only possesses a stronger relative position in world affairs, but it has a firmer hold upon the British Qeople themselves, here in the British Isles and overseas in the Dominions. No one can doubt this who listened, as I did, to speeches at the London Imperial Conference and to Parliamentary debates on British foreign policy. Proud confidence was the keynote of all these speeches and debates—confidence that the British Empire has been revitalised by this war and that it is certain to play an even greater role in the future than it has played in the past. This Viewpoint is not confined to British Conservatives, like Winston Churchill. It is shared by the Liberals and the Socialists. It is shared nlso by the Dominion statesmen who travelled to London last May to participate in drawing up plans for the British Empire's role in the post-war world. Attitude of Dominions This Imperial Conference was a far cry from the attitude of the Dominions in the early years of the war. A large minority in South Africa had been opposed to entering the war at all, and in 1940 all of the Dominions revealed uneasiness about the cohesion of the Empire. Public confidence in imperialism reached its lowest ebb following Pearl Harbour, when the Japanese overran so many of Great Britain's possessions in the Far East. When this Japanese menace was most acute some Australian leaders pictured their future as linked more closely with the United States than with England.

Although the British accepted American capital to bolster their "corporation," they took our help —and the help of others —without making any important concessions. We did not buy into the British Empire, as some Americans seemed to think we had, and we possess no voice today in its management. Ihe directors of the British Empire have never been more independent. This docs not mean, of course, that British loaders are indisposed to work smoothly with us in creating a satisfactory postwar order. They have wholeheartedly approved President Roosevelt's conception of a three-power world as the foundation upon which some kind of society of nations can be created, lhey have supported the American view that an independent China must be the basis for a satisfactory postwar order in the Far East. Anglo-American Partnership But British leaders have devised means for achieving full* and equal partnership in a three-power world or in any other type of world organisation which may prove acceptable to the victors in this war. In recent visits to American troOps now stationed in England, I have encountered frequently expressed perplexity about what the united States is going to get out of this war. The American soldiers here are not satisfied with the obvious answer that we are getting victory over Germany and Japan. Nor does our vague partnership in a threepower world appeal to our soldiers as an adequate war aim. They can see that Britain and Russia are getting very specific gains, in addition to victory, and they have a feeling that Americans are missing the boat. Well, what are we getting? The answer to this question, it seems to me, depends entirely upon us. We are in a position to get almost anything we want. If we want world-wide bases and concessions, then the other great Powers will share them with us. If we want a permanent voice in European and Asiatic afFairs, wo can have that too. We can even have "splendid isolation," if that is what we want. Our British and Russian Allies are arranging matters right now to protect themselves against the possibility that Americans may choose to return to isolation, as we did after the last World War. One thing, however, which we cannot get is an Anglo-American partnership in which the British Empire will accept a subordinate role. After almost five years of world-wide war, the British Empire is stronger than ever. Confidence ill its imperial system, has been renewed, and any modification in that system will bo made upon British terms.

But there was no such talk at the Imperial Conference. South Africans now foresee the fulfilment of /their dreams of a Greater Africa Confederation, including rich additional territories, and Australians have changed their minds about the future of the British Empire in the Pacific. Australia and New Zealand, plus India, anticipate equal post-war participation with Britain and the United States in a regional council which will supervise and co-ordinato defence and civil administration in native territories. United on Foreign Policy To an American, accustomed in his own country to wide divergences of opinion about foreign policy, the serene attitude in England now is startling. The future of the world, as expressed both in Parliament and at the Imperial Conference, depends upon the maintenance and strengthening pf the British Empire and its colonial system, as well as upon the continued existence of the Commonwealth. Right, Left and Middle are in general agreement upon the same broad outlines of foreign policy. What is this foreign policy upon which most of the British people are united, not only in England, but also in the Dominions? In it is extremely simple: Its first aim has been to win the war and to win it completely. Second, it aims to keep the British Empire intact and to fortify it. Third, it aims to strengthen British influence everywhere in the confident faith that British influence is as good for the rest of the world as it is for the British Empire. Britons sincerely want some kind of world organisation wider than the British Empire, but they recognise that such organisation still depends upon unpredictable actions of other great Powers, while the consolidation and reconstruction of the British Empire can be undertaken immediately by British leaders alone. So, during this period, while larger schemes remain in suspense, British imperialists are concentrating their attention upon their Empire. They know exactly what they require for it during the immediate post-war period, and thev are working indefatigablv to get it. It has not been necessary for British leaders to wait until the end of the war, either in Europe or in the Pacific. London already is •"/he centre for continuous conferences, designed to adjust and to fortify the British position in every part of the world. Do Not Intend to Relapse When I left the United States a few weeks ago many Americans believed that Soviet Russia was calling the tune in world affairs and that Stalin's aggressive diplomacy had taken the lead away from the British Empire as well as from the United States. Some American critics were so busy deploring the British attitude toward India, toward the Jewish homeland in Palestine and toward the monarchies in Italy and Yugoslavia and Greece that they overlooked the rapid advances which British diplomacy was making all over the world. Since that time British successes have become more obvious, so that everybody can see now that British statesmen are making hay while the sun shines. The imperialists 1 look back to prtr-war days with feelings of wonder that they ever let themselves become so woalc, and they do not intend to relapse again. Although British imperialism was, in America, adjudged on the verge of bankruptcy by some observers in 1939,1 have not found anyone in Britain who considers it bankrupt today. The British Empire has proved to be a better risk than those observers believed. It has developed vigorous leaders who are not only great wartime statesmen but who are also ardent imperialists. Those who predicted that tho United States, willy-nilly, would fall heir to large portions of the British Empire have been proved poor prophets Those Americans who talked a few years ago abont "the American century" have been discomforted by developments in Britain, and in Russia.