GREEK FRIENDSHIP IS PRICELESS ASSET

New Zealand Herald, Volume 81, Issue 25030, 21 October 1944, Page 10

GREEK FRIENDSHIP IS PRICELESS ASSET

If Russia is going to bestride the Continent the whole of the Balkan peninsula would seem certain to cc me within her "sphere of influence," and the question which comes naturally to the mind is: "What is to become of Greece, a non-Slav race, in the midst of a 'sea of Slays,' with Big Father Russia as the mighty Colossus dominating the scene," writes Thomas Anthem in an article in the Contemporary Review, London.

The Greek's may be exchsed if they feel some qualms about their future. True. Dr. Benes, after the signing of the Soriet-CV-ech Part, declared that the old pan-SJavist notion was considered dead, but that the federation and cooperation of all the Slav peoples would be one of their objects in the new European peace structure. Assuming the sincerity of this statement, how can Greece hope to escape the barrage of Communistic ideas which the Slav countries can expect to have directed at them from Moscow, and—what is more important—to what extent could ehe hope to resist interference in her Government P

BRITAIN IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The modern Greeks, like the ancients, are not afraid of new ideas; but while they are in spirit the most democratic people in the world they are by nature incorrigible individualists (atqmismos is the word they use to describe it), and Communism has never taken serious root in their;, country. Attempts to collectivise them against their will could only result in disaster and bloodshed. The Russians would he well advised to be guided by the lessons of Greek history in their dealings with the Greeks. The future of Greece in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean is'linked with the future of Britain in the Mediterranean, and it would be the height of folly to deny that a great reorientation of power or influence in that sen is about to take place, though the Nazi suggestion that Britain is getting ready to abandon the Mediterranean to Russia is sheer nonsense. What Russia Will Expect Certainly Russia can 110 longer be excluded from this sea. an exclusion which British Foreign Office policy considered fit and proper in the last half century or more, and Russia will expect, and probably demand, that her ships shall be allowed to pass freely through the straits from the Black Sea with wheat from the Ukraine, oil and minerals from' the Caucasus and coal and metallurgical products from South Russia.

It lias even been suggested by one British writer on foreign affairs that Russia, in support of her Aegean policy, would support Turkey if the latter were {o claim the Dodecanese Islands, as these isles command the approaches to the straits from the Mediterranean. This would be a mbnstrous settlement of the Dodecanese question, as the islands are as Greek as Attica itself, and Greece expects their return as part of her just reward for all her sacrifices and suffering. The Greek mainland, with the whole of the Greek islands, constitutes a jjreat strategic bastion, if adequately fortified, in the Eastern Mediterranean.

and as this area is vital to Britain s communications with Palestine. Egypt, the Middle East and the Far East, British relations with Greece in luture obviously assume importance far greater than was the case in the past, in view of the hitter lessons of the Aegean warfare in the present struggle. And although Greece may he surrounded by a sea of Slavs on her land frontiers, on her long, indented coastlino she joins a Britain which, with her powerful navy, may still be regarded as the Colossus of the Mediterranean. in no less degree than Russia is destined to become the land Colossus of Europe. In the network of bases would be not only the Dodecanese and Cyprus, but Crete and Corfu and the other lonian islps. Island of Cyprus With regard to Cyprus, it would be in Britain's interests either to restore this island fully to Greece and gratify the desire of the Greek population (four-fifths) for union with their motherland, or to grant the island complete autonomy. Our past handling of the Cyprus question lias been discreditable. Britain has a priceless asset in the loyalty and friendship of Greece. We have given a number of destroyers to the Greek Navy during this war, and after the war we might give many more warships with incalculable advantage to ourselves, even if we were to bear some share in their maintenance.

If in the past we bad promoted a strong Greece (which Italy consistently and resolutely opposed), instead ol permitting Italy to build a big navy. Mediterranean history might have run rather differently in the past ten years. Economically Greece is poor and requires financial backing on a generous scale, but the Greeks are fearless soldiers and mariners, and their -deep-rooted democracy and high intelligence rate them as the most estimable allies of Britain in the Mediterranean. Their future is definitely _ with Britain, rather than with Russia and the Slavs of South-Eastern Europe.