The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, THURSDAY, MARCH 2, 1944 TERMS TO FINLAND

New Zealand Herald, Volume 81, Issue 24832, 2 March 1944, Page 4

The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, THURSDAY, MARCH 2, 1944 TERMS TO FINLAND

Fon the second time in just under four years Finland is called on to consider terms of peace with Soviet Russia. The circumstances and atmosphere are very different from those of March, 19-10. The Finns then had world-wide sympathy as the victims of aggression. The Great Powers of the west were apologetic for having failed to give direct aid in the struggle against the Soviet forces. Norway and Sweden were reproached directly and indirectly for having denied passage to Allied help, for fear of compromising their own neutrality. It was hinted that they might presently find themselves in a position like that of Finland—a prophecy which has been fearfully fulfilled in Norway's case. The Finland now offered terms of peace with Russia is the ally of, and has fought actively at the side of, Nazi Germany. She is in a state of war with Great Britain and has forfeited the official sympathy of the United States. These were the inevitable consequences of having joined hands with the Nazis. The Finnish Government might protest that there was no desire to do more than regain what had been lost by the peace settlement of 1940. It could be insisted,! as the leaders of various parties did, that Finland was fighting her own war only against Russia. The inexorable fact remained that this was impossible. Whatever their wishes or motives, the Finns were, and still are, playing the game which helps and pleases the Nazis. As long as they continue at war with 'Russia they are, in effect, at war with the United Nations. Nothing short of a resolute break with Germany and peace with Russia will restore them to their old relationship with Britain and the United States. Those are the circumstances, that the atmosphere, in which terms of settlement are now offered. The terms themselves, at first glance, cannot be called harsh. There is some justification for calling them generous, as has already been done. By making the treaty of 1940 the main basis of settlement, Russia refrains from imposing penalties on the Finns for having taken up arms again when Germany attacked the Soviet. Concerning territory anft frontiers, there is no suggestion that what was decided then should be varied now. The greatest loss Finland suffered was the Isthmus of Karelia, up to and including Viipuri. This included the Mannerheim Line and an important industrial area embracing huge sawmills, paper works and electricsupply stations. Russia, however, was obviously less concerned with economic gains than with cover in case of an attack on Leningrad. The frontier drawn in 1940 brought Lake Ladoga wholly into Russian territory. Remembering the part it has played in the siege of Leningrad, only recently lifted, it has to be conceded that the Russian view was realistic. In the light of what has been experienced and suffered during the German onslaught, the Soviet Government would be more than human if it now demanded less in this region than Finland conceded four years ago. Similarly, straightening of the frontier further north was obviously intended to protect the railway to Murmansk against attack from Finnish territory. Again experience has shown this was a real danger and one which the settlement did not wholly eliminate. Consequently Russia understandably requires at least as much as was obtained in 1940.

For all the moderation in asking only for the 1940 frontiers, Finland may be excused for finding difficulties in the terms. Russia requires th ■ German troops on Finnish soil to be interned, and has offered to help in effecting this. The result might easily be occupation of the country. The Finnish passion for independence may well find in such a condition a threat of annexation, with the loss of all that was gained in 1917. The question of reparations has also been imparted into the i terms in such a way that the Finns may be required to sign a blank cheque. This cannot but be disturbing. The future of Petsamo is another reserved point. By the 1940 settlement this port on the open sea was returned to Finland, but with stringent conditions, j'ts use as a naval, submarine or air base was forbidden, while Russia was guaranteed the free transit of passengers, goods and non-military aircraft to and from Norway. How much more the Soviet Government may be disposed to ask now is one of the unanswered questions in the terms. Conditions are very different from those of 1940. Norway is an occupied country, and Russia is at war with the invader. Petsamo is uncomfortably close to Murmansk, and the corridor leading to it is a mere thread separating Norway from Soviet territory. Russia may consider positive safeguards necessary to prevent Petsamo being used as a base for German operations or espionage. In this instance, as in various others, Finland seems to lie between the upper and the nether millstones. That tragic situation would have been in some degree inevitable, but it has been intensified by the ill-omened policy of collaborating actively with Nazi Germany, and thus reaching the pass reflected by the terms Russia now offers.

NEW ZEALAND ON GUARD The gift of two corvettes for the Dominion's navy and our acceptance under the Canberra pact of a measure of responsibility for the security of some of the Pacific islands force attention on post-war armament. The United Nations are aiming at victories over Germany and Japan so clear cut, so decisive, that repentance for all acts of aggression will swe'll in enemy breasts. Humbleness of heart is to evoke promises never to do wrong again. If the repentance is sincere and the promises can be relied upon, there should be little need for the maintenance of large forces here or anywhere else. Italy is not a warrior nation and she has been humbled to the dust, but can it be said she

is repentant? What then of such vigorous fighting nations as the Germans and the Japanese? A defeated power does not glory in defeat. Rather, time and thought are spent in analysing the reasons why it went under in the struggle and how best "national, honour" can be restored by shaking off the shackles of peace treaties and turning the tables on the victors. If New Zealand is .to take her share in policing Japan, even at a distance, some force will be essential. This may entail naval and air bases in the islands to the north and in this country. Pearl Harbour, the • Philippines, Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, New Guinea and the Solomons write convincing chapters of the fate of bases inadequately guarded. Guards in this sense are fullytrained and fully-equipped fighting men. How many is this Dominion to supply, and where? The question may be academic at the moment, but it must be faced sooner or later. ANOTHER ISLAND HOP

The assault on the Admiralty Islands in the Bismarck Archipelago by General Mac Arthur's South-west Pacific forces is a small enterprise in the war, but it has considerable local tactical importance. Vigorous naval and air forces based on the islands should dominate the Bismarck Sea and force the Japanese to break a close blockade should they desire to succour their troops at Rabaul. The blockade could be made tighter by the capture of Kavieng, at the northern tip of New Ireland. Rabaul has long since ceased to be the enemy's main supply base for the New GuineaSolomons area. This role was transferred to Wewak, in New Guinea, after the great air victory over a Japanese convoy in the Bismarck Sea in March last year. Conquest of the Admiralty Islands improves the prospects of increasing the pressure on the supply line to Wewak, and thus of clearing the enemy out of New Guinea. These are essential steps in General Mac Arthur's favoured plan of moving to the Philippines. Now that New Guinea, New Britain and the Solomons have been lost to the Japanese for aggressive action, it may be asked, what have they gained by going there? The answer is very simple; over two years in which to consolidate and exploit their more important conquests in the East Indies. If the maintenance of these advanced posts, which could have been used as starting points for further conquests, has cost them much in naval and air strength, they may put the time gained and like costs to the United Nations on the other side of the ledger and call the account square.