The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1944

New Zealand Herald, Volume 81, Issue 24826, 24 February 1944, Page 4

The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1944

THE WAR REVIEWED Terrible, ghastly days and nights are ahead of the Germans. Within a few hours of the awful expei'ience of having over 9000 tons of bombs dropped on them in two days, they are told by Mr. Churchill that the scale and degree of the air attack will reach beyond the dimensions of anything that has yet been employed or, indeed, imagined. Mr. Churchill has never been a convert to the theory that bombing alone will win the war. Recently, he went so far as to say that the then air offensive was an interesting experiment. Now he has emphasised its vital importance by the plain statement that the air war constitutes the foundation on which the Allied plans for overseas invasion stand. Its object is to make war production impossible in Germany and her satellite territories, and to destroy the means by which Germany hopes to defend herself against the invading forces. The air attack is to continue from England, and to be stepped up from Italy in order to reach effectively Hitler's new Ruhr in Austria, Bohemia and Silesia. Against this industrial region, developed to escape the R.A.F., Russia may reasonably be expected to accept a decisive role and to overcome her prejudice against strategic bombing. Mr. Churchill said the Russian output of aircraft was now equal to Britain's, and ours alone exceeded that of Germany. The Silesian industrial triangle is over 800 miles from England and 650 miles from Foggia, in Italy. From Kiev, it is only 600 miles, and from Smolensk TOO. AngloAmerican bombing and fighter sweeps engage four-fifths of Germany's fighter aircraft and more of her bombers than are employed in the east. Here is an opening for the Soviet to establish a second air front at small risk, and without calling on Britain and America to deliver squadrons and equipment to Russian airfields. Unlike many of his earlier reviews of the war, Mr. Churchill refrained from discussing at length strategical aspects when he came to the Italian campaign. On the German decision co send seven more divisions to Southern Italy, making IS in all, and on the tenacity of their resistance, he committed himself to the belief that Hitler intended to make Rome the decisive issue. In the Allied prospects he had full confidence. There is a responsible body of opinion that the Allies have already gained all their principal strategic objectives in the Mediterranean, and that the present campaign is an aftermath and, to some extent, an anti-climax. This latter observation probably goes too far. The objects of the Mediterranean campaign, it has been suggested, were (1) the conquest of North Africa and the reopening of the Mediterranean Sea; (2) the elimination of Italy from the war; (3) seizure of Italian air bases for the air offensive against the new Ruhr. For the aftermath, there were the psychological and political advantages to be derived from the capture of Rome. A longer-range objective could be the maintenance of sive action against the Germans in Italy, to occupy and divert as much German strength as possible from other theatres. These views coincide in some degree with Mr. Churchill's remarks, particularly those concerning a "large secondary front," and as to there being in North Africa sufficient forces to nourish the Italian campaign.

The Prime Minister did not hesitate to deal, though circumspectly, with the most delicate problem affecting Anglo-American relations with the Soviet—the question of the Polish frontiers. The Russians have been adamant for some time on a frontier based substantially on the Curzon Line. By his declared belief that the Russian demand for reassurance' about her western frontiers does not go beyond what is reasonable and just, Mr. Churchill virtually-endorsed the Soviet claims as far as the Curzon Line. Equally, other expressions in his speech show that he expects the Poland of the future to be strong and independent, and 'not a puppet of Moscow. Of importance was his reference to our obligations to Poland, which do not include a guarantee of her territorial integrity. The treaty of August, 1936, involves an obligation to give the Poles all assistance against an aggressor, a very different thing from the guarantee of frontiers ethnographically so obscure as those of Eastern Poland. Mr. Churchill's statement should encourage both parties to an embittered dispute to compose their differences.

ACTION, NOT WORDS Judging by the tone of the Speech put into the hands of His Excellency the Governor-General yesterday, the Government faces a new Parliamentary session quite unprepared for the crucial tasks which ought to be attacked in the immediate ' future, ft is common to claim that the Speech at the opening of Parliament is not intended to give in detail the working programme for the session which follows. That used to be reserved largely for the Budget, when the proposals were accompanied by the financial provision necessary in carrying them out. Such procedure may have been suitable enough for the leisurely tempo of a session which began in June and usually saw the Budget appear about the end of July. War conditions demand that public business should be treated with greater urgency. The Speech mentions manpower, food production, the balancing of claims between service in the armed forces and in primary industry and other leading problems of the moment. The references to all of them are vague and inconclusive. On the subject of keeping up the supply of essential foodstuffs to the United Kingdom the country is told what it already knows, that butter has been, and meat is to be, rationed. These measures, useful in themselves, are a purely negative approach to the task of giving the British people more food. There is

nothing definite about positive measures to increase production so that the exportable surplus after rationing may be further augmented. All the things necessary to such an end are to be kept in view, to be given continuous attention, or to be carefully reviewed during the year. In other words, nothing is ready, all has to be done from the very beginning. The time when primary producers should be planning for next season is at hand. Yet neither they nor the rest of the people are given any clear indication of what is expected of them. Here is an opportunity for the new Opposition to make its first constructive move by paying little attention to the vague generalities now offered and by insisting that a positive plan of action be produced without further delay. FALL OF KRIVOI ROG

By capturing Krivoi Rog the Russians have wrested from the enemy his last effective bastion in the Dnieper bend, and opened the way to an irruption into the lands around the mouth of the river. The town was the scene of severe fighting last November, when after crossing the Dnieper at Kremenchug the Russians thrust a wedge south and came within two and a-half miles of Krivoi Rog. The only line of approach then was from the north-west. Within the past fortnight the capture, first of Apostolovo and then of Nikopol, made attack from the east and south possible also, with the inevitable result that this town, once the pivot of all the German operations on the lower Dnieper, has fallen to the victorious Soviet forces. The enemy now has no defensive positions left until Kherson and Nikolaev at the mouths of the Dnieper and Bug, respectively, are reached. *An attempt to stand at Kherson might well mean risk of another encirclement such as those of which the Germans have had recent and bitter experience. Consequently a withdrawal to Nikolaev, which means a retreat to the line of the Bug, is more probable. Even that does not necessarily mean that the position will be stabilised. The Russians may be expected to cross the lower Dnieper in strength. Such a move, according to military commentators, would uncover the German positions to the north-west and probably force a regrouping of all the units in the south-western Ukraine. In actual fact Krivoi Rog was a hinge. By breaking it the Russians have opened up ail the territory it dominated, and thus imposed on the enemy the need for very extensive movements before he can hope to make his line in that region stable again.