ALLIES NOW HOLD THE SEAS

New Zealand Herald, Volume 81, Issue 24826, 24 February 1944, Page 3

ALLIES NOW HOLD THE SEAS

ROYAL NAVY'S MAGNIFICENT WORK CLEARING THE MEDITERRANEAN By THE RT. HON. A. V. ALEXANDER, First Lord of the Admiralty

The surrender of the Italian Fleet was one of the turning points in the war at sea. I propose briefly to review the naval campaign in the Mediterranean. In September, 1939, the British and French Fleets together were so much superior to the German that there was no fear of our losing command of the seas, though it was expected that German U-boats and commerce raiders would be very troublesome. In June, 1940, the position changed almost overnight. The French Fleet went out and the Italian came in. Our vital Middle East position seemed to be laid bare to for, at a time when we hourly expected invasion, it was difficult to spare ships for the Mediterranean, and we had to accept in that sea a striking numerical inferiority. Mussolini had available six battleships, two of them very modern, and 19 cruisers, together with large numbers of destroyers and submarines, to which we could oppose four battleships, one aircraft-carrier and seven cruisers. The aerodromes all the way from Gibraltar to Egypt were now either actively hostile or passively unfriendly. The Sicilian Narrows would, we expected, be barred to surface ships by Axis bombers from Sicily and Sardinia. The Mediterranean was closed and reinforcements for the Middle East, had to go via the Cape of Good Hope.

Littorio class, four cruisers and eight destroyers barred his passage. Admiral Vian took avoiding action while air striking forces from Malta and the Western Desert attacked. One of our submarines saw a 10,000-ton cruisei, stopped and on lire, and sank her by torpedo. Other damage was inflicted" on the enemy by the air attacks; and one enemy battleship was lilt »v a torpedo, yet. in spite oi these successes the convoy did not get through, for extra steaming had used up so much fuel that, course had to be set for Alexandria. However, a convoy had been simultaneously passed from tie Western Mediterranean, and in ' the face of incessant attacks by the enemy air forces some of the ships reached Malta. ~ • The next convoy to Malta was in August, this time from Gibraltar, and was" now supported by aircraft-carriers. Although 11. M.S. Eagle was lost at the beginning of the operation, the t! loot Air Arm worked with great success, and shot down no less than 50 ol the enemv. In tiie bicilian Nations, the enemv developed the very heaviest attacks, both by aircraft and b> E-boats. and our losses were not light, five shins only reaching Malta .But Malta was saved by the supplies in those ships, which lasted until the victory of El Alamein and the quest of Cyrenaica made it possible to give air support to convoys from the East. Aircraft for Malta

During all this time Malta had to bo supplied with aircraft to defend hei against the Luftwaffe, and to help to protect the relief convoys. 'I he range ol fighters is limited, and they had to be carried in aircraft-carriers to witnin a short distance of the island Over / >. aircraft wore transported by Mis Majesty's carriers in this way and 111 bv a United States carrier. ' Offensive action against Rommel s supply lines was carried on, mainly by His Majesty's submarines and aircraft of the Elect Air Arm and the .R.A.I'., thom'li from time to time cruisers and dost rover forces were made available for night operations in the Sicilian Narrows. Considerable success was obtained, and the combined sinkings played a vital part in Rommel's destruction. Ilis Majesty's submarines sank a total of 1,3:15,000 tons. These results are the more remarkable because the .Mediterranean is perhaps the most difficult area in the world for successful submarine operations; 41 of our submarines were l |)S tIn addition the Elect Air Arm, oj.eratinir from carriers, from Mada, and liom aerodromes in the Western Desert, accounted for another ■IIO,OOO _ tons. Perhaps the most spectacular action by surface ships was the elimination ol an enemv convoy of H) merchant ships and two destroyers by the cruisers Aurora and Penelope, with the destroyers Lance and Lively. Expedition to Sicily

Cunningham's Policy The U-boat war, for which we could spare verv lew escort vessels, was becoming; more intense, and I ask jou to keep in mind all the time this sombre background, which made _ reinforcement of the Mediterranean with destroyers and light craft so difficult, and threatened to become so dangerous as to require us further to deplete oui inadequate strength there, fortunately, we had in the Mediterranean a Com-mander-in-Chief of great spirit and resource, who proved fully equal to the enormous responsibility. "Because of our weakness, ' said Admual Cunningham later, "our policy had to be one of aggressiveness and it paid handsome dividends." If the Navy was to fulfil the functions of maintaining our lines of communication with Malta and Greece, and destroving those of the enemy, some way must be found of reducing the Italian Fleet. Many times did Admiral Cunningham put to sea with the hope ot forcing a decisive action but, whenever contact was made, the larger Italian forces retired, probably witu the idea of drawing our heavy ships witlnn range of shore-based aircraft. , Consequently, it was decided to attack them in harbour at laranto b\ aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm. On November 11. 1940, the 19 Swordhsh planes which took part in that icmarkable attack succeeded m crippling the Italian battle fleet for a eonsideri able period. From then until the coni quest of Greece and Crete by the Gcri mans and the arrival of the (lerinan i Air Force in Sicily, the Royal Navy 'controlled the bastern Mediteirationn, las the Italians tound to their cost on I Matapan. . . . ■ Earlv in 1941. we suffered heavy losses lin the' operations off Crete, including severe damaee to 11.M.5. Formidable. This was followed by a series of disasters which threatened our whole position at sea. H.M.S. Illustrious and Formidable were already out of action, laud the flood was sunk. Ihe Atmy was j driven back to the borders of Egypt. |which made it impossible lor the Royal Air Force or the Fleet Air Arm to give shore-based tighter cover against German aircraft operating from Crete, at any rate over more than a very limited area, and our ships were constantly bombed whenever they exposed themselves outside that area. Crisis Reached

The advance of the Army from El Alamein and the landing of the AngjoAmerican expedition in North Atnca completely revolutionised the situation. Malta was relieved and became an advanced offensive base, and from November onward our grip on the inland sea has been steadily tightening. No largescale enemv evacuation from 1 umsia was allowed; there was little_ interference with our expedition to Sicily, and bv the capture oi Sicily the Itaaan Fleet was irrevocably divided, one part at Taranto. the other at Spezia, Nevertheless, so long as these battleships and cruisers remained in enemy ports, tliev were a potential menace to the security of our convoys and to our offensive expeditions, and battleship and aircraft-carrier cover had always to be provided lest they should, pel - chance, come out. This verv brief survey reveals how much the nation owes to, a the officers and ships' companies ol: the Medueiranonn Fleet. Admiral of the Meet b.r \ndrew Cunningham, by his jeso.ut.e leadership and skill, has gamed a notable place in our great naval historv. He was grandly supported n> Fhi'tr Officers like Sir John Tovey Sir James Somerville. Cir N'evil e Syiret, and Admirals Lyster. Vian. Burrough. Willis, and many others, but above all bv the general loyalty and enduring courage of thousands oi officers and men in the ships and in the naval aircraft manv oi them almost sti.ugh front the office, the factory and the school. _____

The crisis in our fortunes was reached in November and December, 1941. On November 14, H. M. aircraft-carrier Ark Hoval was torpedoed and sunk; on the twentieth the Australian cruiser Svdnev was sunk, on tin? twenty-fourth the cruiser Dunedin, on the twentyfifth the battleship Barbara. Then came the treacherous attack on Pearl Harbour, which temporarily crippled the American Pacific Fleet, followed almost immediately bv the sinking of 11.M.5. Prince of Wales and .Repulse. Shortly afterward the battleships Queen Elizabeth and Valiant were severely damaged, and the cruisers Neptune and Galatea sunk. Thus within two months the American battle fleet covering the Pacific had been crippled, the British battle fleet, covering Singapore and the Bay of: Bengal had been sunk, the British battle fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean had been crippled, and the famous Force H had lost its invaluable aircraft-carrier. Moreover, as the winter turned to spring the U-boat war reached its peak. Fortunately, the enemy did not know completely our precarious position, ami for vital months we managed to conceal from him the damage to the Queen Elizabeth and Valiant and the sinking of the Barbara. In the Mediterranean we had three cruisers left, yet our men fought on, working wonders. Our greatest problem was Malta. That heroic island was holding out valiantly, but supplies were falling and at times could be measured in weeks. The loss of the airfields from El Alamein to Benghazi meant that little fighter protection could be given over the convoy routes, and every convoy was in extreme danger from surface and air attack. A small convoy with ammunition got through to Malta in January, but an attempt to get another one through in February bad to be abandoned. In March Admiral Vian, in command of the Fighting Fifteenth Cruiser Squadron, was sent to make another attempt. He met the Italian Fleet and the Luftwaffe, and his battle with them is one of the most brilliant in our naval history. Brilliant British Action The enemy cinno south in two forces, the first of one 8-ineh and three 6-inch gun cruisers, the second of the battleship Littorio, with two 8-ineh and three 6-inch gun cruisers with attendant destroyers. Admiral Vian's plan was to lay a smoke screen in front of the convoy, attacking with torpedoes under its cover if the enemy attempted to break through. Favoured by a strong southeasterly wind this plan enabled him to drive off the first seel ion, but while he was searching with his cruisers for two of the enemy's damaged ships, the Littorio, whose presence until then had been unsuspected, bore down at high speed on the convoy. Without hesitation the destroyers Sikh, Havoc, Lively and Hero attacked. Although straddled continuously by 15-inch shells, they held off the threat to the convoy until the cruisers returned. Then the Fourteenth Destroyer Flotilla, Kelvin, Kipling, Kingston and Legion, led by the .Jervis, with the cruisers Euryalus and Cleopatra (Admiral Vian's own ship) in support, went in to attack. The Lil torio was hit by a torpedo and by gunfire, and a cruiser was seriously damaged. The Italian forces turned for home; but before they got there the submarine Urge picked off the damaged cruiser. Under ceaseless air attacks and in the teeth of a gale, the convoy steamed on. One of the four supply ships was sunk 10 miles south of Malta, and another, the Brecon,shire, was hit when almost home. She crawled into a bay to the southward of the Grand Harbour, but was again hit, and sank The other two were bombed in harboui but most of their cargo was saved In June Admiral Vian was i again on the Malta run. Two battleships of the