The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1943 SHELTERS OF BERLIN

New Zealand Herald, Volume 80, Issue 24760, 7 December 1943, Page 2

The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1943 SHELTERS OF BERLIN

It was stated last week that the target of Bomber Command is not the morale of Germany. That is easy to believe. The bombardiers over Hitler's roofless fortress have objectives far more concrete in their sights. Behind their work is cold scientific research as painstaking as any study of Prussian schools of war, and in a vital sphere which all the calculating care of Nazi preparation neglected. The German High Command, whose astonishing thoroughness built a model of the Albert Canal and all ,its fortifications in Czechoslovakia on which to rehearse the Belgian blitzkrieg, was unprepared for scientific bombing on a strategic scale Firm believers in the power of frightfulness to break the will to resist, the enemy Luftwaffe to tumble explosives on the towns of men in a mere demonstration of might. Precise and methodical elimination of the material centres and sources of resistance on a policy dictated by strategy, tactics and economics was left to the invention of a peaceful people roused to the anger of war. Three years' amazing research lie behind the shape of the bombs which whistle over Berlin, behind their secret contents, and the marks on the map they hit. It is to be hoped that even the days of peace will conceal the method from eager note-books across the Rhine. Germany invented * the war of bombs. Britain has countered her barbarian clubbing with a swordsman's lithe steel. There are secrets of pass and parry which should be hidden for ever in Whitehall. Morale, then, is not the target for to-night. But, the optimists may ask, in the consummation of such a policy, can a target so extensive be missed ? Can German nerves, in a tornado such as Britain never knew, stand the strain? What precisely is meant by this question ? Simply this. Is the German people, over wide and influential areas, within measurable distance of that day when, hope and faith finally shattered, they will, unanimously or in overwhelming multitude, accept anything in loss or chastisement rather than continue turning the wheels and feeding the Nazi monster with blood and toil and tears and sweat? It is impossible to answer the question. This only can be said. The German people, conditioned for selfassertion abroad and for aggression, is spiritually unprepared at home for Goebbels' day of endurance. The whole nation has been taught to believe that terrorism is a path to victory. It is reasonable, then, to suppose that the shocking exhibition of power which a thousand Lancasters can pack into the horror of half an hour will bring the conviction of defeat in the shelters of Berlin, a conviction that burning London failed to teach a people whose nerves had never known the stimulus and detriment of unscrupulous propaganda. In the tubes and basements of Britain they expected the hammering they received. In obstinate and in spontaneous faith, they believed their day would come. It always had. Never taught to march in regimented masses, mass destruction failed to impress them. Grim, but gay, London waited its turn with a faith which knows no counterpart in Berlin. "The sole earthly criterion of right and wrong," said the Fuehrer, "is success." It must be difficult for good Nazis not to apply such words to Goering's failure. It must be difficult, too, for the dutiful who have studied the great Prussians not to remember in the smoke such words as those of old von Hindenburg himself, "The more ruthlessly a war is conducted, the more merciful it is, for it finishes the sooner." Were not Warsaw, Rotterdam and Belgrade such satisfying proof? "So we go marching forward," runs the song of the Hitler Youth, "Though we all in ruins lay." The voice of Berlin must catch on the last couplet, "For the world shall be ours to-morrow, as Germany is to-day." Such words would not be worth quoting were it not for the fact that they help to measure the disappointment which must gnaw at German hearts. In a people given to self-glorification, devoid, by common admission, of a saving sense of humour, disappointment turns readily to self-pity and despair. Such a mood is paralysing. When it finally comes, hard facts will speak more loudly than all the eloquence of Hitler's "inspiring fanaticism" and all his "forward-driving hysteria." Both operate ill in the reverse gear of the defensive. And how far off is that day? Hitler has set Himmler to find out. Bomber Command believes it is earlier in time than spring days in the Channel. The rest of the world may hope.

DECISIONS AT TEHERAN No surprises are contained in the communique on the business transacted at the Teheran meeting of Mr. Churchill, President Roosevelt, and Marshal Stalin. Decisions accord closely with anticipations published in this column yesterday morning. These are stated in very general terms in both military and political spheres. As to the conduct of the war, no mofe was to be expected. The Allies cannot broadcast their strategic plans. The proof of the Teheran pudding will be in the eating. At present it is sufficient to learn that plans were concerted for the destruction of the Wehrmacht and that complete agreement was reached as to the scope and timing of operations to be undertaken from the east, the west, and the south. The decision to unify, co-ordinate and synchronise the Allied assaults on Fortress Europe is of the utmost importance, carrying the best guarantee of the early defeat of Germany. This part of the communique is completely satisfactory, and, as military business was the immediate and principal concern at Teheran, it can be argued there are small grounds for cavil. Yet there will be many in Europe and the world who will contend that more

specific declarations on political questions should have issued from Teheran. If, as the communique asserts with good cause, the military decisions guarantee an Allied victory, the more reason to draft the shape of the peace. Instead the world is put off with finesounding generalities. Principles are stated, but not their application. It is interesting and important to learn from an aside addressed to Persia that the three Great Powers continue to subscribe to the Atlantic Charter. Once again, however, the charter is a statement of principles. Interpretations are very much in dispute and, with victory looming, the time has arrived to make a concrete approach to political questions if the peace is to be, as promised at Teheran, an enduring peace.

PERSIA AND THE POWERS Only one political pronouncement has come from the conference at Teheran. It deals with the future of Persia, embodying a pledge which safeguards the territorial integrity and independent sovereignty of the country. Persia has not necessarily been singled the conference was held there, but more probably because Russian and British interests have often been opposed in this vital gateway to Afghanistan, India and the Far East generally. Yet, allowing for its importance in this respect, and for the value of disclaiming past rivalries, it is notable that one country only should be dealt with in this way. In the statement issued after the Moscow Conference between the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Britain and the United States one victim of Nazi aggression, Austria, was given promise of freedom in the future. Both Britain and Russia were and are deeply interested in the destiny of Austria, and it was well tc have agreement about it. But, as was pointed out at the time, a similar concern by both parties might have been expected to bring Czechoslovakia into the picture. That can still be maintained. It may be added now that the continued silence, after both conferences, about Poland provokes even more thought. Here Russia has very decided interests. Britain may not be so directly affected as by the oil concessions in Persia, by the importance of the Persian Gulf, and by the question of air transport to India proceeding via Persia. Nevertheless, since it was Germany's wanton attack on Poland that precipitated the war, it cannot be said that Britain is not concerned in the country's ultimate fate. It is perhaps eloquent of the difficulties attaching to the Polish question that a matter of such magnitude gets no mention in the official report of the proceedings at Teheran.