The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, MONDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1943 MEETING AT TEHERAN

New Zealand Herald, Volume 80, Issue 24759, 6 December 1943, Page 2

The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, MONDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1943 MEETING AT TEHERAN

Nothing is officially known as yet of the proceedings at Teheran except that the long-awaited meeting of Mr. Churchill, President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin took place. In itself, however, this meeting is of profound significance. Whether the results were positive or negative, they are bound to affect the course of the war and the shape of the peace. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt but that the results would be positive. The three Allied leaders would scarcely have met at all had there been any serious possibility of difference. In that case it would have been too dangerous. The fact is the conference has been the subject of careful preparation for months. Every bit of ground has been carefully gone over. The final touches would be given at the recent conference of the three Foreign Ministers in Moscow. Proof of the amity and understanding achieved there by Eden, Hull and Molotov is seen in the quick sequel at Teheran. The fact that the preparatory conference took place in Moscow and the meeting of principals in Teheran should answer those who continually accuse the democracies of cold-shouldering the Soviet. Messrs. Eden and Hull went all the way to confer with M. Molotov. Messrs. Churchill and Roosevelt went far more than half the way to meet Marshal Stalin. They met him on ground under Soviet control and not far from the Russian frontier. Thus they expressed in unmistakable terms the democracies' desire for closer collaboration and co-operation in winning the war and the peace. It is earnestly to be hoped that in return the Soviet will lay aside some of her suspicions and secrecy and be more forthcoming for the future. Complete candour would be essential if the grand assault on Fortress Europe promised for next year is to be the synchronised and unified whole essential to an early decision. The world is likely to hear least from Teheran on this military business, although it would certainly be in the forefront on every one of the five days of the meeting. All three principals are determined on the strategy of "smash Hitler first." Mr. Churchill has never allowed the British aim to be deflected from tha, goal. Marshal Stalin is at one with him. Russia's complaint since the summer of 1942 has been the absence of a Continental second front. Messrs. Churchill and Roosevelt probably went to Teheran with firm assurances on the point, but with an equally firm stipulation that plans in east and west and south must be dovetailed in order to raise the shock of assault to a decisive maximum by combination. The Soviet would be asked to lay its military cards on the table alongside those of the democracies. It should be safe to assume that military co-ordination will be the most important and practical outcome of the conference, and that a working military alliance against Hitler has at last been organised. Instead of fighting two or more campaigns in isolation, the Allies should be found joined in a vast, concerted and converging drive. Nor would a conference at which two such consummate politicians as Roosevelt and Stalin were principals neglect the possibilities of political warfare. As Mr. Churchill has often emphasised, this weapon cuts deepest when coupled with military success. «In Germany herself, the meeting at Teheran is bound to increase defeatism and despair. The German people have been nourished by Goebbels on hopes of Allied differences and dissensions. Teheran proves those hopes to be vain. The Allied leaders would never have ventured a meeting had there remained any strong underlying tension. However much Goebbels may protest to the contrary, the fact will weigh on the German heart like a cold and heavy stone. One political point has been won already. At the same time, the courage of the European occupied countries "will be renewed at the spectacle of Allied unity and strength. The same will apply among the neutrals, while Hitler's hapless satellites hang back in the traces of the German war chariot, seeking the moment when they may kick over them. In other words, there will be all over Europe a demonstration of the influence of power-politics. Can Teheran produce more than that? General Smuts has pointed out that "Russia is the new Colossus that bestrides Europe," with whom Anglo-Ameri-can co-operation for the peace is essential. It would be useless to pretend that many nations are not asking anxiously how they will be affected, especially those in the Baltic, Central Europe and the Balkans. N r or, powerful as the Allies are, can they ignore the possibility of an earlier victory through the intervention on their side of such neutrals as Turkey and Sweden. If Teheran has produced satisfactory answers to these questionings, then by political warfare most valuable reinforcements may be brought to the Allied side, enabling the formation of an unbroken, common front.

FACE TO FACE AGAIN If, lias already been suggested as an inspiring condition of the return of (lie Second New Zealand Division to the Eighth Army that its members are probably associated again with those renowned and trusted comrades, the Indian Division and the 51st Highland Division. Apparently they are also likely to meet once more a German unit which is the same, at least in name, as one with which they often clashed in North Africa—the German 90th Light Division. The end of their rivalry came on May 12 last in Tunisia when, in response to a summons from General Freyberg, all that remained of the crack German division, encircled and hopeless, surrendered unconditionally. A correspondent at the time described the 90th Light Infantry Division as the pride of the Afrika Korps. Yet it was not part of the original

Afrika Korps, when that lighting formation first became famous. The two units which pushed through Cyrenaica in March, 1941, and subsequently fought on the perimeter of Tobruk, were the sth Light Motorised Division and the 15th Armoured Division. The 90th Light Division came into the picture much later. It deserved its reputation as a hard-hitting, hard-lighting enemy nevertheless, one well worthy of the steel of the New Zealand Division. Nor does it follow that the reconstituted 90th will be negligible. It should be remembered that the 51st Highland Division, famous for its deeds in North Africa, reached that theatre a reconstituted unit after the original 51st had lost the greater part of its personnel in France in 1910. The lighting quality of the reformed 51st suggests that the new 90th Light Division, built up on the name of the earlier body, may prove as tough an opponent as its predecessor. .

ALLIED FIGHTER STRENGTH

The Allies, according to the Canadian Air Minister, can now rely on assured ascendancy in fighter strength in the air, for the authorities are confident that the Germans have no hidden reserves. This is, in its way, the most optimistic statement yet made on that particular phase of the air war. Not long ago a 8.8.C. commentator said that the Germans were able to make good all wastage in fighter planes. Yet the two views of the situation are not irreconcilable. The continued and increasing bomber offensive on German targets is putting an ever-in-creasing strain on the fighter resources of the Reich. The concentration of these planes to meet the threat to war industry was nominated long ago as the reason for the loss of ascendancy over the battle fronts, in North Africa, then in Sicily and Italy, and in the Russian theatre. As raids on industrial centres multiply, so do the calls on the intercepting fighters. One of the main difficulties the Luftwaffe faces is that it is required to defend a number of targets so widely spaced that support canno.t be hurried from one to another in time to counter a short, sharp bombing attack. It is 350 miles from Berlin to the Ruhr, 500 miles from Berlin to Northern France, and a similar distance to Northern Italy. When, in addition, such targets as Wilhehnshaven and the Low Countries have also to be considered, it is easy to see how widely fighter protection has to be spread, and how baffling must be the problem of trying to switch from one threatened area to another. It may follow, therefore, that the claim of ascendancy for Allied fighter power is based on other considerations than just relative numbers.