THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, JULY 9, 1943 GERMAN OFFENSIVE

New Zealand Herald, Volume 80, Issue 24631, 9 July 1943, Page 2

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, JULY 9, 1943 GERMAN OFFENSIVE

Whatever the Germans may pretend, the whole world now realises that Hitler launched his third summer offensive on the Russian front on Monday last. It is also clear that the initial gains were small and altogether incommensurable with the enemy force expended. That would ; be one reason for disowning the' offensive. Hitler cannot afford to ad- j mit another big failure with all the j peoples of occupied Lurope on watch, to say nothing of teetering satellites, and Japan, and nonbelligerents like Spain and Turkey, and the anxious German people most of all. Another reason may be that Berlin at last sees the folly of counting chickens before they are hatched. In the last three years, too many eggs warranted as good have turned out to be addled. Britain did not capitulate to Hitler in the autumn of 1940, nor Alexandria to Mussolini two years later. On the Russian front particularly, Nazi trumpets have sounded loudest the triumphs that have yet to be won. As early as July, 1941, it was announced that, after three weeks of war, "the issue in the East has already been settled." Three months later, in a proclamation to the German armies on the eve of the Battle for Moscow, Hitler declared: "Within a few weeks Russia's three most important industrial areas will be completely in our hands. . . . To-day begins the last great, decisive battle of this year. . . We can now strike a deadly blow." His defeat and stultification before Moscow did not prevent Hitler a year later from promising the capture of Stalingrad. So he plunged his people deeper into disappointment and disillusionment, an error that Berlin is this year careful not to repeat. Much too careful, indeed. Thereby the German High Command betrays its despair of a decision, its loss of confidence and growing fears. However deep the doubts of the German leaders, they have by all accounts concentrated a mighty force for this offensive that they allege is not an offensive. At a moment when too many people are inclined to think the war as good as won, a corrective is offered by the strength that Germany is still able to muster in the East. She has done it at midsummer, at the very time when she must make full provision to meet invasion in the West and the South, a contingency against which she has been openly warned by Allied leaders, and by Mr. Churchill in particular. The fact reinforces his and other warnings that a hard and grim struggle lies ahead before Germany can be overthrown. She still feels" she can afford to stake huge forces in the East and to accept losses of men and material on the scale officially reported from Moscow. If earlier campaigns have worn down the Wehrmacht, and Allied bombing is reducing German industrial power, the present offensive expresses the High Command's conviction that it has still plenty in hand. It is another question how long reserves can be maintained at the present rate of wastage. According to the official Soviet tally, the Wehrmacht in the first three days of the current offensive lost 30,000 soldiers killed, 1539 tanks destroyed or damaged, and 649 planes shot down. So far as material is concerned, the Russian assertion is probably correct that "these losses are the greatest ever recorded in such a short space of time, even in this war." In respect of personnel, however, the rate of casualties was far higher on the first day, July 1, of the Battle of the Somrae in 1916. Massing 14 divisions on 17 miles of front, the British suffered 60,000 casualties, compared with the 10,000 casualties incurred (according to the Russian estimate) by 30 German divisions attacking on 180 miles of front on the first day of the battle now raging. The British casualties on that dread day 27 years ago amounted to 60 per cent of officers and 40 per cent of men engaged, a proportion far higher than is now attributed to the Germans. As to the objective of the Germans, there seems to be no reason to amend the original suggestion that they are trying to shear off the great Russian salient west of Kursk. In the two previous summers, their objective was unlimited; now it is limited. Had they achieved striking successes at the outset, they might have enlarged their aims, depending also on the outlook in the West and the South. The stoutness of the Russian defence has probably banished all thoughts of further exploitation. It is even a question whether the limited objective set—the straightening of the line between Orel and Bielgorod—will be reached. That goal includes another aim attributed to the Germans—to anticipate and spoil any summer offensive planned by the Russians by engaging the Red Armies' main concentration and seeking to deprive them of a dangerI ous offensive salient.