THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, APRIL 10, 1943 INTO THE FORTRESS

New Zealand Herald, Volume 80, Issue 24555, 10 April 1943, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, APRIL 10, 1943 INTO THE FORTRESS

Europe's preoccupation with invasion has coloured a dozen news items during the week. The French have been further denuded of youth and leadership, Bulgaria's weak bastion has received some stiffening, there have been a significant Allied visit to Spanish Morocco, glum forebodings from Rome radio, and transparent blustering from Berlin. The change of parts is immensely satisfying. British endurance is extolled as Europe's model, and the fortress simile of 1910 has crossed the Channel. It is, however, no simple theme for jubilation. The military necessities apply both ways. Three years ago Hitler failed to see that the one way to end the war was by the prompt invasion of the British Isles. The arguments which led him to shirk the task are as fallacious for his foes. A successful invasion of the Continent must precede the end. History has known few impregnable strongholds, and none of Continental dimensions. History, indeed, has little comfort for those who sit behind walls. The audacity and ingenuity of men have always sprung surprises on them. The wooden horse, in the dim hinterlands of history, went through the walls of Troy. "Thou shalt not come hither," said the Jebusites on the Jerusalem crags, but David's "mighty men" took the keep. The walls of Babylon, wonder of the | world, were turned by unimagined engineering skill. The walls of Byzantium, the Great Wall of China, I the Roman Wall, the Maginot Line all failed in the end. The Persians found an undefended path up the i Acropolis of Athens, the Gauls up the Capitol of Rome, and Wolfe up the cliffs of Quebec. No coastline has yet held against those who command the sea. All ■ history, apart from Vaagso and Dieppe, proves that Europe can be broken into at a price. Further speculations will be coloured by the problem of supply. The establishment of an ample bridgehead, within which to build up striking power, will require an organisation beyond anything attempted by the enemy in Africa, Crete or the Caucasus. The obvious fears of Rome have turned expectation to Southern Italy. It is true enough that Sicily is the ancient bridgehead for invaders from either continent, but the feeding of an invasion so far from home would be a task of stupendous difficulty. Its ultimate objective would hardly be France or Germany. Even modern strategy must respect the Alps. The plan, it might well be, would be to cross the Adriatic and strike for the Turkish border, along the Roman road. Greece, and the clustering fortifications of the Aegean, would thus be turned, the Turks encouraged to play an active part, the Yugoslav guerilla war turned into a fighting front, and, perhaps, by a co-ordin-ated offensive, a junction made with the Russians across the north of the Balkans. The dream sounds grandiose, but is no more ambitious than was the grand strategy of Germany and Japan a short year ago. The route, at all events, seems the only practical one for a southern attack on the Axis. Greece, with its island screen, its narrow isthmus, and its horizontal mountain chains, is probably the strongest sector in the south. Neutral Turkey awaits the persuasion of success elsewhere. Neutral Spain bars Hannibal's road to the Rhone and Lombardy. The conference in Morocco was probably concerned with the maintenance of a Spanish buffer on the western flank. The front door remains. The Cherbourg peninsula, or the coastal salient of Calais and Dunkirk, could be covered day and night with a roof of air power. The narrow waters would not require the shoals of ships a Mediterranean adventure; would demand. On the other hand the coast bristles with all the ingenuities of Todt, and the cost of ingress in human life must be terrific. The choice, however, seems to lie between the north of France and the south of Italy. An attack on Norway could not be decisive. The re-occupation of Narvik would protect a Russian lifeline, and any northern campaign would be a valuable diversion, but the Baltic seals the way into the Reich. But all speculation is conditioned by available air power and available shipping. The date and the nature of the second front are both finding decision in the hidden battle of the seas. The tenacious Rommel, too, has played his part. The rapid occupation of Tunisia by the United Nations might have caught Italy un-i armed and undefended, an open door. The Afrika Korps may, in its ending, have served its masters well. There is no doubt that a critical hundred days lie ahead. The long struggle with Napoleon might have i been cut at the root by an early j landing in Flanders or La Vendee, or even in Northern Italy, when the European Coalition had been formed. The warning is clear. If the U-boats have staved off a second front, the war will be long and weary. The near future will determine many things. There is stimulus in the thought.