THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 1943 BRITISH AGRICULTURE

New Zealand Herald, Volume 80, Issue 24540, 24 March 1943, Page 2

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 1943 BRITISH AGRICULTURE

In his comprehensive survey of what j could and should be done after the war to build a better Britain Mr. Churchill did not overlook agriculture. His picture would not have been complete if he had. It has been customary for many years past to represent British farming as in the last stages of decay. Yet the statistical position immediately before the war showed some 45,000,000 acres to have been given to agricultural, pastoral and horticultural production. Permanent pasture with 17,000,000 acres occupied the greatest area. Arable land totalled 12,000,000 acres, and rough grazing—mostly in Scotland —16,000,000' acres. The value of the output in 1938-39 was £219,800,000, this making it fourth among single industries and surpassed only by textiles, engineering and shipbuilding, and iron and steel. These arc not the marks of an industry at the point of death. When, in addition, British purebred livestock set a standard for the world and was sought by every other pastoral country, the calibre of the industry could not be dismissed as negligible. With it all it came very far from feeding the nation. Official policy immediately before the war, shaped by a Conservative, and, therefore, land-conscious, Government rejected the idea of making it capable of doing that in peace. The objective set was to maintain the fertility of the soil and efficiency on the farm so that, in the event |of war, production could be rapidly 'expanded to fill the gap created by I the loss of imports. | Much has been heard about the ; success with which output from the : Jand has been increased as a counter |to the threat of the submarine blockade. Especially in grain-grow-ing, wonders have been performed. Reduced to figures, the effort has resulted in bringing an additional 5,000,000 acres under the plough. A good deal of the activity consisted in renewing drains, clearing ditches and hedges, and generally rescuing potentially good properties from impoverishment and neglect. Much of the work was done under the stimulus of fixed and favourable prices, often supplemented by bonuses or subsidies. There was even a measure of compulsion. County agricultural committees have been given power, in the case of persistently inefficient farming, to dispossess the farmer and replace him, or to farm the land themselves. A certain amount was also done to supply mechanical aid to recondition farms, both equipment and labour being provided on a contract basis. Mechanism generally went ahead at a tremendous rate, so that over a year ago the Minister of Agriculture said the British farming industry was employing more tractors than the German. This is the basis on which agriculture has expanded, these are largely the conditions which will exist when the war ends. During the last war there was a similar drive for increased production. There were similar vows that farming would not be allowed to fall back from the high point it had reached; but it was. It cannot be assumed that the same relapse will occur again. Mr. Churchill himself referred to the way the nation had grown great on abundant and cheap food, a hint that agricultural prosperity must not be built on high prices to the consuming public. He also emphasised the need to restore export trade. It is generally recognised that Britain cannot expect to sell unless she buys, and that some of her most important markets, are in countries which export foodstuffs. These factors constitute the backbone of the traditional case against protection for the British farmer. The extreme exponents of the argument used to imply that it would matter very little economically if he disappeared altogether, so long as the exchange of goods could procure food at cheaper prices than those needed to keep his industry alive. War and the threat of blockade have made such theories less acceptable. Other points indicate that the moral and social case foF keeping agriculture alive will have more support in future. It was remarked some time ago that land was rising in favour as an investment, since it could be neither destroyed nor seriously damaged by bombing, as buildings and industrial plant could. People who have experienced bomb attack may thinkthat life and work in the country are preferable to the risks of existence in great cities. An accumulation of reasons, great and small, may well reinforce the determination not to allow British agriculture to fall away as it did between the two great wars. It is a possibility not to be overlooked by countries like New Zealand, which will need markets after the war for the products of their own soil.