ARMY LEAVE

New Zealand Herald, Volume 79, Issue 24369, 3 September 1942, Page 4

ARMY LEAVE

CASE FOR REVISION VALUABLE TIME LOST ASSOCIATED TKOBLEMS Although the majority of soldiers will refuse to agree that such a move is either desirable or necessary', it is evident that there is a good case for the revision of Army leave orders. Since attention was last called to this question in May, it has become even clearer that much valuable training and working time is being lost because units rarely have full strength available for the tasks given them. It is difficult to argue that men who are serving their country should be deprived of the occasional chance to return to their home life, but it must be recognised that in the aggregate the existing leave arrangements subtract from the Army's training year a very considerable period. An Accumulating Process Under these arrangements for ordinarv leave, week-end leave and furlough, it is possible for up to 25 per cent of the men to bo away from their units at any time. This means a constant repetition of training, with boredom for the men who have already taken it and difficulty for those who have not to catch up with their fellows. When field exercises are held there is almost invariably a large percentage of men who do not receive the benefit of what constitutes one of the most important elements of their soldier trainmg. It is true that 6ince mobilisation many men have spent most of their time "liousemaiding," that is, working on camp and defence post construction. This necessarily reduces training time, and tho lag is extremely difficult to make up. Results of Time-wasting Other soldiers will say that much, oi at the least some, of their time in camp is wasted and that the leave they are given makes no diflerence to their progress as fighting men. The blame for such shortcomings in training is difficult to apportion. It must, however, reach right down the whole Army organisation, including associated departmental systems, and the political impact on Army, wishes, but with immediate emphasis on unit commanders and their subordinate officers. Whatever the cause, tho result is had. It is partly psychological, in that men are not seized with any confidence in the utility of the work they are doing, nor are they inspirited by clear thoughts of a morale-building objective. Certainly it is more difficult to present men playing a defensive role with such an objective than it is to give it to soldiers on the offensive. Need For Inspectorate It should be recognised that if the soldiers should lose any of their leave because of the national interest an equally strong case can be made for the introduction of some means of making sure that training time is not lost through administrative and local weaknesses. There seems to bo a need for an energetic Annv inspectorate with authority to do "more than prepare reports and for a general inspiration in formation and unit leadership. Some formations and units are already fortunate in this direction, but the amount of work which devolves upon senior commanders and administrative officers, particularly the best ones, often makes it impossible for them to do more than rely on the word of subordinates that work and morale are being maintained. Inspections, when commanders are free to make them, and field security section reports are not necessarily the most effective way of testing "training progress and strength of morale. i Difficulties of Officers This article is not intended to be destructive, nor can it do more than glance over the surface of various teatures of Army training and organisation which should be considered in conjunction with the question of leave. It is very true that the Army has achieved a colossal amount of extremely good work for the security of the country, especially since general mobilisation gave it its first real chance to get ahead, and it is equally true that there are hundreds of exceptionally fine and capable officers of both senior and junior rank. But it is also true that even the best officer is not always able to do even what he knows to be necessary. Tied to a Policy Two things should be recognised by the private soldier and the individual citizen. One is that,senior administrative and field officers can be just as conscious of weaknesses as the lowestranking soldier and have little more freedom of action to do something about them than he has, and the other is that a soldier rarely has the opportunity to view the Army structure generally, being confined in his knowledge to" his own immediate area. Amending leave is an instance of what even the most senior district field or administrative officer cannot do. He is presented with a policy which he has to carry out; he does not initiate the policy. He may know perfectly well that the district", division or country stands to suffer because of the interruption caused to work or training. but he has no authority to make a change. Similarly, he may be aware of the need for revision of many features of Army systems, but he is faced with tremendous difficulties oi procedure, time, and insufficient authority. MESSAGE TO POLES LONDON, Sept, 1 On the third anniversary of the German attack on Poland, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, sent a message to Count Raczynski, Polish Ambassador and acting-Foreign Secretary, says the British official wireless. Mr. Eden said: "The example of the Polish people under ruthless oppression at home and of their leaders and armed forces abroad, inspires every freedomloving nation in the world. Fighting in the ranks of the United Nations, Great Britain and Poland are pledged to carry on the common struggle until the day of victory restores the greatness of Poland and the freedom of her peoples."