SECOND FRONT IN EUROPE

New Zealand Herald, Volume 79, Issue 24302, 17 June 1942, Page 2

SECOND FRONT IN EUROPE

While Tokio jibes that it is impossible to form a second front in Europe in 1042 —as provided in the Anglo-American agreements with Russia —Hitler is taking no chances. He has ordered Rundstedt, his commander in the W-est, to make the German forces there self-support-ing, while Spcer, Todt's successor, has been sent to inspect transport and fortification systems. Thus the purpose of the second front, the easing of pressure on Russia, is already being served by the mere threat of it. That is justification for the publication of the agreements made by Britain and the United States with Russia. It may fairly be asked whether it is sufficient justification for disclosing the Allied plan to the enemy. Hitler is informed that ne will have to meet an Anglo-Ameri-can invasion of Europe in 1942, that is, in less than seven months. "Second front" also implies more than a reinforcement of the Russian line; it means an invasion of the Atlantic or the Mediterranean coasts of the Continent. Within certain limits of time and of space—both fairly wide—Hitler has been forewarned. The question is whether the warning ie really of much use

to him. The Germans themselves argue that, under modern conditions, preparations on the vast scale necessary to an invasion or any major offensive cannot be concealed. Apart from other intelligence services, air reconnaissance would infallibly search out the enormous secret. No complete surprise as to the time or place of the attack can therefore be sprung and they put most reliance on tactical surprise. If the German argument is sound, then the Allies have given very little away, while causing Hitler to immobilise forces in the West that he can ill spare from Russia. And when the time comes to open the second front in Europe, it may be hoped and expected that the Allies will be able to spring the tactical surprise that promotes success.