THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, APRIL 9, 1942 BOMBERS AND BATTLES

New Zealand Herald, Volume 79, Issue 24244, 9 April 1942, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, APRIL 9, 1942 BOMBERS AND BATTLES

High claims are made for the effectiveness of three recent bombing attacks by the Royal Air Force on German and French industrial works. With masterful ease, it seems, the R.A.F. has s.truck a blow at the German war machine that could only have been achieved by an Allied army of millions at the cost of a prolonged and bloody campaign. By contrast, in the space of about six hours and for the loss of four bombers and 25 men, the R.A.F. destroyed the equivalent of five enemy armoured and mechanised divisions. "The lady doth protest too much, methinks." In the first place the industrial works just destroyed have been working for months producing equipment for possibly several armoured divisions. That production cannot be undone. In the second place, the R.A.F. can only by co-operation with the Army in the field destroy the 30 armoured divisions which are already the spearhead of every German offensive. The claims made for the R.A.F. must therefore be' regretfully set aside as too good to be true. They smell of special pleading in support of the policy of strategic bombing, which has been placed very much on the defensive. The ineffectiveness of the bombing of the battle-cruisers at Brest, or the corresponding enemy failure to mask Malta, have raised doubts. They are increased by the reflection that the enemy has virtually ceased his bombing of British ports and factories, and that, to judge by its actions, the Red Air Force never attached much weight to this form of warfare.

In his first speech as leader of the House, Sir Stafford Cripps said the original bombing policy had to come under review. No one would deny, of course, that strategic bombing plays an important part in total war. What a growing number does contend is that the R.A.F. has devoted a disproportionate amount of attention and power to this department at the expense of its other functions —reconnaissance and particularly close support of the Navy and the Army in the actual battle zone. The most conspicuous failure of air reconnaissance is provided by the Americans based on Pearl Harbour, but similar British failures allowed Hitler to land in Norway almost unscathed, Rommel to ship his Afrika Korps across to Libya, and the German battle-cruisers to reach the Strait of Dover undetected. Had the Air Ministery not been so wedded'to bombing, better organisation and more material might have been devoted to one of. the air arm's primary functions — reconnaissance. Deriving from the same cause and producing even more disastrous results has been the R.A.F.'s failure to solve the problems of close support of the other arms in the battle zone. Possessing the Fleet Air Arm, the Navy has not suffered so grievously as the Army.

No profit can come out. of a recital of the series of army reverses, in all of which a large contributing factor was the failure, early or late, of the air arm to give adequate support on the battlefield. Burma is providing the latest example- Little wonder that there should be bitterness in the soldiers' hearts when they hear of the triumphant exploits of the bombers, anywhere and everywhere but on the battlefield where they are fighting. Perhaps the Libyan campaigns provide exceptions. Yet the fact remains that the R.A.F. has yet to provide the trained personnel, the machines and the organisation to give the Army the measure of air support it must have to succeed. The war cannot be won until it does. For, essential and vital as are the parts played by the Navy and Air Force, the victory cannot finally be clinched except on land and therefore by land forces. When it comes to finishing the job, the Army must, if it is to advance into Central Europe, have the close support of the air arm. When it comes to forcing the passages of the Rhine, it will not care to be assured that the R.A.F.'s heavy bombers are creating havoc hundreds of miles away at Berlin or Lubeck. It will need on the battlefield the protection of fighters and the artillery support of handy light and medium bombers. Admirable as they are for their special missions, Stirlings and Halifaxes, Fortresses and Liberators are useless for tasks where nimbleness, flexibility and close contact are needed. No doubt that is what Major Oliver Stewart has in mind when he says Britain is devoting too much time to the production of large fourengined bombers and too little time to the manufacture of smaller, faster bombers. Until the Army is amply provided with the bombers and fighters which it needs, campaigns of reconquest on .land cannot hopefully begin.