TRAGIC STORY

New Zealand Herald, Volume 79, Issue 24203, 19 February 1942, Page 8

TRAGIC STORY

LOSS OF SINGAPORE DASHING AUSTRALIANS VALUE OF AIR FORCE (Rerd. 1.40 a.m.) LONDON, Feb. 18 The Times' Singapore despatch from Batavia asks: "Why did Singapore fall'?" The following is an attempt to explain -but not explain away what happened.

Firstly. Singapore was never a forti ess, hut. a potential naval base. Its whole significance depended on certain unfulfilled or partially fulfilled conditions,' the chief of which was the Allies' ability to produce enough ships and aeroplanes to operate from the base and keep the Japanese several hundred miles away. Ihe "fortress" concept arose from loose thinking when our propagandists were trying to keep Japanese from the war by making them think we were stronger than we were.

Troops Tired by Withdrawal Secondly, the majority of the troops participated in a long, exhausting and thoroughly dispiriting withdrawal for over 500 miles. Many of our best units suffered heavily in the fighting on the mainlnnd. A single Argyll battalion engaged lost 80 per cent of its men (ihtirka casualties were even heavier. The remnants ot the blast Surreys and Leicesters, who took the brunt of the attack on Kedah, early amalgamated into a so-called British battalion. Two Australian battalions were badly cut up at the Muar Kiver and they also lost, heavily in other sectors.

Thirdly, many of the white troops— Australians wore the conspicuous exceptions—never seemed physically up to the mark. Some had been too long in the tropical climate and had gone soft. Others were unaccustomed to the climate or the terrain. One brigade plunged straight into the jungle, fighting at Johore three days alter landing alter an 11-weeks sea voyage.

Fourthly, the troops whose duty it was to repel the Japanese in the sector where they landed were subjected alter throe days to a crescendo bombardment, reaching a climax in the evening of February 8, when, alter four hours, the Japanese light, medium and heavy guns fired at machine-gun tempo. The Japanese also had the advantage of continuous aerial observation.

Morale Affected Fifthly, the enemy's complete aerial ascendancy had a big efteet on the lighting and a bigger effect on the morale, especially in the case of the Indians. Only one thing could have transformed this state of affairs — dynamic, able leadership. A general showing the gfeatest qualities of leadership was Major-General Bennett, the Australian commander. Though hard, bitter, sarcastic and difficult, he was. a fighter through and through, imbued, like his men. with the aggressive, offensive and unconventional spirit Other generals lacked this vital spark The absence of forceful leadership at the top made itself felt from the top downward. The morale of the men was potentially good, but something was lacking to crystallise and coordinate it and infuse it with the fire of confidence.

The same lack of dynamic leadership characterised the upper ranks of the ci\ ilian administration.

Except lor certain sections of the Chinese community—some inspired by Free China's struggle, others by the So\iet precept and example—the bulk of the Asiatic population remained spectators from the start to the finish. Their inclination was to get as far as possible from hostilities in Singapore. This caused acute labour difficulties. Bomb craters in airfields were not filled because there were no Asiatics and not enough Europeans available for the work of labour. A force ot 12,000 Asiatics was employed at the naval base early in the war. Only 800 reported lor duty.

Native Crews Desert Theie was no native labour at tindocks. Soldiers had been taken from military duties for loading and unloading ships. Many small ships which could have evacuated many thousands from Singapore were immobilised in the harbour because the native crews deserted and there were not enough Europeans to man them.

After nearly 120 years of British rule, the vast majority of Asiatics were insufficiently interested to take steps to ensure its continuance. The few thousand British officials resident in Malaya were completely out of touch with the people. British and Asiatics lived lives apart. British rule and culture and the small British community formed no more than a brittle veneer.

Against this structure there was suddenly launched jui explosive force of a nation impelled by both fanaticism and ilie frustration ot economic repression. Resourceful Japanese

The Japanese in .Malaya revealed themselves able, disciplined and reso 11 reef u] soldiers, well equipped and well supported from the air. The norma! Japanese elan was heightened by continuous unexpected victory. The Japanese also enjoyed certain natural advantages, such as Asiatic appearance and ability to live off the country. Over all, they possessed a capacity for co-ordinated effort with every man and every weapon, thus achieving the maximum effort. This capacity was conspicuously lacking on the British side. One good push sent the structure crashing to the ground. What is the answer? Until more aeroplanes are available tn the Allies in the Pacific it will be difficult to bold the Japanese at sea and on the ground. It is not the Japanese who are strong in the air; it is the Allies who are weak. Secondly, until the British exorcise to the full those qualities of vigour and ruthlessness which have made them great in the past they cannot expect greatness in the present.