THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1941 CRISIS IN SOUTH RUSSIA

New Zealand Herald, Volume 78, Issue 24106, 27 October 1941, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1941 CRISIS IN SOUTH RUSSIA

A grave view must be taken of developments on the southern sector of the Russian front. "Alarming" is the word used by Moscow to describe the situation. It has continued to deteriorate ever since a large part of Marshal Budenny's army group was enveloped east of Kiev. The veteran Cossack leader seems to have been unable to make good the losses sustained in that operation and his armies have been steadily forced back from the Dnieper to the Donetz, uncovering the vitally important industrial basin, chief producer of Soviet iron, steel and coal. At the same time the Crimea has been cut off from the mainland, except for the fciiy across the Strait of Kerch. The precariousness of the position in the south is indicated by the supercession of the old marshal by his \oung colleague, Marshal Timoshenko, I who has apparently been given command of the whole front south of Moscow. This change in grouping as well as command seems designed to meet in advance any attempt by the eneinv to strike at the hinge between the central and southern armies and separate them. The front has been regarded as one whole and placed under a single commander, Marshal Timoshenko, a soldier who has proved his resolution and resourcefulness in the defence of Moscow. He it was who slowed down and stopped at Smolensk the most powerful of the initial German drives and who succeeded in stemming the second onrush begun on October 2. Marshal Timoshenko arrives late on the southern scene and is set no easy task to stabilise and retrieve the position. Even if the enemy's claim to have captured Kharkov and Belgorod should prove false, the bulk of the Ukraine has already been over-run, with six out of its seven great cities. Only the northeastern fringe of this rich republic remains in Soviet hands. Thus the enemy has gone a long way toward occupying the most important of his three primary objectives—the Ukraine, Moscow and Leningrad. The Ukraine contains a population 20 times larger than that of New Zealand in an area not twice as large. Its fame as a granary is deserved, but in more recent times its importance to the Soviet Union has derived chiefly from its heavy industries. They have performed the double role of mechanising Soviet agriculture and the Red Armies. In 1938, for instance, Kharkov alone was producing 150 tractors a day and from tractor to tank is not a long step. More generally, the concentration of the Soviet's heavy industries in the basins of the Dnieper and the Donetz has made the Ukraine the main arsenal of Russia. This localisation has been due to the fact that 60 per cent of Soviet coal—good coking coal—is raised in the area, as well as 63 per cent of the iron ore, 35 per cent of the manganese, and 72 per cent of the aluminium output. Even if the industries based on these raw materials should have been completely destroyed and their output lost to the enemy for the present, the deprivation to the Russian armies may be well nigh crippling as existing reserves of munitions are expended. Britain and America might be able to make good, for instance, the loss of the Ukraine's output of 10,000,000 tons of pig-iron and 9,000,000 tons of steel, but its transport over existing routes to central Russia would be a colossal undertaking. To have gone far toward depriving the Soviet of Ukrainian industrial power counts as a major strategic gain for the enemy. Moreover, the Ukraine is not only an end in itself, but also a stage on the road to two other major objectives—the cutting of the oil lines from the Caucasus and the connection between Russia and AngloAmerican aid landing in the Persian Gulf. It w T ould seem that the enemy thrust has already carried so far .through the Ukraine that Marshal Timoshenko may have to concentrate on denying the Germans these two subsequent objectives. Such a plan, unhappily, is already compromised bv Rundstedt's advance beyond the Ukraine toward Rostov, at the mouth of the Don. Almost any map shows that Rostov is the strategic key that would unlock the door either to the Caucasus or to the lower Volga and North Caspian, or to both. More hangs on the course of the struggle there than on the battle for Moscow. The great hope is that Marsha! Timoshenko will have taken over in time to check Rundstedt short of Rostov, and also short of the one remaining first-class lateral railway, M oscow-V oronej-R ost ov-Baku, serving the Red armies on the southern front.