THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1941 UNITED PACIFIC FRONT

New Zealand Herald, Volume 78, Issue 24102, 22 October 1941, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1941 UNITED PACIFIC FRONT

Political developments in Tokio give added value and significance to the news from Canberra of the formation of a united front against aggression in the Pacific by America, the British Empire, China and the Dutch East Indies. Thus some form has been given to the alphabetical conjunction of the A-B-C-D nations. How firm the new arrangement is, has not been stated, but at least it is founded on the strongest basis of common interest. Such a tie continues to bind long after parchments and signatures have perished. Nor has the united front been hastily improvised. Its formation has been preceded by the most thorough examination of the ground, and of ways and means. Staff talks have been proceeding for months past, and military missions have been exchanged between the military capitals in the Far East of the four Powers concerned —Manila, Singapore, Chungking and Batavia. Now the Commonwealth Prime Minister, Mr. Curtin, is able to announce that difficulties standing in the way of an agreement for co-operation in resisting aggression have been surmounted. He does not say what those difficulties were although, to judge by comment from Batavia, the Dutch Government wished to receive guarantees of support in upholding the democracies' policy of financial and economic sanctions against Japan. Its stipulation was natural because it was not strong enough in isolation to deny essential commodities to Japan.

Dutch opinion was inclined to look to Britain for guarantees, ignoring the fact, that the Empire's hands were full and the further fact that another Great Power, the United States, was also vitally interested in preserving the Far Eastern status quo and was the only Great Power left in the world not actively committed in the war. In fact it was up to America. She had two large stakes in the Far East, her trusteeship in the Philippines and her dependence on the Dutch for tin, rubber and quinine, and oi) the Chinese for tungsten. When in March, 1939, Mr. Chamberlain gave Britain's guarantee to Poland, he freed Russia of anxieties concerning her western frontiers and the sequel was disastrous. Mr. Churchill has apparently sought to avoid the same error in the East Indies of giving guarantees that would permit America, a country at least equally interested, to stand aside and leave the British Empire to defend in the East as well as the West. On the contrary, in his speech on August 24, after the Atlantic conference with President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill left the initiative and first responsibility in the Far East with America. In other words, he intimated that the Empire did not intend to be left carrying the baby. But if America proved by action that she intended to implement her strong policy against aggression by discharging her responsibilities, then Mr. Churchill undertook that the Empire would give immediate and wholehearted support.

In effect, London referred Batavia to Washington with the cordial and firm assurance that, if America engaged to resist aggression in the Far East, "we shall of course range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States." These are the actual words of Mr. Churchill's undertaking. Here arose another difficulty, in that Mr. Roosevelt' does not possess the power to give a binding pledge. As the Washington correspondent of the Times pointed out on this very issue, there is only one way in which tfie United States can be pledged in advance to any common cause with any nation—by a treaty of alliance negotiated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. No such treaty is in sight or has even been proposed. How, then, have Dutch apprehensions been assuaged and the united front formed 1 It will probably be found that the Dutch are convinced that America means business in the Far East and that, therefore, the British guarantee will also become effective. After all, common interests and vital interests are real and substantial and, if and when the acid test comes, are bound to hold together better and longer than any formal paper pact. Far more effective than paper, also, are ships and aircraft, garrisons and guns, and plans for using them in concert perfected by staff talks. The Dutch are a practical people and can see the logic of men and material. We in this country have equal reason for satisfaction at the successful ending of the delicate negotiations in an agreement for co-operation. Our security has been materially increased by the formation of a united front, uncovenanted but real, for defence in the Pacific. The hope is still that the deterrent effect will save it from ever going into action.