THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1940 DICTATORS' DILEMMA

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23781, 8 October 1940, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1940 DICTATORS' DILEMMA

Speculation on the subject under discussion by Hitler and Mussolini at the Brenner Pass meeting lias taken a wide range, but the reason for their having to confer is clear enough. It is British sea power, which not only prevents them clinching the German conquests on land but is also strangling their economic life, slowly but relentlessly. Their desperate anxiety is how to break the British hold. They command vast land forces that promise victory if they could be brought to bear at soino decisive point. But everywhere these forces are separated from vital objectives by narrow seas or tracts of neutral country. At the Brenner, therefore, the dictators would have to fix on the plan that seemed to offer the best chance of success quickly. The fact is that time enables the fuller mobilisation of the Empire's power and American industry, and increases the dangers of the Nazi position in occupied European countries. Hagridden by these questions, Hitler and Mussolini were forced at the Brenner to decide on a course that might supply the answers. In all probability they would have reached virtual agreement prior to meeting after study of analyses of all aspects of the current situation, the Brenner conference signifying no more than a showy ratification of decisions already reached between the general staffs. Meanwhile the courses before the dictators may be worth considering. Mussolini would be able to point out to Hitler that the shortest route to victory lies across the English Channel, a home-truth that would be far from palatable. Hitler, the omniscient and the infallible, would then be left to explain lamely that so far he had not found the courage for the venture, having failed to establish the ascendancy in the air that might have made up in part for his patent inferiority at sea. By way of retort, he might draw Mussolini's attention to the fact that Italian armies had in front of them a major objective in Suez. Then it would be II Duce's turn to explain. He would have to confess that such a campaign .could not bo launched without secure communications. His trouble was that, by the shortest route, Libya was separated from Italy by 300 miles of sea. and that Benghazi, the logical base .for operations against Egypt, was 500 miles distant from the toe of Italy. And he would also have reluctantly to admit that, in spite of his boastful navy, Italian convoys ran the risk of interception from the British fleets based on Alexandria and Gibraltar, to say nothing of the submarines and aircraft operating from Malta, lying <9ose to either convoy route. Even if the Libyan forces could act independently, their difficult advance over the coastal road of the desert was threatened anew by British sea power, carrying the constant risk of an attack in flank or rear. As Hitler had found in the West, moreover, air power had not proved the effective counter to sea power that had been expected. It should not be too readily assumed, of course, that either or both attempts will be abandoned because the fences, are high. The dictators cannot halt in mid-career and may be forced to accept the risks. But no doubt they would anxiously examine any other options. There is a land route to Suez, for instance, but it runs across the Balkkns and Asia Minor. The Axis would need to be very sure of the attitude of Russia before starting out on a long detour through territory in whose disposition she is vitally interested. This route would also involve the violation of at least five or six countries at present neutral and it is not furnished with roads and railways capable of transporting and supplying the large forces required for the operation. Even the bait of Irakian oil might fail to tempt the dictators to take this long and uncertain course, with British resistance still to be overcome at the end. The West African project remains, a sphere in which any large scale expedition would seem to depend on Spanish and French colonial co-operation. Neither appears to be forthcoming in the requisite measure and, even with them, a thrust down the Western Atlantic coast would be heavily handicapped without sea power. The whole survey goes to show the strength of the British defensive position, principally buttressed by the Royal Navy. Yet the dictators' necessities are such that they must soon throw in all the force they can bring to bear in a desperate bid for a decision.