THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1940 ACTION AT DAKAR

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23770, 25 September 1940, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1940 ACTION AT DAKAR

Strategic and political considerations alike recommend the combined enterprise against Dakar undertaken by the forces of Britain and Free France. Strategically Dakar stands athwart the great trade routes to South America and the Cape and, with the closing of the Mediterranean to merchant traffic, to India, the Far East and Australia. While Britain has no pressing need of the port and aerodrome, being already established near by at Bathurst and Freetown, it is vital to deny Dakar to the enemy. Since the collapse of France, the Nazis have shown more than a passing interest in Dakar, despatching members of the Gestapo there and at least one reconnaissance aeroplane to spy out the land. Fortunately they are being forestalled by the bold initiative of London., Politically it is in the highest degree desirable that the Free France organisation should not be compromised in the eyes of Frenchmen and the world by having to function from London. At Dakar General de Gaulle can set up an independent establishment and a rallying point on French soil for his countrymen. The place carries the further advantages of bearing a famous name, of not being too remote from the main war theatre to forfeit influence, nor too near to make it vulnerable. There General de Gaulle can gather and organise his forces, and thence he can disseminate hits invigorating message to the French Empire, and especially to that large part of it in NorthWest Africa.

Political profit is accruing from the move in the Americas as well. They are well aware that Dakar is the nearest point of the eastern land hemisphere to the western hemisphere. The port is sited *Sn the westernmost extremity of Africa, where it juts out into the midAtlantic toward Brazil. Actually it has been named by American military commentators as the logical starting point for the conquest of the Americas by Germany. In view of the economic and political penetration of South and Central America by the Reich, they will be glad that the base is being taken into safe and non-aggressive keeping and closed to the Nazis. Such is already reported to be the reaction in Washington. One considerable by-product of the Dakar expedition will therefore be to impress on the Americas once again that, hardpressed though she be, Britain is fighting, their battle as well as her own. As for the intentions of Germany, Dakar was too precious a strategic prize not to attract acquisitive notice. The difficulty was how to win and hold it. Spain s assistance would have been invaluable and probably essential to the attempt. Only by her leave could the satisfaction of the preliminary condition, the reduction of Gibraltar, be tried and a land route mapped down Africa's Atlantic coast. Her positions at Cape Finisterre, Cadiz, Ceuta and Tangier, the Canaries and Rio de Oro, would all assist the design. The visit to Beilin at this moment of Senor Suner, General Franco's key Minister, together with Ribbentrop's hasty conferences in Rome, suggests that a bargain is being struck concerning Spanish intervention. Most happily Britain and Gene;ral de Gaulle are getting in first at Dakar and Axis picture of controlling the North-West African coast is spoilt at what was to have been its prettiest point. Less happy is the fact that Britain has once again had to use force to prevent trench military prizes falling into enemy hands. The responsibility really falls upon the Vichy Government, whose malign influence and subservient policy in the colonies offers further proof of shameful truckling to the Axis—proof, moreover, that Vichy is no longer a free agent and no more than a Nazi tool. Its commands cannot be respected as sovereign and, in any case, the paramount necessity of ensuring the safety of the Empire's sea routes dictated the action at Dakar. The use of force may unfortunately prejudice General de Gaulle's cause temporarily. The reaction after Oran steadily diminished, however, as Frenchmen placed the smallness of the immediate offence in relation to the greatness of the ultimate issue. The same recovery may be expected when the smoke clears away from Dakar, leaving General de Gaulle standing independent and conspicuous on French soil, holding aloft the standard of freedom, symbolising the real spirit of France and the Marseillaise, and offering his countrymen the gift of renewed hope and a chance to serve French ideals and French material interests. There need be no doubt, therefore, that the seed being planted at Dakar will germinate and grow into a sturdy tree, producing timber for what can once again be called the Allied cause.