The Army of To-day's All Right"

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXVI, Issue 23489, 28 October 1939, Page 3 (Supplement)

The Army of To-day's All Right"

otherwise at the time, but that was to encourage the offensive spirit! The fruits of years of study of how to defeat an annv in strong defensive positions without the carnage of t the last war is seen in the composition of the British Army in France to-day. Fewer but Better Men In a reoent .statement, the Secretary of State for War, Mr. Hore-Belisha, said that, whereas the army in 1914 had 60 per cent of infantrymen, tlie infantry in the force of 1939 constituted only 20 per cent. Converted into man-power figures, this means that of the 90,000 men who comprised the British Expeditionary Force of four infantry divisions and one cavalry division in 1914, 54,000 were infantrymen. To-day, wo have 158,000 men in France and only .'31,600 are infantrymen. The layman without military experience is entitled to infer from these figures that the day of the infantryman is done; but that is far from being true. As is always tlie case, it is the infantry soldier who finally determines the issue of a battle. What has happened is that experiment has proved that fewer but better trained and equipped men can do the job. When censorships in tho various countries wero lifted after tho war, when tho archives of the several states became available for public inspection, when reminiscences and apologia from high commanders' on all sides were issued in book after book, a host of students of war descended on them to ascertain tho reasons for this and that success, and for this and that failure. All the facts of tho war became available and they were sorted and classified time without number. There are now available wholo libraries dealing with single operations. But while there were many to mako meals of the facts, there were few who could digest them. Unfortunately, it is from those who suffered from indigestion that wo have heard most since the war. In their agony they have squealed the loudest and they have left an impression on the public mind that, to say the least, is very confusing. Controversy Evils A controversy concerning tho composition of divisions and tho arms of the men and units went on for years and the worst to suffer from it was the British Army. There were not only rival protagonists of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force, but many strongly-entrenched schools of thought within the three services. After the last war the British Army was reduced to its 1914 strength and reorganised on the 1914 twelve-battalion division instead of the nine-battalion organisation that proved so handy in France. The artillery and the machine-guns were reduced thus, with the increase in the divisional infantry personnel, gravely upsetting tho balance of firepower to man-power. Of course, we were never to have another war like the last one. Every one knew that. But another trouble , was that commands were loth to part j

with the old in favour of the new. They always wanted the new, but they would not give up anything. The worst case of this sort was proved at one of the economy year mobilisations of the Aldcrshot Division. They still had with them the old type horse-drawn ambulances of the Boer War. That is extreme, but it illustrates the difficulties of those who tried to institute reforms based on the lessons of the war. So long as there was peace in the world and no likelihood of another war, there was no great harm done in prolonging academic discussion. When he was Secretary of State for War, Mr. Duff Cooper tried to get things done, but be met the full brunt of the publicists and found himself hampered at every turn. He made good plans, but they wore not fulfilled. The job has boon done by Mr. Hore-Belisha who. one may safely prophesy now, will rank with Card well and Hafdane as a great army reformer. Initiation of Reforms Mr. Hore-Belisha started his reforms at the top and then went to the bottom. He cleaned out the War Office, putting younger men in charge, with Viscount Cort, only 51 years old, at the head. He followed that by giving the training of the men into the hands of the generals who would lead them in the field. Down at the bottom, lie set out to get young men with brains into the army. Ho improved pay and especially efficiency pay; he improved quarters and he allowed married men to sleep out of barracks and gave them allowances that would enable them to do so. He made provision for training men in civilian occupations during the last months of their military service, the army keeping them and paying them, so that when they went out they would find a job.

NO one in the British Army of ,to-day is entitled to hold his head higher than the firstclass infantryman. His training and the - weapons at his disposal mak6 him a tactician. He is an artilleryman because he can bombard on his s own. He is sapper, machine-gunner, scout, hunter, and, at the last "when he goes in with the bayonet, a pikeman of the old days. To get the full benefit of bis weapons . and of his training, the infantryman must be a man of brains. If the recruit is a' dullard, there is no place for him in the infantry. Such a one will have to go to an arm of the service where he can do all that is required of him by easily-learned routine.

This re-elevation of the infantryman to his proper place in the scheme of things is one of the outstanding changes made in the army since the last war. How easy it is to recall the popular definition of the infantryman, especially from 1916 on. He was "something to hang things on." He went "over the top," as some said, loaded like Santa Claus and, as others remarked, decked out like a Christmas tree. It is the awful price paid in practically every assault on the Western Front in the last war that has led to the changes in the status and tactics of the infantryman of 1939. Whether the attackers wero British or French or German, the assailants suffered far more than tho defenders. We were told

Infantryman Still Has Vital Part to Play And Is No Longer a "Beast of Burden"

BRITAIN'S COMPETENT AND ENERGETIC MINISTER FOR WAR

By AUTOLYCUS (Copyright Reserved)

Under tho right direction and with enthusiasm rekindled, the organisation of the modern army for the field was undertaken in earnest. In spite of some wild theorists, the infantry soldier is still the king-pin. It is he who will finally dislodge a determined enemy, and for that job he needs his rifle and bayonet. At the very last moment of the assault he is a pikeman. Six to .eight men had been proved to be the most convenient fire and tactical unit, but often the combined fire-power of their riiles was insufficient in both attack and defence. Therefore, to the section was given the easily portable, easily concealed, light automatic, first tho Lewis gun and now the Bren gun. Since the firc-powev of a light automatic gun is equivalent to that of about eight to ten riflemen, it was found that the platoon had the same fire-power with three sections, each with a light automatic, as it had with four sections, two of riflemen and two with automatics. One section per platoon was cut out. This in turn emphasised the value of the drill in threes and its adaptation to battle formations. The ratio of fire to man-power was further strengthened by reversion to the nine battalion division. Re-arming the Section Still with the thought of the section as the fire and tactical unit, it was realised that the fire-power of tho rifles and automatics would be insufficient for some jobs, and that it would be of advantage if the section commander could conduct a little bombardment of a difficult position. Three high explosive grenades, which could be thrown by hand or fired from the rifle, were thereupon added to tho section and, to assist them to screen their

movements, they were also given nine smoke-grenades. For the bombardment and screening job, which proved to be too big for the section, the platoon headquarters was given a two-inch mortar. Kx-servicenien will note some big differences here. Most important is the limited scale of issue of the grenades. They are not now used so freely as in the last war, but are definite team weapons for team purposes as are the light automatics. Where rifle and bayonet can do the work, they are the weapons to use. Fatigue Reduced Tactical handling of infantry is a development from the later stages of the last war. To-day there is no advancing in a succession of long straight lines. Speed of movement, use of cover, infiltration, movement around Hanks, fire with movement, exploitation of weaknesses rather than concentration against points of resistance, are the main features of to-day's tactics. Platoon and company frontages are much wider, and there is room to manoeuvre. Lines of advance are reconnoitred and the best chosen. The platoon commander pushes in his support sections after the section which is making most progress, and the company commander brings on the support platoons after the platoon which is getting ahead. The battalion commander follows suit with the support companies, and likewise the brigadier with the support battalions. To achieve this desirable speed in movement and freedom to use the best lines of advance, it was necessary to get the weight off the infantryman and this has been done by freeing him of all loads 'save his actual fighting weapons. Fatigue on the march has been reduced by providing a 1.5-ton truck as platoon transport. This carries the guns, the bombs, picks and shovels, reserve ammuntion and, believe it or not infantryman of the last war, the men's packs and greatcoats. For brigades and divisions on the move there is the Reserve Motor Transport run by the Army Service Corps. It is intended to have suflieient lorries and buses attached to each division to enable the whole division to move at once, hut up to the middle of this year the supply of transport was equal to only half the divisional requirements. The basic ideas here are rapidity of movement and the necessity of having men fresh for battle instead of half worn-out as they were so often in 191-1-18. Organisation of the Division It should be realised by now that if the infantryman is to make lull use of the weapons committed to his charge and also to take full advantage of ground in attack and defence, he must be thoroughly trained. This is a much longer process than was required in the last war, when practically everything was thought out for the soldier beforehand ancbhe had little opportunity to display initiative. The non-commis-sioned officers and the officers must bo drawn from the ranks, and therefore

the reservoir of supply must be kept pure nnd undefiled. Definitely, there is no place for the dullard in the infantry. While attention has been paid to the infantry, the other arms have not been overlooked. A halving in the number of battery staffs has been effected by doubling the size of the batteries and calling the old six-gun battery a troop. What was the artillery brigade is now an artillery regiment. The artillery also tend the greater part of the divisional anti-tank guns. The heavy machine-gunners, the men who operate the Vickers guns and whose interlocking fire the backbone of any fire plan in either attack or defence, are organised in three companies in the Machine-gun Battalion of the division. The fourth company of this battalion operates anti-tank guns, and a headquarters platoon has heavy mortars. Divisional cavalry are a new arm

which reyives the old cavalry scouts and advanced guards, etc., of the'division in a Avar movement. They use Ihe Bren carriers for speedy movement; to secure tactical features. The. carrier i;i a transport vehicle for men and light automatics; fighting is done by the light tanks. There was a suggestion that Bren carriers should also be incorporated in each battalion, but |as the process of reorganisation was being carried out when the war came," it' is not known in New Zealand how far intention had become reality. ! Besides the divisions as outlined, there are the completely mechanised divisions • which operate all classes of tanks. Their composition in detail is. also a little obscure. As divisions, they would operate in a war of movement; for the attack in position warfare' join with the artillery, machine-gun-ners and infantry, in conformity; to a set plan. '