THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, JUNE 26, 1939 STOCKING THE WAR LARDER

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXVI, Issue 23382, 26 June 1939, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, JUNE 26, 1939 STOCKING THE WAR LARDER

Provisioning against an emergency is not a new idea, but the scale of the barter deal —cotton for rubber —between Britain and the United States gives a dramatic effect probably not equalled since Joseph laid up stores in Egypt against the lean years. He looked seven years ahead just as the British and American Governments are doing to-day in their reciprocal deal. Joseph, however, provided against a natural dearth whereas the modern Governments seek to reduce the risk of shortage and their vulnerability in wartime. Modern science lias practically eliminated the risk of natural famine but not that produced by "man's inhumanity £o man." Herein resides a chastening commentary on the limits of human progress —the advances of science hamstrung by the backwardness of international morality. Things being as they are, however, Britain has acted wisely in taking precautions against being caught short in certain directions. Barter trading cuts right across the economic principles for which she and America have stood. The adoption of so primitive a method shows, therefore, how literally the threat of war is taken in both countries. The urgency with which Britain is treating the problem of the national commissariat in wartime and its bearing on New Zealand production and trade should not be lost on Mr. Nash, now in London. In fact there was a hint in the news last week that the Minister of Marketing was examining the possibilities. If New Zealand could help Britain to stock the national larder, she should be glad to do so, not only as an item of Imperial defence, but also from motives of self-interest.

A palpable first point for Mr. Nash would be that, while Britain is living and working under the shadow of war emergency, it is contradictory to be imposing new quotas on Dominion produce. Of course British supplies would not be built up and Home farmers might be prejudiced if the quotas were removed and the produce allowed to go into current consumption. For this purpose, therefore, a scheme would have to be devised for taking surpluses into store and building up British stocks to a point at which there would always be as large supplies on the spot as the nature of a particular commodity made practicable. Such a scheme would be expensive, especially for perishable produce requiring cool storage, ! but it has been stated by authorities that the cost of erecting and operating sufficient storage in the ports furthest removed from the bombing danger would be fractional by comparison with the cost of naval and air protection for ocean routes and would give absolute cover. The British Minister of Supply, Dr. L. Burgin, in announcing the acquisition of supplies of a certain metal, has just spoken of the advisability of keeping stocks in Britain rather than in the country of origin. The same argument holds for dairy produce, meat and wool as for metals, cotton, wheat, sugar and whale oil. The President of the Board of Trade, Mr. Oliver Stanley, justified the storage of whale oil (for margarine) "as providing one of our greatest necessities—fat." If whale oil, why not butter and even cheese? It is true that whale oil stores easily for long periods, but the keeping qualities of New Zealand butter are also well known. In the case of wheat, Mr. Stanley admitted its liability to deterioration in store and the need to "turn over stocks frequently." A similar system of rotating stocks for meat and dairy produce would be equally necessary but could be just as readily organised. A rotation of three, six or even 12 months, according to the commodity, could be arranged.

An objection from New Zealand's viewpoint is that her produce would come on the British market only after a long period in store. Her butter, for instance, might suffer in value in competition with the fresh Danish product. The initial market advantage while Britain was building up reserves might be lost many times over subsequently. The degree of loss that might be incurred under this head is partly a technical problem of refrigerating efficiency and partly one of consumer economics. Whether Britain should be looked to for compensation under this head as well as to store and finance stocks is a problem that requires hammering out. Undoubtedly the difficulties arc many and complex, but Britain is in the mood to-day to overcome any obstacles in the way of attaining the fullest measure of national security. Her Achilles heel is the need to bring from overseas GO per cent of her food supplies, and the extent of the mischief that the air weapon can work on the seaways has yet to be proved. Mr. Nash should seek to help in every way he can to cover the risk as far as possible in advance, for our safety is wrapped up with Britain's. How far it will be found practicable to go with perishable foodstuffs does not yet appear, but a good deal should be effected by study and determination. Canned goods represent a different proposition, as they keep indefinitely and can be stored in small units.

British housewives are being urged to stock pantry shelves. New Zealand might well offer to assist with canned supplies of meat, fruit and even butter. Britain might also be willing to lift restrictions on preserved milk in its various forms and finance the accumulation of reserves. Wool, hides, skins and animal fats should present fewer problems. Britain has natural objections to the disturbance of current and future markets involved in this policy but, so far as she is willing to go, Mr. Nash should be ready to offer New Zealand's active co-operation.