THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1939 INADEQUATE DEFENCES

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXVI, Issue 23273, 16 February 1939, Page 12

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1939 INADEQUATE DEFENCES

Once agan Earl Beatty has spoken plainly about the inadequacy of British defences in this part of the world. Lately, in New Zealand, he voiced his anxiety about our weakness in the face of growing risks; now in Sydney, he has expressed a similar concern about requirements in Australia. Thus, according to him, there is urgent need to improve the state of things on both sides of the Tasman —a sea, by the way, that has long been regarded as eminently, if not exclusively, British in its vital interests. It would be a tragedy for both its shores if the Tasman were seriously threatened by a foreign naval force from any quarter. That is not impossible. Distances have been shortened since the days when naval strategy could be discussed without reference to associated attacks by air. Remoteness, after all, is a relative term, and it would* be living in a fool's paradise to imagine that the South Seas, once an antipodean seclusion, are any longer immune by reason of the time taken to reach them from centres of potential enmity. Nor is it their local interests that have alone to be considered. The economic development that has added much to their desirability in alien eyes has made them more important to the Empire as a whole, and nothing is more likely than their being molested should Britain be involved in any war with a Power having naval and air bases in the Pacific or upon its borders. It was long ago pointed out by British strategists that, while a lethal blow at the heart of the Empire would be fatal to its total security, similar injury would be suffered by cutting anywhere the arterial system by which its comprehensive economic life was maintained. This argument is as valid to-day. It behoves Australia and New Zealand, for i;he sake of the national unit in which they are vital elements, as well as for the sake of their own security, to neglect no duty of defence in this time of doubtful peace. Of Australia it can be justifiably said, that defensive measures there have been and are receiving more attention than ever before. Mr. Lyons' statement of progress in the manufacture of arms and munitions is to be noted as part of the , evidence of an energetic policy. But the gravamen of Earl Beatty's frank criticism is that neither in Australia nor in New Zealand are there adequate naval forces. He consequently urges the strengthening of the Australian Navy and mercantile marine, and the provision of ibrtifications additional to those at Ilarwin and Port Moresby. This advice follows closely in detail what he lately urged upon New Zealand. Inexpert comment, not to say amateurish guesswork, has loudly uttered a belief that the next war, whenever it may come, will be fought conclusively in and from the air. This .is a fallacious deduction from the undoubted probability that aerial attack will play a large part in any conceivable war of the near future. Every feasible precaution against this form of attack ought to be taken. But it is not the only menace in the offing, and there is reason to believe that it would not necessarily be decisive. A considerable naval assault, under cover of which transports could land a strong body of armed forces, would be a far more serious matter. Invasion of this kind, in addition to the cuttiing of communications, ought to be taken into account in any scheme of defence. The practical problem is how to counter it. On this pertinent question Earl Beatty has reiterated a counsel that even the lay mind can understand and accept. He urges the establishment- of a chain of fortified naval bases from Singapore to Fiji.

The plain truth is that the security of the waters. adjacent to Australia and New Zealand is linked with naval strategy in the Pacific. America's plans rest critically upon (1) a triangle in which the Aleutian Islands, Hawaii and San Francisco are the three points, with Panama possibly in place of San Francisco,; (2) an extension southward and westward from Hawaii to Tutuila and Guam respectively, another triangle capable of support irom the first. Development of these plans has been seen in the creation of air-bases, particularly on islands at convenient spots not ifar from Tutuila. The weak point jin this ncheme is Guam. Within easy range of Japan's Ladrone and Caroline groups, which are held under mandate but presumably would be used for naval purposes in the event of Japanese hostility, Guam would be in a precarious position. Geographically, it is actually in the Ladrone group, while Nagasaki (in Japan) is less than 1500 mileu away and the Marshalls, also Japanese, are about the same distance eastward. Japan's recent southward thrust to Hainan Island has reduced the possibility of safely covering Guam from the west. As the position is now, in view of Japanese activity in the Orient, Guam would certainly be difficult to hold should war with Japan occur. This weakness suggests that Australia and the Tasman would be immediately vulnerable to a high degree; even America's! probable wish to lend aid would be of little value in view of contingencies elsewhere. Hence E.firl Beatty's proposed chain of bases from Singapore to Fiji would be required as the only sure shield for Australia and New Zealand from attack originating in the north, the quarter from which it is most likely to come—through a gap made by the loss of Guam. To guard against so perilous an emergency is essential to any effective plan desiigned to protect British lands in the South Seaa^