MODERN INDIA

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXVI, Issue 23263, 4 February 1939, Page 12

MODERN INDIA

TIDE OP DEMOCRACY?; TRIUMPH ANTICIPATED CO-OPERATION OF THE EMPIRE No. n. f ' ■ BY H. V. HOESCN. Having described the cam no" framed by the Indian National Con against the ;policy embodied Government of India Act, 1935 I particularly its drive for the democrat! sation of the native States, Mr. Hod proceeds:— on In the end, surely, the campaign ig certain to be successful. The tide democracy cannot be for ever withstood even in a land with India's sW monarchical tradition. It is even 6 a the cards that an accommodation may be reached the Congress nd the more advanced of the States before air* attempt- is made to bring in federation This sounds sensible and satisfactory But it does mean the creation of that Hindu raj which the Moslems say they ■will fight rather than accept. There then, is the inner dilemma for the British Government. To introduce federation on terms that give the Con. gress the hope of power is to court the violent resistance of the Moslems; introduce it on any other terms is to court the non-violent but no fea effective resistance of an organisation that holds the reins of office over the greater part of British India. ' * Concern of Dominions This is a problem of very. grea t moment, not only for the United King, dom, but also for the Dominions and many of the colonies. They are vitally interested in the future place of Imfo in the British Commonwealth on two main grounds—race relations and Im. perial defence. Of these, Imperial defence sounds the more important, and so it is if we look only for a few years ahead. But in the long nm the future of the relations between the different races is perhaps the most im. portant problem of all for the wiob British Commonwealth, indeed for the world.

If India can develop as a friendly self-governing State, freely associated with nations of different race in the British Common wealth, there is hope of a sane solution of the great racial problem. The Dominions will ao dcnbt have to make concessions of principle, if not of practice, in regard to Asiatic immigration if India's amour-propre is to be appeased. But such adjustment* are far more feasible if Indi& stands in friendly relation to her fellow-mem-bers of the Commonwealth than if she nurses anti-British grudges and throbs with hatred and distrust toward men of white race. Hostility Diminishing To-day, a short visit suggests that hostility toward the British as such, and toward the British connection, is much less than it was five to ten years ago. The success of provincial autonomy and the honest co-operation of the local European communities with the Indian administrations, are largely responsible for this, though the pressure of international dangers has alsc played its part. But the real test will come with the move to establish the '.new federal Centre. , " ~"y

That, too, will be the criticai moment in regard to India's future m Imperial defence, which is so import-, ant for the rest of the Commonwealth. For although the 1935 constitution reserves to British authority both fcreip policy and defence, and also the financial resources, without which defence cannot be carried on, the real power even over these reserved subjects will undoubtedly pass gradually but quite quickly to Indian hands once the federation is launched. Departments and Defence This is so for two reasons. In the first place, in times of crisis every civilian department is an organ of defence. That applies particularly to functions like railways or telegraph. These civilian departments are to be handecl to Indian responsible government, which would therefore have to be superseded altogether if it obstructed any defence policy to which it took exception. In the second place, the momentum of advancing democracy $ almost irresistible. Conflicts between autocratic authority and democratic representatives will almost always h* solved (with a little face-saving 03 either side) in favour -of the latter, unless autocracy is prepared to govern by force of the sword. That is certainly not true of British autocracy in Ins s to-day. , What, then, will India do with .her new power? It is hard to tell, for so much thought and agitation have been concentrated on the nationalist iss®* that little has been left for problems of foreign policy and defence. But this at least is certain, that a torn or ens' gruntled India is more dangerous to the Commonwealth than an I nc v s friendly and united, even though site may be unwilling to make anv positiW contribution to Imperial defence. (Concluded.)