"Victory Lies with Hitler"

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 23169, 15 October 1938, Page 11 (Supplement)

"Victory Lies with Hitler"

Noted Observer's Considered * View of the "IT IS MERELY A TRUCE"

PROFESSOR S. H. ROBERTS, Professor of Modern History, the University of Sydney—Author of "The House That Hitler Built."

WHEN the news of the Munich Agreement came through the world breathed A sigh of relief. Since the "black Wednesday" of September 28, we had attuned our minds to the grim realities of war, so that the agreement was like an eleventh-hour reprieve, and it was natural that the whole world should feel that the very maintenance of peace was a great victory. There is much justification for this. r hen warlike/,preparations reach tho point they did, say, in England—when cities have to be evacuated and people crawl into drain-pipes or cower defenceless in hastily-dug trenches in parks or backyards—civilisation is indeed reeling. Such people must inevitably

friendly neighbour, and at times even to secure her complete disappearance as an independent nation, he persisted in a policy that ho knew would upset the entire equilibrium of Europe. He forgot the fact that, less than six months ago, alter the occupation ol' Austria, lie openly promised to preserve Czechoslovakia. He said, through official deputies, that he had no claims on the Czechs and that they might rest secure in the hope that Austria would satisfy the German Fuehrer. How, therefore, can this settlement be called a victory for peace and commonsense? Hitler has not only enjoyed the greatest success of his life. He has emerged from the travail with gains that certainly were unexpected at the beginning. A German friend cf mine drew me a cartoon the other day, expressing what he said was typical German opinion—showing Hitler bemazed by

runner of a new order, is nothing more tior less than a confirmation of international piracy. It endorses the methods of foreign policy employed, openly and unashamedly, by Nazi Germany ami Fascist Italy. Jt is a surrender of everything for which Britain has stood in the past, and can be explained only on two grounds—the unwillingness of Britain's potential allies to act effectively in case of a war-emergency, or the state of.unpreparedness in Britain's own defences—especially in the defence of London and tho practical efficacy of tho A.11.P. (Air Raids Precautions Act). If neither of these factors determined the situation, then there was surrender pure and shnple. Surrender of Principles So run the arguments of the second school of thinkers on the Munich compromise ; and I must say that, on reflection, I cordially agree with such arguments. Assuming that the greater is more important than the lesser (though this itself does not always apply, if we keep any faith in justice and morality)—assuming that it is better to sacrifice a small State in central Europe rather than plunge the whole world into war, haV® we secured any result for the surrender of principles which many people still deem essential to a continued honourable I existence ?

You may argue: What is Czechoslovakia to us, any more than Yugoslavia or disappeared Montenegro, or the Ukrainia that never came into existence? "Why should we fight for a temporary and rather ramshackle erection of the Peace Treaties that has proved incapable of maintaining its own existence? Why should Australians and New Zealanders go abroad to fight if three million Germans in a foreign State want to join Germany?

Why should we worry if they have never belonged to Germany, or if the mountain frontier of Bohemia has been there since the time of the Romans; what are these things to us? And — most urgently of all—whv should we fight to keep the Sudeten Germans from going to Germany when we know that, even if we win the war, we could never make them go back to their previous position as a minority within the Chechoslovakian republic? This being so. why would we be fighting at all? Conditions in Europe 1 admit the force —and especially the popular appeal—of all these arguments; but, against them, I contend that they have nothing to do with the case. AVe would not have been taking a stand for or against the German minority in Bohemia. Wider principles would have been at stake —principles that apply just as much at Alice Springs or the North Pole. Conditions in Europe unfortunately raise these principles more frequently, but the issues remain the same. Wo say that existence is impossible without a continuance of a certain amount of freedom. Abroad, this means an absence of threats from our neighbours and a maintenance of decent communal life. If I live in a street, and a neighbour demands part of my belongings, saying that he will resort to force if I do not give them up. then obviously lifo becomes impossible. If all the dwellers in a s,treet act decently and only one threatens decent relationships, he becomes a standing evil. Should the question of his repression arise, it doesn't matter whether we agree with the actual incident that allows decent liv-

appreciate the removal of the warcloud, if only for a few months. But, now that some days have gone and now that we have had time to think over the position, what has been achieved? More important still, what, if anything, has been lost? Two schools of thought already exist onthe matter. Many writers feel that the doorway has been opened to a general peace- The Munich Agreement has shown, say these people, that the thorniest question in Europe can be solved by negotiation. If this can be bo spired, no other issue could involve war. The four rulers of Europe have come together in personal contact; they have come to know each other personally instead of through despatches; and they have talked over their grievances. A four-Power pact has been arranged to settle the Sudeten problem; and it can probably be extended to recast the whole of central Europe; The Munich Agreement, say these thinkers, is only a beginning. It is the stone originally thrown into the pool; the concentric circles of ripples started by the stone will become ever larger until the edge of the pool is reached. Commonsense has triumphed over narrow grounds of national interest, go on such theorists; and, as a result, we may look forward to a new period of European co-operation. This is all very attractive. The wish is father to the thought, for such an outcome is what most of us really want in our hearts. To Australians and New Zealanders, far away from the accumulated traditions of centuries that mean so much in everyday European life, it seems silly to go to arms when you have a dispute with your neighr hour; and so most of us turn naturally to a prospect of continued peace. Germany's People But the matter is not as simple as that. Except for a few megalomaniacs and profession-ridden soldiers, everybody wants peace. Recent observers in ! Germany have stated repeatedly that the ordinary people in Germany, ex» cept for a few romantic youths led astray by party propaganda, loathe war. In other countries it would be impossible to find any war-fervour at all. The ordinary people, then, want Peace. But the problem is this: The dictators know that the people of the democracies want peace and abhor war above all things; but are they not able . to play on this objection to war and, hy using methods of blackmail with an ultimate threat of war, wrest concession after concession from the democracies? Is it not precisely this which has happened in the last fortnight? The second school of thought on the Munich Agreement starts from this angle. Fully admitting the benefits of the respite of peace, and realising full well what it would have meant to have heen at war at the present time,_ they fi sk if there are not other considerations which count. Aftermath Who has heen the victor in the recent exchanges? Some people may say that it is arid to argue about victory when we have escaped war by the narrowest margin, but, in such a crisis, the aftermath is always more important than the crisis itself. Nobody can deny that the victory lies with Hitler. The Fuehrer—and the Fuehrer alone the Sudeten issue in the form 'n which it threatened the world with war. He alone made Sudeten discontent ■o vocal that the earlier solutions of autonomy within Czechoslovakia no longer applied. He alone so increased his demands between the Berchtesgaden and Godesberg conferences that France and Britain resolved to take a stand, by "arms if necessary. He alone raised a precedent for | Wrenching the Polish and Hungarian minorities away from Czechoslovakia. He alone was ready to go to war at an early stage. He alone demanded concessions from everybody, enforcing his Policy of blackmail with an ever-present threat to resort to arms. He alone blustered through the conferences and made not the slightest concessions. He alone boasted of victory and intran•igeant success Not once in the negotiations did «itler show any sign of modifying his Attitude. Seeking jo dismember a

the acceptance of his ever-wider demands, and Henlein absolutely prostrate because, while he would have been satisfied with the cession of partial local autonoinj", ho has been handed over all "predominantly" German areas in fee-simple, and, not only that, but given the right of a plebiscite, on terms favouring German' residents, in regions having less than half a German population. It is little wonder that the Nazis feel their estimate of the democracies to be justified—little wonder that, crowned by this newest and greatest success, they are confirmed in their own aims and methods. The Munich Agreement, far from boing a bulwark of peace and the fore-

inn conditions to be restored in the street; it is the wider outcome —the greater aim—that is all-important. And so it is, as 1 see it, in international affairs. Britain, France, and the smaller Powers constitute no threat to peace or to the maintenance of reciprocal obligations. Germany definitely does, because her leaders have often enunciated a policy of calculated disturbance, and. in spite of Hitler's recent disavowals, they have gone from stage to stage in a carefully drawn-up programme of military imperialism. Italy also seems to use such methods, but probably more from circumstances than preference. Not Permanent A few people in Australia and New Zealand see Hitler as a figure of peace, struggling against an outside world that has been trying to throttle him; most of us look upon him as a .warped man relying to an increasing degree on "the mailed fist" and working inexorably toward the military mastership of Europe. I cannot endorse the pious hope of most people that the Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938, will be the beginning of a new age. I it merely as a truce (accomplished under conditions that do not leave us easv in our minds when we sit down and think); I do not take it to be a permanent settlement. None of the outstanding issues are solved, except that, for the first time, the outside Powers have endorsed Hitler's methods of international blackmail ; they have retreated before him when it came to a test of strength; thev have given him far more than he probably expected to obtain: and they have consented to the dismemberment of a free State without even telling that State —incidentally a democracy — until after the event. In return they have obtained a statement from Hitler that ho has no outstanding territorial grievances in Europe. But what of Danzig, Memel, the Polish Corridor, the Trentino in Italy, and the scores of other pockets of Lost Germans to whom he has repeatedly promised redemption? He has vowed again and again to take his own life rather than desert these Germans,

all of whjOm, by the way, had far greater grievances than the Sudetens: and, if lie can change his promises with such facility, what value can be attributed to his latest statement? Does any reasonable person think that Hitler will stop short now —now that his methods have been endorsed, now that the great Powers have given in to his every demand —with only half his ultimate programme fulfilled? "Have We Lost Next War?" As soon as Sudetenland is consolidated, Hitler will be able to reduce the remaining fragment of Czechoslovakia to economic vassalage: he can immediately move to the control of Hungary: and by the time his influence will be at the gateway of Bukowina he will find Kumania waiting to fall into his lap. And why not? If the western Powers deserted Czechoslovakia, a progressive democracy, the keystone of France's system of European alliances, what chance is there of intervention in Kumania and further afield? The road to the Black Sea is definitely open. Hitler can move along it without any risk of war or threats of war. The old dream of Mitteleuropa— Middle Europe—is fast becoming a reality; and Hitler, thanks to the surrender of the outside world, is now remakinc the map of Europe. Germany is Europe's master, and the lesser Powers, warned by the recent lessons, must run to her. We have gained peace for a time; but have we lost the next war? —By arranßempnt with the Sydney Mail.