FINAL TALKS

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 23160, 5 October 1938, Page 15

FINAL TALKS

PREMIER'S REVIEW MODIFIED DEMANDS p: CONCESSIONS GAINED |" " ■" . I HOPE OF APPEASEMENT Jr." * ;. British Wireless . RUGBY. Oct. 8 ft"ln his eagerly awaited statement in the , House 7of Commons Mir. fe Chamberlain paid , a tribute to Herr || Hitler, . Signor Mussolini and M. Daladier for their respective contriplbutions to the Munich agreement. He described his hopes—founded on the declaration signed by Herr Hitler and himself on Friday—for further progress toward wider appeasement and for a. fresh approach to disarmanient, although he laid stress on the ."necessity in the meantime of not relax- : ing British rearmament efforts. : The Prime Minister also praised the patience , and wisdom of Viscount Halifax, the, Foreign Secretary, who had v borne the brunt of serious decisions and whose lofty conceptions of his duty not .only to his own country but to all humanity had domifaated and sustained his colleagues through the darkest houra. Decision already Made | .Mr. Chamberlain went on to remind flipthe House that at Munich there was ( ', v no questionof deciding whether the : predominantly German areas in Sudetenland should be transferred. That had been decided when Czechoslovakia accepted the British and French proposals. '' ' „ ■ '

What had to he discussed at Munich was the method,' conditions and time -|A)f transfer. The question was, moreover, most urgent, for all elements were present for the outbreak of a conflict which might have precipitated chaos. f|p|| Mr. Chamberlain next compared Herr . /Hitler's Godesberg memorandum, which, although cast in the form of proposals was?in fact an ultimatum, with the ||||j|[unich agreement, which he said reverted to the British and French proV. posal and secured international supervision of the main principles of the 'memorandum. y rOccupation -by Stages !

Under the Munich agreement occupation of the evacuated territory was to be carried out in five clearly defined Btages, and the line up to which German troops would move was no longer the line on the map attached to the Godes- - berg memorandum, but a line to bo Infixed by the international commission. Again, under the Godcsberg memor- *' andurn, plebiscite areas on the Czechosloyakian side of the line were drawn Germany, while those on the Ger- , roan side were left, undefined, whereas Wider the Munich agreement all the plebiscite areas would be defined by the International Commission. * ;Further, the Munich agreement pro- «■ Vided that the plebiscite should be based yijtt conditions of the Saar plebiscite, ;• which indicated that the vote would bo by small administrative areas in place of the largo areas which it had been feared •in Prague the Germans frould demand, and which would have llpPwated to the disadvantage of Czechoslovakia. Under the Munich agreement the plebiscite areas -were to be occupied ■ b y an international force. •' 'ro!^® 80 °tber modifications, Mr. , ywaberlain argued, destroyed the obJeetionable character of the Godesberg v ,Proposals and represented concessions I jVimportance to those of them who If /."wliked the ultimatum and were auxioua to see orderly and reasonable •procedure prevail. .