THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1938 THE MUNICH CONFERENCE

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 23156, 30 September 1938, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1938 THE MUNICH CONFERENCE

Hope of peace, and of a boon better than peace, is strengthened by the new turn of events in Europe. The outlook remains uncertain. It cannot be said that the difficulties in the way of an amicable settlement of even the Sudeten question have been removed. Much less is it right to think that on a broader basis can be easily fashioned a secure and effective understanding all round. But this hope can be cherished as it could not have been a few hours ago. History is being made at a rate so rapid that to keep pace with events is a rather bewildering task. Who could have thought that so soon after Herr Hitler's final memorandum and menacing speech the spokesmen for four Great Powers of Europe would be hurrying to Munich for a round-table conference on the situation? By a succession of dramatic moments this remarkable progress has been made: Mr. Chamberlain's broadcast recital of his conversations with Herr Hitler, the sending to Germany of further proposals in the name of the British and French Governments, the summoning of the British Parliament to consider the crisis, the unforgettable scene in the House of Commons as the Prime Minister's grave statement, was interrupted near its end by the arrival of an invitation from Herr Hitler to the Munich conference, the speeding of Mr. Chamberlain, M. Daladier and

Signor MusSolini to that rendezvous, Mr. Chamberlain's departure being taken amid a thunderous God-speed representative of the whole nation. It is really but a few hours since Herr Hitler was declaiming against the President of Czechoslovakia as the "one man" obstructing a settlement, and the Fuehrer then offered his sole challenge to face Dr. Benes in mortal combat. Against that melodramatic threat the new phase is strikingly in contrast. Whatever the outcome, the swift torrent of

hostility is suddenly stemmed. Were this sudden change unaccompanied by other signs of amicable intent it would not be so hopefully significant. Of the political signs the most encouraging have been Germany's denial of the rumour that a march on Czechoslovakia would be begun before the specified date (October 1), Poland's conclusion of an agreement with the Czechoslovak Government for the discussion of a revised boundary, and Italy's decision to withdraw her volunteer forces from the war in 'Spain. Such things point unmistakably to saner thinking. An uncontradicted rumour of precipitate military action against Czechoslovakia would have served Herr Hitler's initial purpose better than a belief that he would patiently wait; Poland had been plainly bent on intimidation of Czechoslovakia; and Italy's haste to withdraw troops from Spain in compliance with the Anglo-Italian understanding negotiated by Mr. Chamberlain, can be better interpreted as a preparation for meeting him in friendliness at Munich than as a diversion of forces to help Germany —if the latter object were intended there would have been no open beginning of the withdrawal nor forgetfulness of the strategic possibility of harassing France on her southern frontier with troops already in Spain. Therefore, estimating all these indications at their reasonable value, the prospect of a really sincere conference at Munich seems brighter than a pessimistic judgment may be tempted to forecast. Looking farther afield, those inclined to set store by the Rome-Berlin-Tokio pact as a factor operating in Herr Hitler's favour must be struck by the news that Japan has not gone beyond an affirmation of "moral support" of Italy and Germany. There is no crowding of the roads with aid in forcing Czechoslovakia to submit. This fact augurs well for the conference. Nevertheless, at this stage should be remembered the difficulty in which Herr Hitler is placed. He has consistently breathed out threatening and slaughter, and incited the people of Germany to regard the Sudeten cause—and the humbling of Czechoslovakia —as vital to German national policy. The advance" is prepared and ordered. All that remains, in keeping with his word, is to ptrike the blow. Sympathy with him, as he stays his hand for the duration of this conference, could be honestly felt, were it not for a realisation that he has himself created the temporarily embarrassing position. It is essential to his hold upon the nation he has schooled to venerate him that he should either carry out his enunciate*! programme or furnish satisfactory reasons for deviating from it. This is an inescapable part of the problem he takes to the conference, and doubtless Signor Mussolini will feel bound to help him to solve it in a way calculated to keep him in possession of German admiration and confidence. "The task ahead of me is difficult," said M. Daladier when announcing his acceptance of the invitation. He seemingly dwelt in thought upon the influences expected to play upon Herr Hitler when endeavouring to stand by his earlier decisions. These influences will lie powerful and real. On the other hand, Mr. Chamberlain has said, "There can be no member of this House who did not feel his heart leap when he heard that the crisis had been once more postponed and we have been given one more opportunity to try what reason, goodwill and discussion can do to settle the problem which is already within sight of settlement." He knows, better than anyone else, the details of the difficulty to which M. Daladier refers. That gives his hopeful words immense weight. The whole nation, proud of what he has already done for peace, can to-day rest in his cheery greeting, "It is all right this time." There may be won the boon of a far-reaching cure for Europe's obstinate jlls..