THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS SATURDAY, JUNE 25, 1938 PROVOCATIVE WORDS

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 23073, 25 June 1938, Page 14

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS SATURDAY, JUNE 25, 1938 PROVOCATIVE WORDS

Hope of a speedy solution of the minority problem in Czechoslovakia has been diminished by Dr. Goebbels' words in reply to a pointed question. As he is one of Herr Hitler's henchmen and exerts an intimate influence on the trend of Nazi policy, these words have an important bearing on the most perilous phase of the problem—the plan of action to be adopted by the German Government. Moreover, he has long been Minister of Propaganda, and as such has been often entrusted with the responsibilities of official spokesmanship on national policy. The occasion of his utterance gave it additional force. To an assemblage of 100,000 at the Olympic Stadium near Berlin he had announced that legal means would shortly be taken to suppress all shops kept by Jews in Germany. Then came a shouted query by one of his audience, "What about the Sudeten Germans?" Pondering a moment, Dr. Goebbels gave a clear reply. "They should be left in peace," he said, evidently meaning that their rights in Czechoslovakia were under threat, "and I.tell you we shall not look on much longer while 3,500,000 Germans are maltreatfed. The nations should know by now that they cannot separate one ra<?e into two countries. We saw the result of that in Austria, and we will soon see it again elsewhere." No doubt he had an immediate purpose in speaking so plainly at a time when negotiations between Dr. Hodza, head of the Czechoslovak Government, and Herr Henlein, leader of the Sudeten German Party, were proceeding quietly. This purpose could have been no other than dn incitement of Herr Henlein to intensify his demands, even to the point of making them finally unacceptable to Dr. Hodza. At the same time, the words were probably intended to convey to foreign Powers, especially Britain, France and Russia, a declaration of Germany's defiance of their pledged resolve to come to Czechoslovakia's aid in the event of foreign aggression.

' These words of Germany's spokesman do not necessarily amount to an announcement that Czechoslovakia is to be immediately seized as was Austria, nor even that its western border region, where the Sudeten Germans are most numerously located, is at once to be overrun by Nazi troops. As words, they are sinister enough, without being taken at their full face value. Herr Henlein is given an opportunity to quote them as a frank promise of German support for complete Sudeten German autonomy ; he may be tempted to return to this demand in a new ultimatum, which would suit the Nazi book. In any case, the negotiations may be hampered anew. With reference to possible allies in Czechoslovakia's defence, Dr. Goebbels is fully aware that France and Russia are definitely bound to intervene on her behalf. Only a few weeks ago France plainly warned Germany of the certainty of this militant action should provocation occur. As to Britain's course, Mr. Chamberlain's re-statement of British foreign policy is still unqualified: he announced, with obvious and accepted reference to Czechoslovakia, that Britain would be prepared to fight, if necessary, to honour her treaty obligations, and that she might be involved if an upheaval occurred in Central Europe. In theory, then, there remain in the situation all the possibilities of a European war, and seemingly it may be precipitated by a breakdown of the Hodza-Henlein negotiations, if the Sudeten German Party feel encouraged by Dr. Goebbels' words to risk all on a desperate throw. Those words are, in themselves, inflammatory. They coincide with what was generally said at the time of the Austrian coup, "Czechoslovakia will be the next," and logically the expectation was well based. But, in practice, the predicted sequence is not necessarily imminent.

It may be too sanguine to confide in certain promises of Herr Hitler, yet he has repeatedly declared that force would not be used to achieve his ends in Czechoslovakia. What those ends precisely are he has refrained from stating: he may mean either to insist on independence for the Sudeten Germans as a minority resident in Czechoslovakia, or to take them, with the acres they occupy, and incorporate them in the Reich. Dr. Goebbels is more explicit: one race in two countries is not to be tolerated, a pronouncement that squares with absolute Nazi doctrine. Neither he nor his chief, it is relevant to say, has ever been over-scrupulous in making conduct march with promises. Not long before Austria was annexed, Herr Hitler gave an unqualified pledge, in common with the heads of other Governments, to respect Austria's independence. So words about Nazi intentions are worth little. However, a belief that Dr. Goebbels' words are to be discounted, in spite of their precision, is based on practical considerations. Austria was easily mastered, without bloodshed; Czechoslovakia will vigorously and courageously resist. Germany had no fear that any other Power would make the seizure of Austria an occasion of war, but she must have much doubt whether two and possibly three great Powers will not spring to the assistance of Czechoslovakia should her territory be invaded. It is significant that, at an earlier and much more opportune moment, when two Sudeten Germans were shot dead by Czech police, Herr Hitler was content to use verbal ammunition. So Dr. Goebbels' words, bellicose as they are, can be regarded with comparative calm..