THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, MAY 23, 1938 THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 23044, 23 May 1938, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, MAY 23, 1938 THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS

In the conspicuous facts of the Czechoslovak situation, as these are known to-day, is cause for deepened anxiety. Even the developments dimly seen cannot be reasonably interpreted as offering any better promise of peace than was forthcoming a week ago; they are too easily capable of sinister meaning to be viewed with equanimity. The total effect of all the news is therefore disturbing, whether the point of origin bo Prague, Berlin, Paris or London. Within Czechoslovakia tension is daily increasing. Hope of amicable negotiations between the Government and the Sudeten German Party led by Herr Henlein is lessened. Instead of being a basis of such negotiations, as the Government frankly intended, its proposed minorities statute has become a ground of further quarrel. It was the one and only possibility of finding a fully peaceful solution of the national problem: had all its implications been patiently examined by both sides, a way would probably have been found to reconciliation of the two competing purposes —the Government's desire for territorial security at a critical time and Herr Henlein's eagerness for Sudeten German progress in attaining a larger enjoyment of political rights. Theoretically, these aims need not be divergent. A satisfied German minority would have voluntarily contributed a welcome element of defensive strength, providing this satisfaction was not bought too dearly—at the cost of complete self - determination, which would assuredly have brought a risk of non-compliance with the Government's scheme of frontier defence.

The problem is an intensely practical one, and no easy solution is possible along the line of an extended liberty productive of loyalty. Had Herr Henlein's demand been less extreme, and had the Government's need for a comprehensive, centrally-controlled scheme of defence been less acute, that line could have been safely and profitably taken. The crux of the difficulty is this : to grant virtual self-determina-tion to a minority so clearly bent on a project hostile to unity would, at the present time, have been indistinguishable from handing the fate of Czechoslovakia to the Sudeten Germans. This point is inescapable when the disposition of the country's defences is considered: it happens that, while these Sudeten Germans are numerically a minority, the parts of Czechoslovakia they chiefly occupy are those frontier regions, particularly on the west, where the greatest danger of foreign attack exists. Thus enters the most disquieting element in the situation. It comes from the contiguity of these regions, in great part, to Germany. After Germany's sudden seizure of Austria, the Czechoslovak Government would be worse than foolish to under-estimate the danger of a similar coup. This danger is now real. Dr. Benes has reason all too good for saying that there has been, for Czechoslovakia, no more critical time since the Great War; to that can be added the opinion that this situation in Central Europe creates a crisis for international peace. How much truth there is in the reported movement of troops in both Czechoslovakia and Germany cannot to-day be positively said. But, remembering what lately happened in Austria, the Czechoslovak Government is fully justified in taking precautionary military measures, and in looking for support from other Powers should a similar coup be attempted.

What support can be expected? This depends on direct undertakings by other Powers and on the view they may feel compelled to take, irrespective of such pacts, should Germany decide on militant action on behalf of Herr Henlein's demands. France is specifically pledged, by a treaty concluded in 1925, to give help to Czechoslovakia in the event of aggression by Germany. This treaty bound all three to maintain general peace, and pledged France and Czechoslovakia, reciprocally, to act immediately should Germany have unprovoked recourse to arms with reference to either of them. Herr Hitler has been at no pains to hide his sympathy with the Sudeten German Party's complaints against the Czechoslovak Government, and left no room to doubt that, as soon as an ostensible cause for intervention arises, he will express that sympathy in practical fashion. It is significant that the Berlin newspapers are making capital out of the shooting of two Sudeten Germans when endeavouring to evade Czech police. This episode may have an explanation putting it outside the purview of the German Government, but such episodes have been made the excuse for foreign interference before this, with no care for rights or wrongs. It is fatally easy to make them appear acts of deliberate affront, even to third parties, and the Nazi political philosophy can be so employed without much straining. This episode certainly adds a fresh cause of anxiety, for it strengthens the likelihood of Germany's taking a hand and thereby involving France in the quarrel. Russia may thereupon feel compelled to stand with France. Will Britain be indifferent, should the trouble thus spread? Mr. Chamberlain has made clear the certainty of British concern if upheaval occurs in Central Europe. He has been counselling an amicable settlement of the dispute between the Sudeten German Party and the Czechoslovak Government, no doubt fearing a fatal enlargement of the field of quarrel. A hope has been ventured of Anglo-Italian influence to check this danger. One thing alone, at the moment, is disquietingly sure: a severe test of the sincerity of peace pacts is imminent.